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Reference of Juvenile Offenders for Adult
Prosecution: The Legislative Alternative
to Asking Unanswerable Questions
Barry C. Feld*
I. INTRODUCTION
The adult criminal justice system presumes responsible actors
who make blameworthy choices and punishes those actors in proportion to culpability and the gravity of the offense.' By contrast, the
juvenile justice system is committed to a "rehabilitative ideal" and
individualized treatment of the offender. 2 At least in theory, the best
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
I am indebted to my colleagues Richard Frase, Robert Levy, and David Ward for
helpful comments and suggestions in preparing this article. I received exceptional
research assistance from Jack S. Levey (University of Minnesota Law School, Class of
1978) and Debra Polinsky (University of Minnesota Law School, Class of 1979). This
research was made possible by a generous grant from Mrs. Elsie L. Fesler, who funded
the John K. Fesler Memorial Fellowship in memory of her late husband.
1. See generally H.L.A. HART, PuNIsHMENT AND RESPONSIBMrry (1968); N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974); H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
SANCTION (1968); Hart, The Aims of the CriminalLaw, 23 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 401
(1958).
The criminal law jurisprudence reflected in the works of Hart, Morris, and Packer,
upon which this Article draws heavily, accepts culpability as a limiting factor on the
imposition of penalties and utility as a justification for the deliberate infliction of
punishment on blameworthy criminal actors. See N. MORRIS, supra at 58-84; H.
PACKER, supra at 62-70. Rehabilitation is rejected as a justification for penal intervention because social change cannot be achieved consistently enough to warrant granting
administrators the extensive discretion associated with therapeutic justice and because danger for abuse of discretion exists where administrators are permitted to deal
with offenders differently on the basis of assumed, but empirically undemonstrated,
differences. See generally N. MORRIS, supra at 14-20; notes 50-62 infra and accompanying text. The rejection of rehabilitation as a purpose for intervention does not, of
course, preclude efforts at voluntary offender change. Incapacitation is also rejected
as a justification for penal intervention because predictions of future conduct are
unreliable and may lead to overincarceration. See notes 79-87 infra and accompanying
text.
2. See, e.g., Paulsen, Kent v. UnitedStates: The ConstitutionalContext of Juvenile Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 167, 169:
[Tihe reformers generally rejected deterrence and retribution as adequate
notions to justify criminal sanctions. A criminal law based on such principles
had failed to suppress crime and was cruel to individuals because of its
failure to individualize treatment. Certainly such a harsh, poorly conceived
system should no longer be applied to children. . . . The rules of criminal
responsibility, based on what seemed to be an outmoded conception of "free
will," were thought unsuited to the progress appropriate to the new century,
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interests of the child are paramount, and the offense is accorded little
significance since it provides scant insight into the social or psychological needs of the individual offender. At a minimum, the existence
of a distinct system for dealing with juvenile offenders3 reflects a
societal consensus that youthful law violators should be treated differently from adult offenders because juveniles are both less responsible for their delicts and more responsive to nonpunitive intervention.'
At the gateway between the more deterministic and rehabilitative predicates of the juvenile justice process and the free will and
punishment assumptions of the adult criminal justice system is a
mechanism for transferring juvenile offenders for adult prosecution.5
and certainly could have no proper application to children ....
Children were considered educable and reformable.
See generally F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JusrIcE 25-41 (1964).
3. There have been conflicting interpretations as to the development of the juvenile justice system. See, e.g., A. PLArr, THE CHILDSAVERS (1969); Fox, Juvenile Justice
Reform: An HistoricalPerspective, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1187 (1970).
4. For discussions of various aspects of juvenile jurisprudence and the doctrine
of parenspatriae, see Allen, The Juvenile Court and the Limits of Juvenile Justice,
11 WAYNE L. REv. 676 (1965); Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System:
Problems of Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 7, 9-10; Mack, The Juvenile Court,
23 HARv. L. REv. 104 (1909); Note, Rights and Rehabilitationin the Juvenile Courts,
67 COLUM. L. REv. 281 (1967).
The doctrine of parens patriae has been invoked to justify the "civil" nature of
the juvenile court, its less formal procedures, and the role of state intervention as
benevolent and therapeutic rather than punitive. As the Supreme Court said in Kent
v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554-55 (1966),
[t]he Juvenile Court is theoretically engaged in determining the needs of
the child and of society rather than adjudicating criminal conduct. The
objectives are to provide measures of guidance and rehabilitation for the
child and protection for society, not to fix criminal responsibility, guilt and
punishment. The State is parenspatriae rather than prosecuting attorney
and judge.
5. The mechanism for removing juvenile offenders from the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court for prosecution as adult offenders is known by a variety of terms, including reference or certification for adult prosecution, waiver, decline, or transfer of juvenile court jurisdiction. The essence of the procedure is movement from a juvenile to
an adult forum. Regardless of the local terminology, the mechanism renders a chronological juvenile vulnerable to criminal prosecution as an adult.
Virtually every jurisdiction provides some mechanism to prosecute juveniles in
adult criminal proceedings. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1976); Aniz. CONST. art. 6, § 15; ALA.
CODE tit. 12, § 15-34 (1977); ALAsKA STAT. § 47.10.060 (1975 & Supp. 1977); ARK. STAT.
ANN. §§ 45-417, -420 (1977); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 707-707.4 (West Supp. 1978);
CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 19-1-104, -3-108 (1973 & Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 51-307 to -308 (West Special Pamphlet 1978) (effective July 1, 1978); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, §§ 938-939 (1975 & Supp. 1977); D.C. CODE § 16-2307 (1973); FLA. STAT.
§ 39.02(5), .09(2) (1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2501 (1976); HAw. REv. STAT. § 57122 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 16-1806 (Supp. 1977); Act of Sept. 20, 1977, § 1, ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 37, § 702-7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-5-7-14 (Burns
Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE §§ 232.72-.73 (1977); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-808 (Supp. 1977);
Ky. REv. STAT. § 208.170 (1977); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:1571.1 (West Supp. 1978);
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Although the juvenile court attempts to rehabilitate all the young
offenders appearing before it, a small but significant proportion of
miscreant youths resist its benevolent efforts. These are typically
older delinquents, nearing the maximum age for juvenile court jurisdiction.' They are frequently recidivists who have not responded to
prior intervention and for whom successful treatment during their
minority may not be feasible.' Despite their chronological minority,
these delinquents are perceived as being as mature and sophisticated
in the conduct of criminal activity as adult offenders.' Moreover, they
§ 2611(3) (West Supp. 1975); MD. CTS. & JUD. PRoc. CODE
ANN. § 3-817 (Supp. 1977); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 119, § 61 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1977);
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 712A.4 (West Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT. § 260.125 (1976);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-31 (1972); Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.071 (1969); MoNT. REv. CODES
ANN. § 10-1229 (Cum. Supp. 1977); NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-202.01 (Cum. Supp. 1976);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.080 (1977); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 169:21 (1964); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:4-48 (West Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-14-27 to -27.1 (1976); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7A-280 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34 (1974 & Supp. 1977); Omo
REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.26 (Page 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1112 (West Supp.
1977); OR. REv. STAT. § 419.533 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-325 (Purdon Supp.
1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-7 (Supp. 1977); S.C. CODE § 14-21-10(C) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-11-4 (Supp. 1977); TENN. CODE Am. § 37-234
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,

(1977); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 54.02 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-3a-25 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 635 (Supp. 1977); VA. CODE §§ 16.1269 to -270 (Supp. 1977); WASH. REv. CODE § 13.04.120 (1974); W. VA. CODE § 49-5-10
(Supp. 1977); Wis. STAT. § 48.18 (1975); Wyo. STAT. § 14-115.38 (Supp. 1975); ARiz.
R.P. Juv. CI. 14(b).

New York has no provision for juvenile transfer. However, it sets a relatively low
maximum age, sixteen, for juvenile court jurisdiction and has youthful offender sentencing provisions for sixteen- to eighteen-year-old offenders sentenced by the adult
court. See N.Y. Cam. PRoc. LAW § 720.10(1) (McKinney 1971); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§§ 712-713 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1977).
6. See, e.g., Schornhorst, The Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction:Kent
Revisited, 43 IND. L.J. 583, 592 (1968); Note, Problem of Age and Jurisdictionin the
Juvenile Court, 19 VAND. L. REv. 833, 858 (1966); notes 189-90 infra and accompanying
text.
7. See Keiter, Criminalor Delinquent? A Study of Juvenile Cases Transferred
to the Juvenile Court, 19 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 528 (1973); Schornhorst, supranote 6,
at 595. Interestingly, in some jurisdictions, treatment of a youth may actually require

adult prosecution as a condition precedent. Under the California Youth Authority
provisions, for example, a minor adjudicated as a juvenile must be discharged by age
21 or, in some circumstances, age 23, even though he might respond favorably to
additional intervention. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1769 (West Supp. 1978). On
the other hand, if the same minor is waived and tried as an adult, he may be committed to the Youth Authority until age 25, thereby assuring an additional two to four
years of treatment. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1771 (West 1972); Note, Juveniles

in the Criminal Courts: A Substantive View of the Fitness Decision, 23 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 988, 1007-08 (1976).
8. See Sargent & Gordon, Waiver of Jurisdiction:An Evaluation of the Process
in the Juvenile Court, 9 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 121, 122-23 (1963); Stamm, Transfer of
Jurisdictionin Juvenile Court: An Analysis of the Proceeding,Its Role in the Adminis-
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may account for a disproportionate amount of the total volume of
juvenile crime
Because of their criminal sophistication and the seriousness of
their offenses, the continued presence of these troublesome youths
within the juvenile justice system conflicts with the presumed immaturity and lesser culpability of juvenile offenders that justify that
system. When a youth, by his behavior, experience, or sophistication,
evinces criminal maturity and culpability, the justification for rehabilitative juvenile intervention is obviated, and the legitimacy of a
retributive sanction is revived. Moreover, it is argued, in light of their
persistent delinquencies, further efforts to rehabilitate these hardcore offenders could entail a misallocation of scarce treatment resources vis-&-vis other, more tractable juvenile offenders. It is also
suggested that retaining these individuals within the juvenile justice
system might have a negative influence on the less criminally sophisticated youths with whom they are housed."
Finally, there is the political reality that highly visible, serious
offenses evoke community outrage or fear that only the punitive sanction of an adult conviction can mollify." The availability of a mechanism for prosecuting the hard-core youthful offender as an adult is
ihus an important safety valve, permitting the expiatory sacrifice of
some youths to quiet political and community clamor and to preserve
a more benign system for those remaining."2 In the absence of transfer
tration of Justice, and a Proposalfor the Reform of Kentucky Law, 62 Ky. L.J. 122
(1973).
9. See, e.g., HENNEPIN COUNTY OFFICE OF PLANNING AND DEVmoPMENT & CoMMuNrrY HEALTH AND WELFARE COUNCI., THE VIOLENT AND HARDCORE JUvENILE OFFENDER
IN HENNEPIN COUNTY 4-13 (rev. ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as HEN
COUNTY
STUDY]; M. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO, & T. SELLIN, DELINQUENCY IN A Brm COHORT 88

(1972) [hereinafter cited as WOLFGANG, FIGLIO, & SELIN] (reporting that eighteen
percent of the delinquents in the birth cohort studied accounted for over half of the
total delinquencies of that cohort). See also J. PETERSILiA, P. GREENWOOD, & M. LAviN,
CRIMINAL CAREERS

OF HABITUAL FELONS (1977); J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRmIE

(1975).
10. See Note, Youthful Offenders and Adult Courts: ProsecutorialDiscretion v.
Juvenile Rights, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1184 (1973).
11. See Sargent & Gordon, supra note 8, at 125-26; Stamm, supranote 8, at 155;
Comment, Representing the Juvenile Defendant in Waiver Proceedings,12 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 424, 437 (1968). One writer has observed,
Community fear and outrage in the wake of dramatic increases in violent crimes by juveniles as well as the influence of "law and order" political
leaders are undeniably factors which intrude upon the fitness decisions of the
juvenile courts. This is true whether a judge shares public sentiments or
simply seeks to divert pressure from the entire juvenile justice system by
sacrificing the most serious of delinquents through transfer to the criminal
courts.

Note, supra note 7, at 1008-09 (footnotes omitted).
12. The "safety valve" function of adult prosecution as a means of relieving the
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procedures, the pressures to lower the maximum age of juvenile court

jurisdiction could be almost irresistible. 3 While lowering the maximum age would reach most of these older, sophisticated juvenile
offenders, it would also sweep many youths who might be rehabilitated (or who perhaps are simply less culpable) into the adult criminal process.
Thus, the necessity for creating a transfer mechanism to deal
with the serious juvenile offender is obvious. Less obvious are who
should decide whether a juvenile offender is to be prosecuted as an
adult and on what basis that decision should be made. Resolution of
these questions is complicated by the fact that the decision to transfer the difficult juvenile offender to the adult justice system simultaneously raises virtually every other issue associated with juvenile
justice, including questions about the efficacy of treatment for these
or any offenders and questions about the exercise of broad discretion
in the transfer process with the attendant dangers of abuse or discrimination. Furthermore, transferring a juvenile for adult prosecution constitutes an admission of failure by the juvenile system,-an
admission that, for a system predicated on the "rehabilitative ideal,"
is difficult, indeed dangerous.14
The transfer problem has been as vexatious in Minnesota as in
other jurisdictions. In recent years, a number of adult reference cases
pressures imposed on the juvenile system by the "intractables" has been adverted to
by a number of commentators. See, e.g., Sargent & Gordon, supra note 8, at 126;
Stamm, supra note 8, at 147; Note, supra note 7, at 1008.
13. It is perhaps instructive that in New York, a jurisdiction without a transfer
provision, sixteen is the maximum age for juvenile court jurisdiction. See note 5 supra.
Most jurisdictions with transfer provisions extend juvenile court jurisdiction to age
eighteen.
14. See Note, supra note 7, at 992 ("The [transfer] determination constitutes
an institutionalized admission of the system's failure, with the minor often being made
to suffer the consequences of inadequate state provision for rehabilitative resources.")
(footnotes omitted).
Stamm describes the availability of transfer as a paradox, an internal contradiction within a system committed to rehabilitation but unable to realize that commitment:
Any transfer of jurisdiction strikes at the most basic philosophical elements
of the juvenile court system, for it is an admission that the system cannot
or does not want to try to rehabilitate one member of the class of individuals
for whom it was created. The very existence of juvenile court is predicated
upon recognition of the fact that a child is capable of rehabilitation no
matter what he may have done and that he has a rightto expect no less than
that society, through the special establishment of juvenile court, will seek
to identify and treat the root causes of the trouble in which he is involved
rather than seek retribution against him.
Statmm, supranote 8, at 145 (emphasis in original). The failure of rehabilitation efforts
may often result from the lack of intervention at a time when it might have been more
effective.
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have reached the Minnesota Supreme Court, 5 and in response to a
felt need to reexamine the theories on which juvenile law is based,
the court established the Juvenile Justice Study Commission. 6 Several bills have been introduced in the legislature,'7 and the Governor
has appointed a special advisory committee to the Department of
Corrections.'" Finally, public discussion and debate about the appro- .
priate response to youthful criminality has taken place outside government.' 9
This Article and the appended bill propose a marked departure
from present approaches to the transfer dilemma. The Article begins
by critically examining the present judicial waiver process. Drawing
on social science research and empirical evaluations of judicial waiver
administration in Minnesota and elsewhere, it contends that judicial
waiver statutes require juvenile courts to make individualized determinations as to a youth's amenability to treatment and the danger
to society posed by the youth's retention within the juvenile system
that, using current methods of clinical prediction, simply cannot be
made with an acceptable degree of accuracy. Moreover, because judicial waiver statutes typically give judges broad discretion in making
transfer decisions, such statutes invite abuse of discretion and discriminatory application, thus undermining the fairness of the judicial
process.
The Article next examines alternative methods of identifying
juvenile offenders who should appropriately be processed through the
adult criminal justice system. While it is not currently possible to
predict clinically a youth's amenability to treatment or dangerousness, actuarial methods based on present offense and past record can
be used to identify in rough terms those juveniles likely to recidivate
15. See, e.g., State v. Duncan, 250 N.W.2d 189 (Minn. 1977); In re I.Q.S., 244
N.W.2d 30 (Minn. 1976); J.E.C. v. State, 302 Minn. 387, 225 N.W.2d 245 (1975).
16. Address by Chief Justice Robert Sheran, Annual Meeting of the Minnesota
State Bar Association (June 25, 1976) (The State of the Judiciary-1976).
17. See, e.g., H.F. 1277, 70th Minn. Legis., 1977 Sess.; H.F. 388, 70th Minn.
Legis., 1977 Sess.
18. See Address by Governor Rudy Perpich, Rochester, Minnesota (Feb. 15,
1977): "At my request the Commissioner of Corrections has appointed a committee of
legislators, police and interested citizens to develop a concrete proposal to identify and
control these delinquents. Their recommendations will be the basis for more specific
legislative proposals in the near future." See generally GoVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON
CRIME PREVENTION AND CONTROL, ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS OF "VIOLENT" OR "HARD-

CORE" JUVENILE OFFENDERS (1977) [hereinafter cited as GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION
STUDY]. The Governor's Commission on Crime Prevention and Control was replaced
by the Crime Control Planning Board. See Act of May 25,1977, ch. 260, § 2, 1977 Minn.
Laws 570.
19. See, e.g., CENTER FOR NEW DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES, THE SEIuOUS JUVENILE
OFFENDER IN MINNESOTA (1977); CITIZENS LEAGUE, REPORT-SUPPRESSING BURGLARY
(1976); GrandJurorsBack New Planfor Juveniles, Minneapolis Tribune, Mar. 5, 1974,
§ A, at 1, col. 4.
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and, accordingly, to pose a threat to public safety. The Article contends that a legislatively created waiver mechanism that automatically excludes certain youths from the juvenile justice system on the
basis of present offense and past record will not only be more accurate
in identifying those who should be transferred, but, in eliminating
judicial discretion in the transfer decision, will minimize the dangers
of inequity and discrimination. The mechanism proposed is a matrix
that uses various combinations of present offense and past record to
make the waiver decision.
Finally, the Article explores, in a preliminary manner, some of
the advantageous changes in the administration of juvenile justice
that might be expected to flow from adoption of the proposed waiver
mechanism.
II. WAIVER MECHANISMS
There are two principal mechanisms for transferring juvenile offenders to the adult criminal justice process.2° The more common of
20. See Stamm, supra note 8, at 138; Whitebread & Batey, Transfer Between
Courts: Proposalsof the Juvenile Justice StandardsProject, 63 VA. L. REv. 221 (1977);
Note, supranote 4. A third mechanism for removing serious offenders from the juvenile
system is known as prosecutorial waiver. See Mlyniec, Juvenile Delinquent or Adult
Convict-Prosecutor'sChoice, 14 AM. Crai. L. Rnv. 29 (1976); Stamm, supra note 8,
at 138. Although legislative waiver, which mandates adult prosecution of juveniles
charged with certain offenses, is sometimes referred to as prosecutorial waiver, "pure"
prosecutorial waiver vests the prosecutor's office with discretion in making the transfer
decision. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 232.73 (1977); NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-202.01 (Cum.
Supp. 1976). See generally Comment, Due Process,Equal Protectionand Nebraska's
System Allowing the County Prosecutor to Determine Whether a Juvenile Will Be
Tried as an Adult, 7 CREIGHTON L. REV. 223 (1974). Variations on the prosecutorial
waiver mechanism exist in a number of states. For example, in Florida, the prosecutor's decision to seek a grand jury indictment rather than filing a juvenile court petition can result in a youth's prosecution as an adult. See Johnson v. State, 314 So. 2d
573 (Fla. 1975); FLA. STAT. § 39.02(5)(c) (1975).
Because the prosecutor's discretion is unreviewable and there is a general absence
of guidelines for making these jurisdictional determinations, prosecutorial waiver has
been criticized extensively. See, e.g., Mlyniec, supra; Note, supra note 10. Every
objection to judicial waiver that will be developed in this Article is equally applicable
to prosecutorial waiver decisions. But because this Article focuses on the differences
between the juvenile and adult systems, and their respective emphases on offenders
and offenses, and because those emphases are reflected in the differences between
judicial and legislative waiver, prosecutorial waiver will be analyzed only as an adjunct
to legislative waiver provisions.
Fortunately, prosecutorial waiver is the least common transfer mechanism, and
its use appears to be in disfavor. Federal delinquency proceedings, which formerly
relied on prosecutorial waiver, now employ judicial waiver to deal with serious juvenile
offenders. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5032 (1976) (originally enacted as Federal Juvenile
Delinquency Act, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 857 (1948)). Under the former provisions, acts
punishable by death or life imprisonment were excluded from juvenile court jurisdic-
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these-the judicial waiver-involves a hearing at which a juvenile
court judge transfers a juvenile on a discretionary basis, considering
primarily the youth's amenability to treatment and the public safety.
The second mechanism-legislative waiver-involves the legislatively imposed age and offense limitations on juvenile court jurisdiction. By excluding certain categories of offenses, the legislature automatically places youths charged with those offenses into the adult
2
criminal courts. 1

tion, and the Attorney General had discretion to transfer any.youth not otherwise
excluded. See Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 869
(1973). Under the revised statute, a judicial transfer hearing is mandated.
21. The procedural and substantive issues raised by prosecution of juvenile offenders as adults have been analyzed in the following articles: Advisory Council of
Judges, National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Transfer of Cases Between Juvenile and Criminal Courts:A Policy Statement, 8 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 3 (1962); Frey,
The CriminalResponsibility of the Juvenile Murderer, 1970 WASH. U.L.Q. 113; Hays
& Solway, The Role of PsychologicalEvaluationin Certification of Juvenilesfor Trial
as Adults, 9 Hous. L. REV. 709 (1972); Keiter, supra note 7; Mountford & Berenson,
Waiver of Jurisdiction:The Last Resort of the Juvenile Court, 18 U. KAN. L. Rxv. 55
(1969); Paulsen, supra note 2; Resteiner, Delinquent or Criminal: The Problems of
Transfers of Jurisdiction,24 Juv. JUST. 2 (1973); Sargent & Gordon, supra note 8;
Schornhorst, supranote 6; Speca & White, Variations and Trends in ProposedLegislation on Juvenile Courts, 40 U. Mo. KAN. CiTy L. REv. 129 (1972); Stamm, supra note
8; Vitiello, ConstitutionalSafeguards for Juvenile Transfer Procedure:The Ten Years
Since Kent v. United States, 26 DE PAUL L. REv. 23 (1976); Whitebread & Batey, supra
note 20; Note, Sending the Accused Juvenile to Adult Criminal Court:A Due Process
Analysis, 42 BROOKLYN L. Rxv. 309 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Due Process Analysis];
Note, supra note 4; Note, Juvenile Law: Decision to Refer Juvenile Offenders for
CriminalProsecutionsas Adults to Be Made on Basis of "State of the Art" of Juvenile
Corrections, 60 MINN. L. REv. 1097 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Juvenile Law]; Note,
Reference for Prosecutionin Juvenile Court Proceedings,54 MINN. L. REv. 389 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Reference for Prosecution];Note, Waiver of Juvenile Jurisdiction
and the Hard-CoreYouth, 51 N.D.L. REv. 655 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Waiver of
Jurisdiction]; Note, Certification of Minors to the Juvenile Court: An Empirical
Study, 8 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 404 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Certification of Minors];
Note, DoubleJeopardy and the Waiver of Jurisdictionin California'sJuvenile Courts,
24 STAN. L. Rav. 874 (1972); Note, supranote 7; Note, supranote 6; Note, Due Process
and Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 591 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Due Process and Waiver]; Note, ConstitutionalLaw--Juvenile
Waiver Statute-Delegationof Legislative Powers to Judiciary, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 259
[hereinafter cited as Juvenile Waiver Statute]; Comment, Trial of Juveniles as
Adults: Past, Present, and Future, 21 BAYLOR L. REv. 333 (1969); Comment, Juvenile
Delinquency-Transfer of Juvenile Cases to Adult Courts-Factorsto be Considered
under the Juvenile DelinquentsAct, 48 CAN. B. REv. 336 (1970); Comment, supra note
20; Comment, Juvenile Transfer in Illinois, 67 J. CriM. L. & CRMOLOGY 287 (1976);
Comment, Waiver of Jurisdictionin Juvenile Courts, 30 OHIO ST. L.J. 132 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Waiver in Ohio]; Comment, Separating the Criminal from the
Delinquent: Due Process in CertificationProcedure, 40 S.CAL.L.REv. 158 (1967);
Comment, Juvenile Court Waiver: The Questionable Validity of Existing Statutory
Standards, 16 ST. Loins U.L.J. 604 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Juvenile Court
Waiver]; Comment, Juvenile Court: Due Process, Double Jeopardy and the Florida
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The judicial and legislative mechanisms reflect different ways of
asking and answering the same questions: who are the serious, hardcore youthful offenders, on what basis are they identified, and how
shall the juvenile and adult systems respond to them? Each mechanism emphasizes different information in determining whether certain juvenile offenders should be handled as adults. Judicial waiver,
through its focus on the offender, reflects the rehabilitative values of
the juvenile court, while legislative exclusion, with its primary emphasis on the offense, reflects the values of the criminal law. Both
approaches suffer from the limitations of treatment technology, the
inexactitudes of the social sciences, and the inability to make rational
and just predictions about future conduct. The thesis of this Article,
however, is that a properly constructed legislative matrix, based on
combinations of present offense and prior record, will identify hardcore youths more accurately and objectively than does individualized
judicial inquiry. Moreover, because of the administrative advantages
of such a mechanism, a properly constructed legislative waiver is
clearly superior to clinical or judicial prediction.
A.

JUDimLL WAIV

Because of the significant philosophical differences between the
emphasis of the juvenile system on individualized treatment and the
emphasis of the adult system on punishment, waiver is the most
drastic disposition available to a juvenile court.2" Although juvenile
Waiver Procedures, 26 U. FLA. L. REv. 300 (1974); Comment, Criminal Offenders in
the Juvenile Court: More Brickbats and Another Proposal, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 1171
(1966); Comment, Waiver of Jurisdictionin Wisconsin Juvenile Courts, 1968 Wis. L.
REv. 551 [hereinafter cited as Waiver in Wisconsin]; 53 B.U.L. Ray. 212 (1973); 22
DRAKE L. REv. 213 (1972).
Virtually all of these commentators support judicial waiver. Judicial waiver has
also been universally endorsed by professional organizations and advisory councils.
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.10, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1957); INSTITTrrE
OF JUDICIL ADMINISTRKAION & AMRICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS
PRoJEcr, STANDARDS RELATING TO TRANSFER BETWEEN CouRTs (1977) [hereinafter cited
as TRANSFE BETWEEN CouRTS]; NATIONAL ADvisoRY COMMITrrr ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STANDARDS AND GOALS, JUVENuE JusTIC AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION 303-05 (1976);
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: JuvENI DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRINM 24-25 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as TASK FORCE REPORT].
22. Forty-six states and the federal courts outside of the District of Columbia
employ judicial waiver to make some or all transfer decisions. In"28 states and the
federal jurisdictions, judicial transfer is the only mechanism for adult prosecution. See
18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1976); ARiz. CONST. art. 6, § 15; ALA. CODE tit. 12, § 15-33 (1977);
ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.060 (Supp. 1977); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 707-707.1 (West
Supp. 1978); HAw. REV. STAT. § 571-22 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 16-1806 (Supp. 1977); Act
of Sept. 20, 1977, § 1, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 38-808 (Supp. 1977);.KY. REv. STAT. § 208.180 (1977); ME. REv. STAT.
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court jurisdiction over an adjudicated offender may continue for the
duration of his minority, this period is significantly shorter than the
sentence of twenty years to life imprisonment that may be imposed
if a juvenile is tried as an adult for a serious felony." Moreover,
juveniles, unlike adults, enjoy private proceedings, confidential records, and protection from the stigma of a criminal conviction.2
In Kent v. United States,2 the Supreme Court concluded that
the loss of these special protections through a waiver decision was a
"critically important" action that required a hearing, assistance of
counsel, access to social investigations and other records, and written2
findings and conclusions capable of review by a higher court.
"[There is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such
tremendous consequences without ceremony-without hearing, with'
out effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of reasons."
Although Kent was decided in the context of a District of Columbia
statute, its language, especially when read in conjunction with such
subsequent decisions as In re Gault,2s suggests an underlying constitutional basis for requiring that any judicial waiver decision be ac3
companied by procedural due process. 9 Recently, in Breed v.Jones, 1
ANN. tit. 15, § 2611(3) (West Supp. 1975); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 61 (Law. Coop. Supp. 1977); MICH. CoMp. LAWs ANN. § 712A.4 (West Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT.
§ 260.125 (1976); Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.071 (1969); MoNT.REV. CODEs ANN. § 10-1229
(Cum. Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-48 (West Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13-14-27 to -27.1 (1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34 (1974 & Supp. 1977); OHIo
REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.26 (Page 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1112 (West Supp.
1977); OR. RE. STAT. § 419.533 (1977); S.C. CODE § 14-21-510(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-11-4 (Supp. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-234 (1977);
TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 54.02 (Vernon 1975 &Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7832-25 (1977); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 13.04.120 (1962); Wis. STAT. § 48.18 (1975); Amz.
R.P. Juv. CT. 14(b).
23. See, e.g., Anderson v. Commonwealth, 465 S.W.2d 70 (Ky. 1971) (life imprisonment for sixteen year old); Tucker v. State, 482 P.2d 939 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971)
(twenty years for fourteen year old).
24. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556-57 (1966); Schornhorst, supra
note 6, at 586; Stamm, supra note 8, at 143; Note, supra note 7, at 995.
25. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
26. See id. at 554-57. See generally Paulsen, supra note 2.
27. 383 U.S. at 554.
28. 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (extending due process procedural safeguards to the adjudicatory hearing of delinquency proceedings).
29. Schornhorst concludes that Kent was a decision of constitutional dimension
rather than simply a construction of a District of Columbia statute. See Schornhorst,
supra note 6, at 585-88; accord, In re Harris, 67 Cal. 2d 876, 878-79, 434 P.2d 615, 617,
64 Cal. Rptr. 319, 321 (1967) (Traynor, C.J.).
In the aftermath of Kent, many states revised their waiver procedures. See, e.g.,
MoNT.REv. CODES ANN. § 10-1229(2) (Cum. Supp, 1977); TEX. FAm CODE ANN.tit. 3,
§ 54.02(f)(1)-(6) (Vernon 1975).
30. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
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the Supreme Court decided that jeopardy attaches to juvenile court
proceedings, thereby barring subsequent criminal reprosecution as an
adult, ' and established a requirement that a state determine whether
to transfer an offender before proceeding against him. 2
With the procedural issues essentially resolved,n the most significant remaining controversies concern the substantive bases of waiver
and the evidentiary showing required to support a waiver decision.
Ultimately, a waiving court must balance the admittedly deleterious
consequences to the child against an estimate of the probable success
of available treatment alternatives and the potential threat that the
child poses to society, but jurisdictions vary both as to the substantive considerations deemed appropriate to a waiver decision and as
to the specificity with which these considerations are described.
Although Kent was decided on procedural grounds, the Supreme
Court, in an appendix to its opinion, indicated some of the substantive criteria that a juvenile court might consider.34 These factors have
31.

See id. at 541.

32. See id. at 539-40.
33. One unresolved procedural issue concerns the requirement of a probable
cause determination prior to transfer. While many jurisdictions require such hearings
by statute, see, e.g., ME. Rxv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2611(3) (West Supp. 1975), where
they are not required, appellate courts have declined to find them constitutionally
mandated, see, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 537-38 (1975); Juvenile v. Commonwealth, 347 N.E.2d 677, 682 (Mass. 1976); State v. Duncan, 250 N.W.2d 189, 197
(Minn. 1977). These courts note, however, that if the present offense provides the
primary basis for certification, there must be some procedure for connecting the juvenile with it. The American Bar Association and the Institute of Judicial Administration recommend that such a procedure be required as a prerequisite to waiver. See
TRAsFER BETWEEN COURTS, supra note 21, at 35.

34. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566-67 app. (1966):
An offense falling within the statutory limitations ... will be waived if it
has prosecutive merit and if it is heinous or of an aggravated character,
or-even though less serious-if it represents a pattern of repeated offenses
which indicate that the juvenile may be beyond rehabilitation under Juvenile Court procedures, or if the public needs the protection afforded by such
action.
The determinative factors which will be considered by the Judge in
deciding whether the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction over such offenses will be
waived are the following:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether
the protection of the community requires waiver.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property,
greater weight being given to offenses against persons especially if personal
injury resulted.
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether there is evidence upon which a Grand Jury may be expected to return an indictment
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been adopted by a number of jurisdictions, through either legislation or judicial gloss." In addition, surveys of waiver decisionmaking
disclose that a number of seemingly relevant, albeit contradictory,
factors are considered.37 Despite the wealth of criteria, however, the
waiver decision appears to be a function of three principal factors: (1)
age; (2) the dangerousness of a youth, gauged in terms of (a) seriousness of the present offense and (b) seriousness and persistence of
criminal activity as reflected in the prior record; and (3) the youth's
treatment prognosis.
With respect to age, a number of judicial waiver statutes provide
for a minimum age as a precondition of adult prosecution., The other
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one
court when the juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are adults ....
6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by
consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and
pattern of living.
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous
contacts with the Youth Aid Divisioh, other law enforcement agencies, juvenile courts and other jurisdictions, prior periods of probation to this Court,
or prior commitments to juvenile institutions.
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found to have
committed the alleged offense) by the use of procedures, services and facilities currently available to the Juvenile Court.
35. See, e.g., TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 54.02(f)(1)-(6) (Vernon 1975).
36. See, e.g., Summers v. State, 248 Ind. 551, 561, 230 N.E.2d 320,325-26 (1967);
State v. Smagula, 377 A.2d 608, 610-11 (N.H. 1977); cases cited note 104 infra.
37. See, e.g., Advisory Council of Judges, supra note 21, at 5; Children's Bureau,
U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, Survey of Juvenile Courts and Probation Services, 1966, in TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 78 app. B, table 5; Note,
supra note 4, at 314-16. See generally Schornhorst, supra note 6 at 603; Note, supra
note 7, at 1012; Juvenile Court Waiver, supra note 21, at 609-13; Comment, supra note
11, at 426; Waiver in Wisconsin, supra note 21.
38. Several states permit waiver at any age. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 47.10.060
(1975 & Supp. 1977); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-807 (Supp. 1977). A
majority of states, however, have established a minimum age requirement. See, e.g.,
Act of Sept. 20, 1977, § 1, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-7(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978)
(thirteen years old); IOWA CODE § 232.72 (1977) (at least fourteen at time of conduct
charged); KAN. STAT. ANN. §'38-808 (Supp. 1977) (sixteen at time of conduct); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 13.1570(A)(5) (West Supp. 1978) (fifteen at time of charge); MINN. STAT.
§ 609.055 (1976) (at least fourteen at time of conduct); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-280 (1969)
(fourteen at time of charge); Wis. STAT. § 48.18 (1975) (sixteen when charged). Several
states have different minimum age requirements for nonserious and serious offenses,
with a lower minimum age requirement for more serious offenses. See, e.g., GA. CODE
§ 24A-2501(a)(4) (1976); Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.071 (1969). Other states set a minimum
age requirement for less serious offenses, but set no age requirements for very serious
offenses. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 208.170.(1) (1977); NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-202(3)
(Cum. Supp. 1976). Only one state has set a higher minimum age requirement for
serious offenses than for less serious offenses. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-5-7-14 (Burns
Supp. 1977).
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two factors are set forth in waiver provisions with varying degrees of
specificity. Some jurisdictions, such as Minnesota, provide only minimal direction to the judiciary, broadly authorizing waiver if a youth
is found "not suitable to treatment" or his retention within the juvenile system poses a threat to the "public safety.""0 Other jurisdictions
provide greater guidance, directing the judiciary to assess the offender's amenability to treatment within the time remaining for juvenile court jurisdiction," the success of prior treatment efforts, 41 the
availability of treatment facilities within the juvenile justice system,"2 or the possibility of civil commitment as an alternative to
39. MINN. STAT. § 260.125(2)(d) (1976) provides that the juvenile court may refer
the child for adult prosecution only if it "finds that the child is not suitable to treatment or that the public safety is not served under the provisions of laws relating to
juvenile courts." See MINN.Juv. CT. R. 8-7(2)(a)-(d) (criteria relevant to determining
amenability or dangerousness include (1) the type of offense; (2) whether the offense
is part of a repetitive pattern; (3) the record of the child; and (4) the relative suitability
of programs and facilities available to the juvenile and criminal courts).
Typically, courts have elaborated on these conclusory standards by specifying
factors relevant to fitness assessments. For example, in California, factors that
"indicate a relatively poor prognosis for rehabilitation [include] the maturity of the
individual, numerous prior contacts with the courts, the seriousness of the offense
alleged or proved, the youth's attitude toward treatment, and his general behavior
pattern as revealed by the probation officer's report." People v. Smith, 5 Cal. 3d 313,
317-18, 486 P.2d 1213, 1216, 96 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (1971).
In Minnesota, the supreme court has enumerated some factors that might support
a judgment that retaining jurisdiction would not be consistent with public safety.
These factors include
(1) The seriousness of the offense in terms of community protection; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the offense; (3) whether the offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner; (4) whether
the offense was directed against persons or property; (5) the reasonably
foreseea econanquences of the act; and (6) the absence of adequate protective and security facilities available to the juvenile treatment system.
State v. Hogan, 297 Minn. 430, 438, 212 N.W.2d 664, 669-70 (1973).
40. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 47.10.060(d) (Supp. 1977) ("cannot be rehabilitated
by treatment under this chapter before he reaches 20 years of age"); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:4-48(c) (West Supp. 1977) ("no reasonable prospects for rehabilitation of the
juvenile prior to his attaining the age of majority by use of the procedures, services
and facilities available to the court").
41. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 12, § 15-34 (1977) ("[the nature of past tratment
efforts and the nature of the child's response to such efforts"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 938(c)(4) (Supp. 1977) ("whether the child has previously been subjected to any form
of correctional treatment by the Family Court"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-234(b)(2)
(1977) ("[the nature of past treatment efforts and the nature of the child's response
thereto").
42. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2501(a)(3)(ii) (1976) ("the child is not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation through available facilities"); KA. STAT. ANN. § 38808(b)(6) (Supp. 1977) ("whether the child would be amenable to the care, treatment
and training program for juveniles available through the facilities of the court"); TENN.
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waiver.43 Several jurisdictions also include a catch-all amenability
factor based on the child's demeanor, home environment, living patterns, or attitude." The "public safety," or dangerousness, criterion
is sometimes elaborated to require an examination of the circumstances or seriousness of the present offense, 5 the juvenile's prior record,"
or simply the "public interest."4 Even those legislatures and courts
CODE ANN. § 37-234(b)(5) (1977) ("[t]he possible rehabilitation of the child by use of
procedures, services and facilities currently available to the court in this state").
Several commentators have criticized this limitation, noting that it "could provide
a convenient subterfuge for those jurisdictions that choose to provide only the most
meager resources for treatment and rehabilitation." Stamm, supra note 8, at 158; see
Note, supra note 7, at 1004 (footnotes omitted):.
The most serious limitation on the juvenile court's treatment options is an
objective lack of resources. State and local governments have been unwilling
or unable to devote necessary legislative energies and funds to the task of
rehabilitating juvenile offenders. Particularly inadequate are the programs
designed to reach so-called "hard-core" delinquents who suffer from serious
emotional illnesses. Since amenability to treatment is, by the terms of the
fitness statute, dependent upon "available" programs, the juvenile courts
have generally been powerless to avoid transfers of juveniles who could be
helped were it not for the absence of appropriate rehabilitative programs.
43. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 12, § 15-34(c) (1977) ("When there are grounds to believe
that the child is committable to an institution or agency for the mentally retarded or
mentally ill, the court shall proceed as provided in section 12-15-70."); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 37-234(a)(4)(ii) (1977) ("[tlhe child is not committable to an institution for
the mentally retarded or mentally ill").
44. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 12, § 15-34(d)(4)-(5) (1977) ("[d]emeanor" and
"[tihe extent and nature of the child's physical and mental maturity"); FLA. STAT.
§ 39.09(2)(c)(6) (1975) ("[tlhe sophistication and maturity of the juvenile, as determined by consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude, and
pattern of living").
45. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 39.09(2)(C)(2)-(3) (1975) ("[w]hether the alleged
offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner" and
"[w]hether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater weight
being given to offenses against persons, especially if personal injury resulted"); Act of
Sept. 20, 1977, § 1, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-7(3)(a)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978)
("whether there is evidence that the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive
and premeditated manner"). Some jurisdictions provide for a consideration of these
factors by judicial construction. See cases cited notes 36 & 39 supra & note 104 infra.
46. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 20, 1977, § 1, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702(3)(a)(4)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978) ("previous history of the minor"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38808(b)(5) (Supp. 1977) ("record and previous history of the child"); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 37-234(b)(1)(1977) ("extent and nature of the child's prior delinquency records"). An
extensive record may be relevant as an indicator of both dangerousness and a need for
treatment.
47. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 12, § 15-34(d) (6) (1977) ("interests of the community
and of the child requiring that the child be placed under legal restraint or discipline");
Act of Sept. 20, 1977, § 1 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-7(3)(a)(6) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1978) ("whether the best interest of the minor and the security of the public may
require that the minor continue in custody . . . for a period extending beyond his
minority").
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that have indicated the factors to be considered in a waiver decision
with some degree of precision, have typically enumerated those factors disjunctively, without rank-ordering or assigning controlling
weight to any one.4" Thus, judges are given wide discretion in assigning weight to each of the various criteria.
1. Amenability to Treatment49
Assessing a youth's amenability to treatment raises two of the
most fundamental issues of juvenile jurisprudence: first, are there
any coercive intervention strategies that will systematically bring
about improved social adjustment in juvenile offenders, and second,
if such strategies exist, does a classification or diagnostic basis exist
for separating those youths who are amenable to treatment from
48. See note 92 infra. Some courts have held, however, that certain factors, taken
in isolation and without reference to a youth's treatment potential, are insufficient to
justify waiver. As the California Supreme Court ruled in Jimmy H. v. Superior Court,
3 Cal. 3d 709, 714, 478 P.2d 32, 35, 91 Cal. Rptr. 600, 603 (1970), "it is clear from the
statute that the court must go beyond the circumstances surrounding the offense itself
and the minor's possible denial of involvement in such offense." But see P.H. v. State,
504 P.2d 837 (Alaska 1972); Mikulovsky v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 699, 708, 196 N.W.2d 748,
753 (1972) (allowing waiver solely on the basis of the seriousness of offense). Minnesota's statute permits waiver if a youth is either not amenable to treatment or dangerous. Thus, either a treatable youth who is also dangerous or a nondangerous youth who
is untreatable may be waived. See In re I.Q.S., 244 N.W.2d 30 (Minn. 1976); J.E.C.
v. State, 302 Minn. 387, 225 N.W.2d 245 (1975).
49. Amenability to treatment is a common criterion for the transfer decision in
those jurisdictions providing for judicial waiver, see TRmSFER BErwEEN COuRrs, supra
note 21, at 37, and despite the discretion it generally affords judges, some commentators have argued that amenability is the only proper consideration, see, e.g., Stamm,
supra note 8, at 137 ("The only legitimate basis for distinguishing among children, for
the purpose of determining who will be extended the protections of the juvenile court
and who will be denied its regenerative good will, is whether they are amenable to
rehabilitation under the aegis of the court's philosophy and resources.") (footnote
omitted); accord, Mountford & Berenson, supra"note 21, at 65 (arguing that if a
cessation of the child's deviant behavior can be achieved by either imprisonment or
rehabilitation, the emphasis of the juvenile codes on the best interests of the child
demands the latter).
On the other hand, inquiry into a youth's amenability to treatment may require
courts to engage in essentially subjective and often speculative investigations that may
reveal information only tangentially related to the decision finally made. See, e.g.,
Vitiello, supra note 21, at 31 (observing that "[iut is questionable whether
'amenability to treatment' . . .is sufficiently self-defining to provide the juvenile
courts with adequate guidelines"). The "amenability" conclusion required is neither
clearly nor readily ascertainable: "The statutorily required conclusion of unsuitability
to treatment is at best a nebulous concept . . . . [B]ecause of its vagueness, [it] is
open to abuse as a convenient rationalization which may allow a court to refer when
it desires to do so for a variety of irrelevant or unarticulated reasons." Reference for
Prosecution,supra note 21, at 405.
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those who are not?
The question of "what works"-whether rehabilitation programs
can produce lasting change-is currently one of the most controversial issues in penology. Evaluations and reviews of penal programming tend to be skeptical about the availability of a change technology that can consistently and systematically rehabilitate adult or
serious juvenile offenders,"0 and one recent review concluded that,
"with few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have
been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism."5'
There are several possible explanations for this lack of success.
If free will and rational calculation are rejected as explanations for
crime and delinquency, as they typically are under a rehabilitative
premise, a deterministic "something" must be found that causes offenders to violate laws and upon which treatment can operate."
50. See, e.g., D. GLASER, THE EFFECTvENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSrEM
(1964); D. MANN, INTFRVENING wrrH CoNvICTE SERIOUS JUVENHE OFFENDERS (1976); D.
WARD, D. WILNER, & G. KASSEBAUM, PRISON TRETmFmr AND PAROLE SURVIVAL (1971);
L. WnmINs, EVALUATION OF PENAL MASURES (1969); Adams, Evaluative Research in
Corrections:Status and Prospects,38 FED. PROBAToN 14 (1974); Fishman, An Evaluation of CriminalRecidivism in ProjectsProviding Rehabilitationand DiversionServices in New York City, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMNOLOGY 283 (1977); Gold, A Time for
Skepticism, 20 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 20 (1974); Robison & Smith, The Effectiveness
of Correctional Programs, 17 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 67 (1971). It is this empirical
reality-the inability to deliver rehabilitative services-that, more than any other
factor, prompted the Supreme Court to impose minimum procedural safeguards. See
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). Justice
Fortas, writing for the majority in Kent, observed,
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose of juvenile
courts, studies and critiques in recent years raise serious questions as to
whether actual performance measures well enough against theoretical purpose to make tolerable the immunity of the process from the reach of constitutional kuarantees applicable to adults. There is nuch evidence that some
juvenile courts ... lack the personnel, facilities and techniques to perform
adequately as representatives of the state in a parens patriaecapacity, at
least with respect to children charged with law violation. There is evidence,
in fact, that there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the
worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults
nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children.
Id. at 555-56 (footnotes omitted).
51. Martinson, What Works?-Questions and Answers About PrisonReform, 35
PuB. ITEREST 22, 25 (1974); see D. LPTON, R. MARINSON, & J. WuNKs, TuE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT (1975).
52. Not all forms of treatment rely upon causal explanations as the basis for
intervention. Behavior modifications based on learning theory, for example, can ignore
the causes of behavior and treat the symptoms, reinforcing or extinguishing the actual
behavior. Most forms of rehabilitative treatment, however, are grounded in psychological or sociological processes and rely upon both the existence of causal forces as a
source of "differentness" and appropriate forms of intervention to modify or eliminate
those forces.
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[Therapy for correctional "clients" consists of explicit tactics or

procedures deliberately undertaken to change those conditions
thought to be responsible for the violator's misbehavior. Treatment
implies some rationale or causal argument to the effect that the
criminal behavior of the individual stems from some particular set
of factors or conditions. In turn, the steps which are taken to
"change" or rehabilitate the offender are designed to alter some or
all of the conditions specified in the treatment rationale
as causally
53
responsible for the person's undesirable behavior.
Unfortunately, social scientists have thus far been unable to identify
the causal factors that produce criminal behavior. The factors normally associated with "official delinquency"5 -poverty, low educational attainment, minority group membership-may in fact be correlates of the official response to the offender rather than causal
explanations of the behavior itself. When "hidden delinquency"55 is
examined, rather than officially processed delinquents, many of the
factors relied upon as causal explanations for delinquency appear to
lose their salience. For instance, although juvenile offenders appear
to come disproportionately from the lower social classes and minority
groups, middle and upper class youths may engage in hidden delinquencies with virtually the same frequency and degree of seriousness
as youths from the lower classes. The significance of this hidden
53. D. GmBONS, CHANGING THE LAWBREAKER 130 (1965).
54. It is important to distinguish between "hidden" and "official" delinquent
behavior. As Williams and Gold note,
[D]elinquent behavior is norm violating behavior of a juvenile which, if
detected by an appropriate authority, would expose the actor to legally prescribed sanctions. Official delinquency is the identification of and response
to delinquent behavior by the police and courts.
. . . Official delinquency is defined by official response to alleged delinquent behavior.
Williams & Gold, From Delinquent Behavior to Official Delinquency, 20 Soc. PROB.
209, 210 (1972).
55. "Hidden delinquency" is delinquent behavior that receives no official response, either because it is undetected or because, having been detected, it is ignored
by the police and other officials within the juvenile justice system.
56. The picture of juvenile crime that emerges from official records reflects in
large part the responses of agents of social control to the larger universe of offenders
from which official delinquents are culled. See, e.g., WoLGANG, FIGLO, "&SELUN, supra
note 9, at 16.
When self-reporting interviews or surveys are conducted in which respondents are
asked whether they have engaged in particular forms of illegal conduct, a different
picture of the distribution of delinquent activity emerges. This research suggests that
delinquent behavior is much more uniformly distributed throughout the community
than official statistics reveal. Black youths and white youths, and lower, middle, and
upper class youths engage in many comparable delinquencies, and differential exercises of discretion in official processing may account for the impression that lower class
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delinquency research is that if youths from different backgrounds,
social classes, and races are actually engaged in comparable types of
delinquencies, then the factors that characterize officialdelinquents,
such as poverty, educational deficiencies, or race, cannot cause these
delinquencies. 5 Accordingly, the underlying assumption of rehabilitation that official delinquents are somehow different from normal
people is subject to question."
and minority youths are more prone to criminal conduct. See, e.g., T. Huiscm, CAUSES
OF DEuNQUENCY 67 (1969); Clark & Wenninger, Socio-economic Class and Area as
Correlatesof Illegal Behavior Among Juveniles, 27 Am. Soc. REV. 826 (1962); Empey
& Erickson, Hidden Delinquency and Social Status, 44 Soc. FoRCES 546 (1966); Erickson & Empey, Court Records, Undetected Delinquency and Decision-making,54 J.
CrM. L.C. & P.S. 456 (1963); Gold, Undetected Delinquent Behavior, 3 J. RESEARCH
CRIME & DELNQUENCY 27 (1966); Murphy, Shirley, & Witmer, The Incidence of Hidden
Delinquency, 16 Am. J. ORTHoPSYcHIATRY 686 (1946); Nye, Short, & Olson, Socioeconomic Status and DelinquentBehavior, 63 Am. J. Soc. 381 (1958); Reiss & Rhodes,
The Distributionof Delinquency in the Social Class Structure, 26 Am. Soc. REv. 720
(1961); Short & Nye, Extent of UnrecordedJuvenile Delinquency, 49 J. CRIM. L.C. &
P.S. 296 (1958); Voss, Socio-economic Status and Reported Delinquent Behavior, 13
Soc. PROB. 314 (1966); Williams & Gold, supra note 54. A review of foreign research
may be found in Doleschal, Hidden Crime, 2 CRIME & DELINQUENCY LrrERATUxE 547,
557-66 (1970).
57. One of the foremost researchers in this area has noted with respect to the
relationship between social status and delinquent behavior,
Real as the relationship appears to be, it is slight, and official records have
exaggerated it. . . .These data suggest that the relationship between social
status and delinquency should be considered a clue-a scant one at that-to
the causes of delinquency, and that we need to probe beyond it if we wish to
identify the forces which account for much delinquency. They also suggest
that treatment and prevention programs aimed exclusively at lower-class
targets miss a lot of heavily delinquent youngsters.
M. GOLD, DELNQUENT BEHAVIOR IN AN AMERICAN Crry 76-77 (1970) (emphasis added).
It should be noted, however, that while hidden delinquency research appears to
support the conclusion that social or class differences in offenders reflect biases in
ifficial processing rather than social or psychological causes of involvement in criminal
behavior, recent "victimization" studies-involving interviews with victims of
crime-suggest that offender involvement in criminal activity by race may correspond
more closely to the official picture of crime than to the "hidden" picture of delinquency. See, e.g., Hindelang, Race andInvolvement in Common Law PersonalCrimes,
43 Am. Soc. REV. 93 (1978). These findings tend to support social structural theories
predicting differential racial involvement in crime rather than theories emphasizing
differential selection processes. See id. at 105.
58. Indeed, there is reason to suspect that to the extent differences exist between
serious offenders and nonoffenders, they are exacerbated by the labeling process associated with official processing as a delinquent. One study compared self-reported delinquencies of youths with no official records, one court appearance, probation status, and
institutionalized status. While this study found that boys who had been institutionalized had greater delinquencies than others in the sample, the authors questioned
"whether they were excessively delinquent prior to becoming labeled as delinquent or
whether the label was self-fulfilling in some way." Empey & Erickson, supra note 56,
at 550-51.
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In the alternative, if offenders really are different from other
people, one must still identify the causal forces producing such differences. 9 Typically, the explanations are social structural or social psychological. 0 Treatment, then, attempts to reverse the influence of
those forces. Such efforts-necessarijy-g-ume a degree of plasticity;
that people respond to environmental influences and change accordingly. But at the conclusion of penal intervention, offenders are returned to the same criminogenic environments that presumably
caused their delinquencies in the first instance. Thus, the assumption
of malleability that makes institutional treatment feasible also explains the prompt reversion to criminal involvement that may occur
upon release.
If rehabilitative programs are ineffective, whether because of
inadequate intervention technologies or inadequate resources,' then
Efforts to test this labeling thesis have lent some support to the inference that
official intervention may adversely change life chances and subsequent opportunities
and may actually reinforce the delinquency it was intended to prevent. For example,
Gold and Williams matched 35 pairs of youths on the basis of comparable hidden
delinquency records, one of each pair having been previously apprehended and the
other not. A significantly greater number of previously apprehended youngsters committed subsequent offenses than did their nonapprehended counterparts. See Gold &
Williams, National Study of the Aftermath of Apprehension, 3 PROSPECTUS 3 (1969).
See generally Mahoney, The Effect of Labeling upon Youths in the Juvenile Justice
System: A Review of the Evidence, 8 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 583 (1974).
59. Behavior that is delinquent and criminal is distinguishable from ordinary
behavior only by the fact that it violates norms external to the actor. Efforts to explain
the factors internal to the actor that cause criminal behavior, therefore, involve all of
the considerations involved in explaining behavior generally. See, e.g., E. SUTHERLAND
& D. CRESSEY, CRIMINOLOGY 71 (9th ed. 1974). Finding causal explanations is complicated by the numerous personal, psychological, historical, social structural, and situational antecedents to any act of delinquency. The process of crime causation is a
function of basic social structural variables amplified or suppressed by intervening
variables. These intervening variables, in turn, are precipitated by situational factors,
which are further amplified by delinquent career contingencies such as labeling and
contacts with agents of social control. See D. GIBBONS, SOCIETY, CRIME, & CRIMINAL
CAREERs 253 (2d ed. 1973); accord, M. CLImARD & R. QUINNEY, CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR
SvysMs 12 (1967); W. RECKLESS, THE CRImE PROBLEM 40 (5th ed. 1973). Because of the
multiplicity of factors involved, the complexity of human behavior and criminal behavior, and the fact that delinquencies occur when causal factors are not present and
do not necessarily occur when they are present, one can only conclude that "[the
attempts during the last 150 years to explain crime, to formulate theories of crime, to
discover causative factors, have largely been failures. The best that can be said is that
certain possible connections have been charted or inferred between criminal behavior
and the way a particular factor operates." Id.
60. See generally R. CLOWARD & L. OHLmN, DELINQUENCY AND OPPORTUITY (1960);
A. COHEN, DELINQUENT Boys (1955); R. MERTON, SocIAL THEORY AND SociAL STRucTURE
125 (1949); E. SUTHERLAND & D. CREsSEY, supra note 59, at 71-111; Miller, Lower Class
Cultureas a GeneratingMilieu of GangDelinquency, J. Soc. IssUES, 1958, No. 3, at 5.
61. In Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), the Court noted that inadequate resources were a critical shortcoming of the juvenile justice system. See id. at
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one must question the exercise of broad discretion in reliance on
expertise associated with therapeutic justice. The outcome of this
reassessment may ultimately be adoption of a system of dispositions
based on offense and "just deserts," what has become known in the
adult criminal process as the "justice" model."2 For the present, however, so long as transfer decisions continue to turn on a youth's amenability to treatment, the premise that at least some offenders are
treatable remains- a necessary presupposition of the waiver process.
Thus, for purposes of this analysis only, the rehabilitative premises
of the juvenile system will be taken as a given, and the issue framed
in terms of reconciling the assumptions of the present system with
rational decisionmaking in the waiver process.
Even assuming that coercive intervention may be effective for
some individuals, it is nevertheless clear that not all youths are treatable since some youths who have been subjected to treatment persist
in criminal conduct. Thus, the juvenile court is left with the problem
of determining the amenability to treatment of each individual
brought before it. Answering the judicial question of amenability
requires the existence of an offender typology that differentiates be555-56. The Court reiterated its concern with this problem in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 544 (1971). The lack of resources has been a chronic problem. See
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME INA FREE SocImY 279-91 (1967) [hereinafter cited as CRIME IN A

FREE SocTY]. The social reform implications of the parens patriae doctrine have
always exceeded the resources available to implement them. See generally E. SCHUR,
RADICAL NON-INTERVENTION

(1973).

62. In the adult criminal process, the failures and abuses of coercive rehabilitation as a justification for intervention have prompted a call for intervention based on
"just deserts." See, e.g., AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITrEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE
(1971); D. FOGEL, WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF (1975); N. MoRms, supra note 1;
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976); A. VON
HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE (1976). See also E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS (1975);
J. WILSON, supra note 9; Gardner, The Renaissanceof Retribution-An Examination
of Doing Justice, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 781.
The "justice" model rejects individualized treatment and rehabilitation as justifications for coercive intervention because of the discretionary power their use vests in
presumed experts, the inability of such experts to justify empirically differential treatment of similarly situated offenders, and the inequalities and injustices resulting from
individualized treatment. The justice model, with its retributive groundings, would
punish offenders according to their actions rather than according to who they are or
whom they may be predicted to become.
The inability of proponents of juvenile rehabilitation to demonstrate the effectiveness of parens patriae intervention raises the question whether the juvenile justice
system should not be subject to "justice" principles or even eliminated as a separate
judicial institution. Washington has recently adopted a revised juvenile justice statute
that incorporates substantial justice principles into the juvenile system, with determinate and proportional disposition graded on the basis of an offender's age, present
offense, and prior record. Juvenile Justice Act, ch. 291, §§ 55-79, 1977 Wash. Legis.
Serv. 892-904 (West).
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tween those offenders who will and those who will not respond to
intervention. While there are numerous offender typologies, differentiating offenders on the basis of such factors as offense patterns, rolecareers, social psychological variables, and societal reactions, they
are generally either theoretical or empirical classifications rather
than causal explanations."3 The lack of causal explanations precludes
the development of a diagnostic typology that would enable a court
to make clinical predictive judgments about treatment effectiveness.
Moreover, even if there were distinct categories of offenders,
some of whom could be rehabilitated, there is the further problem of
determining into which class any giren offender fits. This involves a
very subtle social investigation of the youth, his psychological characteristics, family background, social environment, school experiences,
prior delinquencies, responsiveness to prior treatment, availability of
treatment resources, and the like."4 The problem of classification is
compounded by a lack of reliable indicators or diagnostic measures
that can, with any degree of accuracy, differentiate between the amenable and nonamenable categories.
In short, judicial waiver statutes require juvenile court judges to
determine a youth's amenability to treatment even though there is
little evidence indicating that serious delinquents or criminals respond to coercive intervention, there are no distinct behavioral categories of those who are or are not responsive to intervention, and there
are no validated objective indicators that permit individual diagnostic classification of amenable and nonamenable serious offenders. 5
Aside from the problems inherent in identifying and providing
effective treatment for those youthful offenders considered amenable
to treatment, a waiver system predicated on the notion that those
youths not waived can be successfully treated is likely to generate
serious "right to treatment" issues. Incarcerating an individual without treatment is punishment; subjecting a person to punishment requires full criminal procedural safeguards. Thus, incarcerating a juvenile without the benefit of procedural safeguards is justified only
if the juvenile is receiving rehabilitative treatment."6 If a court denies
63. See, e.g., M. CLm.um & R. QumnNEY, supra note 59; D. GIBBONS, supra note
53; D. GIBBONS, supra note 59; Glaser, The Classificationof Offenses and Offenders,
in HANDBOOK OF CmMiNoLoGY 45-84 (D. Glaser ed. 1974).

64. See generally Stamm, supra note 8, at 161-62.
65. See, e.g., D. MANN, supra note 50, at iv ("Most practitioners and most analysts reject both the idea of a behaviorally distinct category of such [serious] offenders
(except of course with respect to the presenting offense) and of a distinct set of treatments premised on a category of seriousness.").
66. Cf. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (jury trial not required
for juvenile delinquency adjudication because premise of juvenile court is rehabilita-

tion). The right to treatment has been a topic of extensive commentary, especially in
the context of civil commitment of the mentally ill and mentally retarded. See Baze-
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waiver because it finds that a youth is amenable to treatment and
the youth subsequently exhausts available resources or is found actually to be no'namenable, theoretically the offender should be released. Continued incarceration without meaningful treatment would
constitute punishment that, if imposed without procedural safeguards, would violate the youth's right to due process. 7 Moreover, if
Ion, Implementing thd Right to Treatment, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 742 (1969); Birnbaum,
The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960); Hoffman &Dunn, Beyond Rouse and
Wyatt: An Administrative Law Model for Expanding and Implementing the Mental
Patient's Right to Treatment, 61 VA. L. REv. 297 (1975); Symposium-Observations
on the Right to Treatment, 10 DuQ. L. REV. 553 (1972); Symposium-The Right to
Treatment, 57 GEo. L.J. 673 (1969); Note, Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally 11, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1190, 1316-57 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Civil Commitment];. Note, Wyatt v. Stickney and the Right of Civilly Committed
Mental Patients to Adequate Treatment, 86 HAnv. L. REv. 1282 (1973); Note, The
Nascent Right to Treatment,53 VA. L. REv. 1134 (1967); Note, Civil Restraint, Mental
Illness, and the Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87 (1967). For commentary on the
right to treatment in juvenile correctional institutions, see sources cited note 67 infra.
Analytically, the legal issues are very similar in both contexts since both involve
involuntary coercive intervention under the parenspatriaepower for the benefit of the
individual and both employ less than full criminal procedural safeguards.
The right to treatment follows upon the state's invocation of its parens patriae
power to intervene for the benefit of the individual. In a variety of settings other than
juvenile corrections-institutions for the mentally ill and the mentally retarded, for
example-states incarcerate with fewer and less stringent procedural safeguards
than those associated with criminal incarceration for punishment. In all of these settings, it is the promise of benefit that justifies the lesser safeguards. Thus, failure to
deliver the promised treatment is a denial of due process. See generally Donaldson v.
O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated on othergrounds, 422 U.S. 563 (1975);
Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487
(D. Minn. i974); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, enforcement hearing ordered,
334 F. Supp. 1341 (1971), enforced, 344 F. Supp. 373, supplemental decision, 344 F.
Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part,remanded in part,decision reserved in part
sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
The constitutional rationale of these civil commitment cases has also been invoked
to secure treatment for juveniles incarcerated in state training schools. In Nelson v.
Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 358-60 (7th Cir. 1974), the court noted that while the Supreme
Court has not yet had occasion to find a constitutional right to treatment for incarcerated juveniles,
several recent state and federal cases, out of concern-based upon the parens
patriae doctrine underlying the juvenile justice system-that rehabilitative
treatment was not generally accorded in the juvenile reform process, have
decided that juvenile inmates have a constitutional right to that treatment
We hold that on the record before us the district court did not err in
deciding that the plaintiff juveniles have the right under the 14th Amendment due process clause to rehabilitative treatment.
Id. at 359-60 (citations omitted).
67. See, e.g., Pena v. New York State Div. for Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); Robinson v. Leahy, 401 F. Supp. 1027 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Long v. Powell, 388 F.
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the youth is released, the Supreme Court's holding in Breed v. Jones
would bar later prosecution as an adult for the same offense."8
The right to treatment issue must also be addressed in evaluating proposals to create a secure juvenile treatment facility for serious
offenders as an alternative to waiver for adult prosecution. 9 The proponents of this alternative insist that treatment in a secure juvenile
setting is the appropriate response to the serious juvenile offender.7"
Supp. 422 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974);
Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Tex. 1973); Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp.
451 (N.D. Ind. 1972), affl'd, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F.
Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp.
1354 (D.R.I. 1972); Baker v. Hamilton, 345 F. Supp. 345 (W.D. Ky. 1972); Lollis v.
New York State Dep't of Social Servs., 322 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); M. v. M.,
71 Misc. 2d 396, 336 N.Y.S.2d 304 (Fain. Ct. 1972). The right to treatment has been
invoked successfully in a number of suits against juvenile institutions, where rehabilitative services were not forthcoming and custodial warehousing or barbaric practices
were shown. See, e.g., In re Elmore, 382 F.2d 125 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Creek v. Stone, 379
F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967); J.E.C. v. State, 302 Minn. 387, 225 N.W.2d 245 (1975).
There has been extensive commentary on these cases. See, e.g., Renn, The Right
to Treatment and the Juvenile, 19 CRIME & DELINQUENcY 477 (1973); Silbert & Sussman, Right of Juveniles Confined in TrainingSchools, 20 CRIME & DELINQUENcY 373

(1974); Wald & Schwartz, Trying a Juvenile Right to Treatment Suit: Pointers and
Pitfalls for Plaintiffs, 12 AM. CRm. L. Rxv. 125 (1974); Note, Establishment of a
ConstitutionalRight to Treatment for Delinquent Children, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 366
(1974); Note, The Courts, The Constitution and Juvenile Institutional Reform, 52
B.U.L. REv. 33 (1972); Note, InstitutionalizedJuveniles Have a Right to Rehabilitative
Treatment, 4 CAP. U.L. REv. 85 (1974); Note, JudicialRecognition and Implementation of a Right to Treatmentfor InstitutionalizedJuveniles, 49 NoME DAME LAW. 1051
(1974); Note, A Right to Treatment for Juveniles?, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 157; Recent
Development, ConstitutionalRight to Treatment for Juveniles Adjudicated to Be
Delinquent-Nelson v. Heyne, 12 AM. CraM. L. Rav. 209 (1974); Recent Development,
Limits on Punishment and Entitlement to Rehabilitative Treatment of Institutionalized Juveniles: Nelson v. Heyne, 60 VA. L. Rv. 864 (1974).
68. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1975), discussed at notes 30-32
supra and accompanying text (where juvenile adjudicated a delinquent and subsequently found to be unfit for treatment as a juvenile, double jeopardy barred reprosecution as an adult).
69.

See, e.g., HENNEPIN CouNTY STUDY, supranote 9, at 55-56.

70. Proponents of secure juvenile settings argue that juvenile incarceration is
preferable to committing young offenders to adult institutions where they will be
schooled in crime. But youthful offenders tried as adults need not be intermingled in
facilities with more mature adult offenders. An intermediate youthful offender status
and separate dispositional facilities could provide the necessary degree of segregation,
with certified youths being allowed to receive rehabilitative services voluntarily as
adults rather than coercively as juveniles. See notes 229-31 infra and accompanying
text. This approach is already used in several jurisdictions. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 54-76b to -76m (West Supp. 1978); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 720.10(1) (McKinney Supp. 1977).
A second argument for separate juvenile confinement stems from the concern that
young offenders will be victimized in adult institutions. Stamm argues, for example,
that placing juveniles in adult facilities is inherently anti-rehabilitative:
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On the basis of all available evidence, however, successful treatment
does not appear to be a viable prospect for these offenders. Moreover,
there appears to be a fundamental organizational incompatibility
between pursuing treatment and security goals simultaneously, with
an inevitable subordination of rehabilitative concerns to custodial
considerations.7 ' Consequently, what proponents of secure juvenile
treatment are actually advocating is custodial incarceration without
the procedural safeguards that adults are afforded prior to receiving
the same disposition. A juvenile incarcerated in a secure facility reThis is certainly the case where children are concerned, because it is the
youngest who are always victimized in prison; the weakest who are hurt by
the strongest; and the most innocent who are defiled by the most depraved.
If they are not exploited, they will certainly become more aggressive out of
a need for self-protection ....
And since the best lesson traditionally taught
in prisons is how to be a better offender, the use of prisons for anything short
of the permanent removal of an individual from the ranks of society is seemingly a most ill-advised action.
Stamm, supra note 8, at 146 (footnotes omitted); see Sargent & Gordon, supra note
8, at 124-25; Waiver of Jurisdiction,supra note 21, at 665-67.
Interestingly, however, a study by the Minnesota Department of Corrections of
certified youths currently in the State Reformatory for Men challenges this conventional wisdom. This survey reports that, based upon interviews, "[t]here is no conclusive evidence that this population has been seriously victimized by homosexual rape."
In light of their extensive juvenile criminal histories, it is perhaps not surprising that
"[m]ost staff persons at the reformatory consider certified youths, as a group, to be
aggressors,not victims." MINN. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, A PROFILE OF CERTIFIED JUVENILES COMMITTED TO S.R.M. 1970-1975, at 23 (1976) [hereinafter cited as CORRECTIONS
PROFILE] (emphasis added).

If claims of victimization and exploitation are accurate, however, a separate program for certified juvenile offenders is responsive to this concern. Insistence on humane
adult facilities is another approach to the same problem. But proponents of juvenile
security ignore the extent to which identical victimization takes place in juvenile
facilities. Several studies have documented the prevalence of violence, aggression, and
homosexual rape in juvenile facilities. See, e.g., C. BARToLLAs, S. MILLER, & S. DINrz,
JUVENILE VICTmZATION (1976); B. FELD, NEUTRALIZING INMATE VIOLENCE (1977); H.
POLSKY, COTTAGE SIX (1962). One of the most significant findings of this research is
that inmate violence appears to be a function of the degree of security to which inmates
are subjected; the greater the imposition of authoritarian controls to facilitate security,
the greater the levels of covert inmate violence within the subculture. See B. FEW,
supra at 132-38, 163-69. See also D. STREET, R. VINTER, & C. PERROW, ORGANIZATION
FOR TREATmENT (1966). In a facility designed to handle a small population of serious,
persistent offenders, the necessarily limited mobility, program resources, and intensity
of interaction between the most difficult youths in the entire juvenile system could give
rise to a warehouse with all of the worst characteristics of adult penal incarceration.
See Rolde, Mack, Scherl, & Macht, The Maximum Security Institution as a Treatment Facility for Juveniles, in JUVENILE DEuNQUENCY 437 (J.Teele ed. 1970).
71. See generally D. STREET, R. VINTER, & C. PERRow, supra note 70; Cressey,
Contradictory.Directives in Complex Organizations:The Caseof.the Prison, 4 AD. Scl.
Q. 1 (1959); Cressey, Limitations on Organizationof Treatment in the ModernPrison,
in THEORETICAL STUDIES IN SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE PRISON 78, 93-101 (1960); Cressey, PrisonOrganizations,in HANDBOOK OF ORGANMTMONS 1023-70 (J. March ed. 1965).
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ceiving so-called treatment of dubious efficacy might challenge his
confinement as a denial of due process. Such a challenge would then
involve the courts in such uncertain tasks as evaluating the comparative effectiveness of alternative modes of treatment, defining minimally adequate standards of treatment, and assuring the delivery of
such treatment. Courts making substantive rulings in these areas
have frequently found themselves drawn into the ongoing administration of treatment programs, a role for which they are ill-equipped. 2
A related problem triggered by the right to treatment/
amenability to treatment interface arises if a court concludes that
a youth would respond to a particular form of treatment but that
treatment is not available. While several jurisdictions avoid this dilemma by tying the amenability decision to available resources,73
without such a limitation a court could find that a youth is amenable
to some treatment but certify him because the appropriate treatment
is unavailable. In J.E.C. v. State," the Minnesota Supreme Court
was presented with this issue. Rather than deciding whether a youth
who had been found amenable to some form of treatment had an
absolute right to treatment that would preclude certification, however, the court remanded the case for consideration of whether an
appropriate and effective method of treatment existed and, if so, why

it was not available. 5 Nevertheless, in its consideration of the issues,

the Minnesota Supreme Court skirted dangerously close to finding
that if a youth could feasibly be rehabilitated as a juvenile, then he
72. See, e.g., Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974); Wyatt v.
Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785, enforcement hearing ordered, 334 F. Supp. 1341
(1971), enforced, 344 F. Supp. 373, supplemental opinion, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala.
1972), aff'd in part, remanded in part, decision reserved in part sub nom. Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 385 (E.D.
Ark. 1970), affl'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). See generally M. HARIs & D. SPILLER,
AFTER DECISION: IMPLEMENTATION OF JUDICIAL DECREES IN CORRECTIONAL SETTINGS

(1977); Note, JudicialIntervention in Prison Discipline, 63 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 200
(1972).

73. See, e.g., Jimmy H. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 709, 714, 478 P.2d 32, 35,
91 Cal. Rptr. 600, 603 (1970) ("the dispositive question is the minor's amenability to
treatment through the facilities available to the juvenile court"); note 42 supra and
accompanying text.
74. 302 Minn. 387, 225 N.W.2d 245 (1975).
75. See id. at 400, 225 N.W.2d at 253. In making this determination, the lower
court was directed to consider the following factors:
(1) whether there is presently any program available for treatment for this
and other similar juveniles; (2) if no program is available, whether it is

feasible and possible to put together an effective program which could treat
this and other similar juveniles; (3) if so, why has the Department of Corrections failed to make such a program available?
Id. On remand, the juvenile court found that no adequate program existed and certified the juvenile for adult prosecution. See In re I.Q.S., 244 N.W.2d 30, 40 (Minn.
1976). See generallyJuvenile Law, supranote 21.
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could not be waived for prosecution as an adult."6 Such a holding,
that treatment must be initiated if feasible, would raise extraordinarily difficult issues involving the separation of judicial and legislative
powers in allocating scarce resources."
2. Dangerousness
Rather than finding that a youth is not amenable to treatment,
a juvenile court might transfer a youth for adult prosecution if it
concludes that his retention within the juvenile justice system would
be inimical to public safety. Virtually every jurisdiction using a judicial waiver mechanism provides this alternative as a basis for adult
certification. In the vast majority of cases, waiver is initially sought
because of serious or persistent misconduct by a juvenile, and youths
are much more likely to be waived because of their criminal activities
than because they are considered nonamenable to treatment.
Predictive judgments about an individual's present or potential
dangerousness are implicit or explicit in a variety of decisions made
in the criminal justice, juvenile justice, and mental health fields. 9
76. See 302 Minn. at 396-98, 225 N.W.2d at 251-52. The court questioned
whether reference was proper in a case "where the finding of lack of amenability to
treatment or danger to the public is based upon the correctional authority's failure to
provide favorable treatment facilities." Id. at 398, 225 N.W.2d at 252. The court faced
a choice between two unsatisfactory alternatives:
to retain jurisdiction over him as a juvenile, with the knowledge that no
matter what action is taken the offender will soon again be turned loose on
society to continue his depredations, or to refer him as an adult for prosecution and probably subject him to a lengthy sentence with doubtful rehabilitative sources available.
Id. at 395, 225 N.W.2d at 251.
77. See, e.g., Juvenile Law, supra note 21, at 1105-11.
Such a finding would also have raised an interesting issue of contributory fault.
Even assuming that a minor's treatment prognosis was at present unfavorable, could
the minor defend against waiver by arguing that at an earlier phase of his delinquent
career he could have responded, but that the juvenile justice system had neglected to
provide appropriate resources? In other words, did the prior actions or inactions of the
system contribute to the minor's present nonamenability? This kind of argument was
properly rejected in People v. Browning, 45 Cal. App. 3d 125, 138, 119 Cal. Rptr. 420,
429 (1975).
78. In its enumeration of reference criteria in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541 (1966), see note 34 supra, the Supreme Court focused almost exclusively on factors
bearing directly on the issue of dangerousness. For instance, the Court emphasized the
circumstances of the present offense and the youth's prior record, see 383 U.S. at 567
app., two obvious indicators of dangerousness. It also expressed a concern with dangerousness in its inquiry into the "public interest" and the availability of secure facilities
within the juvenile system. See id.
79. A judgment of dangerousness is involved in many sentencing decisions, in the
granting or withholding of parole or release at the conclusion of a period of imprisonment or commitment, in the involuntary civil commitment of the mentally ill, as well
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Like the quest to determine who may be amenable to treatment,
efforts to identify the currently or potentially dangerous have entailed social science research as well as judicial inquiry. " The irresistible conclusion of this research is that identification of the dangerous
"tpresupposes a capacity to predict future criminal behavior quite
beyond our present technical ability."' In this regard, one of the leading scholars on the prediction of
dangerousness concludes that
[t]he ability to predict which juveniles will engage in violent crime,
either as adolescents or as adults, is very poor.
The conclusion of Wenk and his colleagues that "there has been
as in the transfer of juveniles for adult prosecution. Dangerousness is also a relevant
factor in sentencing criminal offenders to enhanced terms. See, e.g., United States v.
Stewart, 531 F.2d 326 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976) ("dangerous" as
basis for increased sentence in 18 U.S.C. § 3575(f) (1976) not unconstitutionally
vague); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3575-3578 (1976); MINN. STAT. § 609.155 (1976). For an analysis
of the vagueness problems associated with general, predictive statutes, see notes 92130 infra and accompanying text.
80. Discussions of available empirical evidence and the problems of predicting
dangerousness include: N. MoRRuS, supra note 1, at 62-73; D. WEXLER, CmIMNAL COMMrrMENTS AND DANGEROUS MENTAL PATIENTS (U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and
Welfare Pub. No. 76-331,1976); Dershowitz, The Law of Dangerousness:Some Fictions
About Predictions, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC. 24 (1970); Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the
Presumptionof Expertise:Flipping Coins in the Courtroom,62 CALF. L. REv. 693,71116 (1974); Gottfredson, Assessment and Prediction Methods in Crime and
Delinquency, in TASK FORcE REPORT, supra note 21, at 171; Klein, The Dangerousness
of Dangerous Offender Legislation: ForensicFolklore Revisited, 18 CAN. J. CmMINOLOGY & CORRECTIONS 109 (1976); Livermore, Mahlmquist, & Meehl, On the Justifications for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 75, 81-83 (1968); Monahan & Cummings, Social Policy Implications of the Inability to Predict Violence, J. Soc. IssuEs,
1975, No. 2, at 153; Morris, The Future of Imprisonment: Toward a Punitive
Philosophy, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1161, 1164-73 (1974); Rubin, Predictionof Dangerousness in Mentally Ill Criminals, 27 ARcHrVEs GENERAL PSYCH. 397 (1972); Shah,
Dangerousness and Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Some Public Policy
Considerations, 132 Am.J. PSYCH. 501 (1975); Shah, Some Interactions of Law and
Mental Health in the Handling of Social Deviance, 23 CATH.U.L. Rav. 674, 700-12
(1974); Steadman, Some Evidence on the Inadequacy of the Concept and Determination of Dangerousness in Law and Psychiatry, 1 J. PSYCH. & L. 409 (1973); Civil
Commitment, supra note 66, at 1236-45. See also Monahan, The Prediction of
Violence, in VIOLEN E AND CRIMINAL JusncE 17-20 (D. Chappell & J. Monahan eds.
1975); Wenk, Robison, & Smith, Can Violence be Predicted?,18 CRME &DELINQUENCY
393 (1972). This research raises serious questions about a court's ability to predict
human behavior accurately, especially behavior that is unusual or violent.
81. N. Momus, supra note 1, at 62. Psychiatrists as well as lawyers have criticized the presumption of mental health professionals in making predictions. Rubin,
for instance, observes that there is no empirical basis for the assumption that psychiatrists can predict dangerous behavior and that even with "the most careful, painstaking, laborious, and lengthy clinical approach to the prediction of dangerousness, false
positives [or erroneous predictions] may be at a minimum of 60% to 70%." Rubin,
supra note 80, at 397-98.
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no successful attempt to identify, within . . . offender groups, a

subclass whose members have a greater than even chance of engaging again in an assaultive act" is as true for juveniles as it is for
adults. It holds regardless of how well trained the person making the
prediction is-or how well programmed the computer-and how
much information on the individual is provided. More money or
more resources will not help. Our crystal balls are simply very
82
murky, and no one knows how they can be polished.
The problem of predicting dangerousness is not merely that it
cannot be done with an acceptable degree of accuracy but also that
there is a very substantial tendency to overpredict and to identify as
potentially dangerous persons who, if subsequently released, would
engage in no further violent or even criminal behavior. Thus,
[t]he conclusion to emerge most strikingly from these studies is the
great degree to which violence is overpredicted . . . . Of those
predicted to be dangerous, between 65 percent and 99 percent are
false positives-thatis, people who will not, in fict, commit a dangerous act . . . Violence is vastly overpredicted whether simple
behavioral indicators are used or sophisticated multivariate analyses are employed and whether psychological tests are administered
or thorough psychiatric examinations are performed.u
The tendency to overpredict dangerousness raises profound
moral questions with which society must deal in its treatment of both
juvenile and adult offenders. In the context of assessing dangerousness for purposes of parole release, for example, how many false positives-people who would not offend again if released-are we willing
to continue to incarcerate in order to ensure that those relatively few
but unidentifiable individuals who actually would offend are not
released? To what extent are we willing to permit judicial speculation
about future violence in the waiver context if to do so means that
large numbers of juvenile "false positives" may be prosecuted as
adults?
82. J. Monahan, The Prediction of Violent Behavior in Juveniles 10-11 (paper
presented at National Symposium on the Serious Juvenile Offender in Minneapolis,
Minnesota, Sept. 19-20, 1977) (emphasis deleted). See generally Schlesinger, The Prediction of Dangerousness in Juveniles: A Replication, 24 CmME & DELNQUENcY 40
(1978).
83. Monahan, supra note 80, at 20 (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see
Monahan, The Prevention of Violence, in ComiuTrY MENTAL HEALTH AND THE CmuNAL JUSTn SYSTM 13 (J. Monahan ed. 1976); Monahan & Cummings, supra note 80,
at 157; J. Monahan, supra note 82; cf. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966) (ordering the transfer of the "most dangerous mental patients" in New York). Followup
studies of those released reported very low incidences of violence, despite the fact that
all of the patients were incarcerated as dangerous. See H. STEAMAN & J. CocozzA,
CAREERS OF THE CRIMNALLY INSANE 115-18 (1974).
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Predicting dangerousness is thus at best an inexact science, the
uncertainties of which trigger difficult moral questions. The task,
therefore, is to select from among several imperfect methodologies
those that are least susceptible to error or abuse. The two principal
methods for anticipating behavior are clinical and actuarial prediction. A clinical prediction entails a clinician reviewing whatever information is deemed relevant and making a predictive judgment on
the basis of professional training and intuition. Clinical prediction
requires an integration of available information about the individual
in order to develop "some psychological hypothesis regarding the
structure and the dynamics of this particular individual. On the basis
of this hypothesis and certain reasonable expectations as to the
course of outer events, we arrive at a prediction of what is going to
happen."' "
Actuarial or statistical prediction, on the other hand, entails the
development of probability relationships between predictor variables, such as age and prior offenses, and the behavior to be predicted-violence. It requires an examination of the individual only to
determine the presence of the predictor variables: "The combination
of all of these data enables us to classify the subject; and once having
made such a classification, we enter a statistical or actuarial table
which gives the statistical frequencies of behaviors of various sorts for
persons belonging to the class." 5 Whereas a clinical judgment ultimately relies on informed professional expertise, an actuarial prediction employs correlational statistical tables to yield a probability
statement.
In view of the uncertainties and inconsistencies typically associated with social science research, the clear-cut superiority of actuarial over clinical methods of predicting future behavior is startling:
[O]ne should not simply assume that "intensive, clinical, psychological understanding of the individual" leads generally to more
trustworthy forecast of behavior than a more behavioristic-actuarial approach to the predictive task. This . . . assumption seems
still to be taken blithely for granted by almost all psychiatrists
and-surprisingly, given the research evidence-by many clinical
psychologists. The comparative efficacy of different methods of predicting behavior is, of course, a factual question; and in spite of the
armchair plausibility of the above mentioned assumptions (to be
sceptical of "understanding the individual" is rather like being
against motherhood), there exists a very sizable body of empirical
evidence to the contrary. .... Of some five dozen published and
84.
85.

P. MEEm, CLIICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION 4 (1954).
Id. at 3 (emphasis in original).
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unpublished research studies known to us, there is only a single
study showing, given an acceptable research design, a clearcut superiority of clinical judgment over actuarial prediction. . . . It would
be difficult to mention any other domain of social science research
in which the trend of the data is so uniformly in the same direction,
so that any psychiatrist orpsychologist who disfavors the objective,
actuarial approach in a practical, decision-making context should
be challenged to show his familiarity with this research literature
and invited to rebut the theoretical argument and empirical evidence found therein.86
The inability of clinicians to make reliable predictions about
juvenile dangerousness obviously applies as well to judges making
waiver decisions. Reliance on psychological testimony to inform the
court is both inefficacious and misleading since neither clinical insights nor psychological tests can improve the accuracy of clinical
predictions of future violence in juveniles.87 It is possible, however, to
improve somewhat the rationality of waiver decisions by relying on
certain social, behavioral, and demographic characteristics associated with probabilities of violence that exceed the base rates for the
general population. Even though many juveniles with a history of a
violent act will not commit another violent act, research suggests that
a record of past violent behavior is still the best predictor of future
violent behavior.8 Factors other than a juvenile's present offense or
prior history of offenses also appear to correlate with the probability
of future violence or other official criminal misconduct. Age, sex,
race, and socioeconomic status are the most obvious correlates with
official delinquency. In purely probabilistic predictive terms, lowerclass, nonwhite, adolescent males, as an aggregate, have a substantially greater probability of official criminal involvement than do, for
example, white, middle-class women aged thirty and over.
For obvious reasons, however, many factors with marginal predictive relevance cannot provide a legal basis for actuarial prediction.
There would, for example, be an equal protection problem with certifying a black juvenile but not a white one, even if it were demon86.

Livermore, Mahlmquist, &Meehl, supra note 80, at 76 n.4 (emphasis added).

87. See, e.g., Megargee, The Prediction of Violence with Psychological Tests, 2
CuRRENT Topics CuNIcAL & COMMUNrIY PSYCH. 97 (1970). See generally Schlesinger,

supra note 82.

88. A person's relevant past behaviors tend to be the best predicators of
his future behavior in similar situations. It is increasingly evident that
even simple, crude, demographic indices of an individual's past behaviors
and social competence predict his future behavior at least as well as, and
sometimes better than, either the best test-based personality statements or
clinical judgments.
W. MiscHEL, PERSONALrY & AssassM

rr 135 (1968); see, e.g.,
SLLN, supra note 9; Wenk, Robison, & Smith, supra note 80.

WOLFGANG, FIGUO,

&
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strated that, statistically, blacks as a class have a greater probability
of subsequent criminal involvement than do whites." Moreover, despite the statistical relationships between factors such as sex, age,
class, and race and criminal involvement, these factors are all beyond
the control of the juvenile. They are not his fault, and it would be
inappropriate to punish an individual for that which he cannot
change or control.
The only statistical variables that both have predictive validity
and can be controlled by the offender are his present offense and
cumulative record. Perhaps intuitively, many juvenile court judges
already rely on these factors as the principal basis for making reference decisions." But to the extent that the seriousness of the present
offense, plus an extensive prior record, provides a rational predictive
basis for certification that is more accurate than any clinical judgment, there is no need to conduct a judicial waiver hearing at all. An
89. Monahan suggests that "[o]ne reason clinical prediction persists in juvenile
justice is that it allows socially sensitive predictor variables to be hidden." J. Monahan, supra note 82, at 14 (emphasis deleted). Assuming that even after controlling for
such effects as racial discrimination and social class disparities, a statistically reliable
relationship remained between race or class and future violence, reliance on such a
"suspect" factor in an actuarial prediction table would presumably still be struck down
on equal protection grounds "even if it could be shown to be statisticallyaccurate."
Id. at 15 (emphasis in original). Monahan concludes, however, that reliance on clinical
expertise permits these same factors to be weighted into the "professional" judgment:
The "virtue" of clinical prediction is that a judge or youth authority
board does not have to deal with highly sensitive social questions, but can
camouflage the issues by deferring to clinical expertise. The clinician is then
free to take all these variables into account... if the prediction is to be any
good-and no one will be the wiser. The sensitive issues will never be raised
because they are hidden in the depths of "professional judgment," while in
fact that judgment is made on the basis of the same factors that might be
unconstitutional if used in open court. In this sense, clinical prediction represents a "laundering" of actuarial prediction, so that the sensitive nature of
the predictor variables cannot be traced.
Id. at 16.
90. This Article proceeds from the premise that retribution and prevention are
the principal justifications for penal intervention. It focuses throughout on the seriousness of the offense as evidence of culpability and on persistence of criminal conduct
as evidence of the likelihood of future offenses. Because of this emphasis on culpability
and the making of blameworthy choices, it does not rely on factors such as age, race,
sex, or class, which might aid predictive judgments since they are characteristics for
which the actor is not responsible. An unwillingness to punish a person for his status
is one of the benchmarks of the criminal law. "Criminal penalties may not be inflicted
upon a person for being in a condition he is powerless to change." Powell v. Texas,
392 U.S. 514, 567 (1968) (Fortas, J., dissenting); see Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660, 666-67 (1962).
91. According to one source, "[t]he two factors most often cited by juvenile
judges deciding whether to waive jurisdiction are the seriousness of the offense and the
past history of the juvenile." Due Process and Waiver, supra note 21, at 598.
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empirically derived actuarial matrix that simply excluded offenders
with various combinations of present offenses and prior records from
juvenile court jurisdiction could be adopted by a legislature. Such a
matrix would be more easily administered and less prone to subjective speculation than present judicial practices.
3.

Discretion, Vagueness, and Discrimination

In addition to requiring courts to make determinations as to a
youth's amenability to treatment or dangerousness that cannot be
made with any degree of precision, judicial waiver statutes typically
contain broad, standardless grants of discretion 'to the juvenile
courts" that create the potential for abuse and discrimination in
waiver decisions. The breadth and generality of waiver statutes have
led to challenges in a number of jurisdictions on grounds that such
statutes are either void for vagueness or unconstitutional delegations
of legislative functions to the judiciary. Whether the challenge is
couched in terms of vagueness or the delegation doctrine, however,
the analytical issue is essentially the same: is the statutory language
sufficiently precise to ensure evenhanded administration of the law
and meaningful appellate review of its application?"
92. See notes 39-48 supra and accompanying text. For a general discussion of the
scope of judicial discretion in waiver determinations, see Note, supra note 7, at 100104. Appellate courts, like legislatures, typically refrain from specifying the determinative factors a waiving court must consider or assigning those factors relative weight.
See, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 537 (1975) ("the Court has never attempted to
prescribe criteria for, or the nature and quantum of evidence that must support, a
decision to transfer a juvenile for trial in adult court"); Juvenile v. Commonwealth,
347 N.E.2d 667, 684 (Mass. 1976) ("There is no specific requirement that a judge weigh
these factors in a certain manner or achieve some predesigned balance.").
93. Underlying the vagueness doctrine is a concern that "a law provide explicit
standards for those who apply it, lest there be 'impermissibl[e] delegat[ion of] basic
policy matters ... for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant
dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.'" Todd, Vagueness Doctrine in
the Federal Courts: A Focus on the Military, Prison, and Campus Contexts, 26 STA.
L. Rav. 855, 857-58 (1974). Objective and ascertainable standards reduce the risks of
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement both by eliminating subjective interpretations of the law and by increasing the visibility of abusive applications. See Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional Restrictions on the Punishment of Crimes of Status,
Crimes of GeneralObnoxiousness, Crimes of DispleasingPolice Officers, and the Like,
3 CRIM. L. BUL. 205, 229 (1967).
The vagueness doctrine has been invoked in a number of contexts to invalidate
overly broad or imprecise statutes. See generally Amsterdam, supra; Todd, supra;
Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67
(1960). Although the doctrine is most commonly associated with the invalidation of
criminal statutes, it has been successfully invoked in a variety of noncriminal contexts
as well. In A.B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233 (1925), the
Supreme Court articulated the precision requirement for civil statutes:
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At least part of the rationale of the Court's decision in Kent v.
United States suggests the relevance of the void-for-vagueness doctrine in the context of judicial waivers: "Meaningful review requires
that the reviewing court should review. It should not be remitted to
assumptions. It must have before it a statement of the reasons motivating the waiver including, of course, a statement of the relevant
facts."'" Meaningful review of a waiver decision requires not only
procedural regularity in the determination of facts, but substantive
standards against which those facts can be evaluated.
[Ulnless statutory clarity exists, other guarantees of procedural
due process cannot be meaningful. Typical procedural due process
requirements such as written notice of charges, a hearing with an
opportunity to present testimony to the hearing body, and a written
decision containing the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the
decision, may be of little avail when a tribunal is free to apply its
own standard of what constitutes reasonable conduct. 5
Some commentators have suggested that the lack of objective standards is especially critical in legal proceedings from which the public
may be absent or in which the subjects may be members of subgroups
readily victimized by arbitrary official actions."
The ground or principle of the decisions was not such as to be applicable only
to criminal prosecutions. It was not the criminal penalty that was held invalid, but the exaction of obedience to a rule or standard which was so vague
and indefinite as really to be no rule or standard at all.
Id. at 239. See also Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 230 (1951). Several distinguishable but interrelated rationales have been adduced for the vagueness doctrine: "the
concern for fair notice; the concern against uncontrolled and lawless administration
of the criminal law, with its potential for arbitrary and discriminatory impositions; and
the concern against overreaching of other federal constitutional guarantees, particularly the sensitive 'preferred' guarantees of personal liberty contained in the Bill of
Rights." Amsterdam, supra at 217. The second rationale has obvious relevance for
transfer statutes, which, because of their broad grants of discretion, are susceptible to
abuse in their implementation, permit decisions based on extraneous considerations,
and do not provide the standards necessary for meaningful judicial review. Thus,
reviewing courts are often simply unable to discover whether the law is being administered on the basis of arbitrary and impermissible factors or excessively subjective
judgments. See Note, supra at 80 ("Prejudiced, discriminatory, or overreaching exercises of state authority may remain concealed beneath findings of facts impossible for
the court to redetermine when such sweeping statutes have been applied to the complex, contested fact constellations of particular cases.").
94. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561 (1966), discussed at notes 25-29
supra and accompanying text; accord, State v. Gibbs, 94 Idaho 908, 916, 500 P.2d 209,
217 (1972); People v. Fields, 391 Mich. 206, 217, 216 N.W.2d 51, 53 (1974).
95. Todd, supra note 93, at 858-59; see United States ex rel. Pedrosa v. Sielaf,
434 F. Supp. 493, 495-96 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (invalidating a transfer statute on ground that
"[w]here there are no standards to govern the exercise of. . . discretion, 'the scheme
permits and encourages an arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law' ").
96. See, e.g., Todd, supra note 93, at 866. Although written in the context of
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Before it was overruled, the leading case to invalidate a waiver
7 in which the Michigan Supreme Court
statute was People v. Fields,"
held that a completely standardless statute was a fatally defective
delegation of legislative power. 8 The statute in question permitted
waiver "after investigation," but failed to specify what factors the
court was to investigate. 9 The Fields court ruled that
[i]f the legislature is to treat some persons under the age of 17
differently from the entire class of such persons, excluding them
from the beneficent processes and purposes of our juvenile courts,
the legislature must establish suitable and ascertainable standards
whereby such persons are to be deemed adults and treated as such
subject to the processes and penalties of our criminal law."®
In assessing the statutory criteria that might have been relied upon
in this case, the court dismissed the proffered test of "the child's
welfare and the best interests of the state" as being "so vague and
subject to so many possible interpretations as to be no standard at
10
all." 1
prisons or schools, the concern is equally applicable in the context of juvenile court
proceedings.
97. 388 Mich. 66, 199 N.W.2d 217 (1972), aff'd on rehearing, 391 Mich. 206, 216
N.W.2d 51 (1974). But see People v. Peters, 397 Mich. 360, 367-69, 244 N.W.2d 989,
901-02, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 944 (1976). Apparently the only other case in which a
transfer statute was invalidated for lack of guidelines or standards is United States ex
rel. Pedrosa v. Sielaf, 434 F. Supp. 493 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (invalidating Act of Aug. 7,
1973, § 1, 1973 Ill. Laws 1099).
98. See 388 Mich. at 76, 199 N.W.2d at 222; Stamm, supra note 8, at 138:
The judiciary has been enabled to decide who shall be tried for crimes,
traditionally a legislative function, in the absence of any criteria governing
this determination. The Fields court observed, in part, that the traditional
delegation of this power can no longer be upheld because transfer decisions
are not being made on the basis of uniform and easily discernible standards.
The reasons for transfer vary greatly from one judge to another and therefore
the law is not evenly administered.
See generallyJuvenile Waiver Statute, supra note 21.
The question of lack of standards arose again in Michigan under the newly enacted
waiver rule, MICH. Juv. CT. R. 11, which provided five criteria for consideration in the
court's determination whether to waive jurisdiction, among them, the juvenile's prior
record and character, the seriousness of the offense, and whether there was a repetitive
pattern of offenses. See id. 11(1)(b). The Michigan Supreme Court upheld the rule,
expressly overruling Fieldsand adopting the reasoning of the Fields dissent. See People
v. Peters, 397 Mich. 360, 367-69, 244 N.W.2d 898, 901-02, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 944
(1976).
99, See Act of Mar. 6, 1944, no. 54, 1944 Mich. Pub. Acts 1st Ex. Sees. 118, as
amended, Act of Feb. 26, 1946, no. 23, 1946 Mich. Pub. Acts Ex. Sess. 44.
100. 388 Mich. at 77, 199 N.W.2d at 222.
101. Id. at 76, 199 N.W.2d at 222. Contra,In re Juvenile, 364 Mass. 531, 536-39,
306 N.E.2d 822, 826-28 (1974) (the "interests of the public" held sufficiently precise);
State v. Weidner, 6 Or. App. 317, 323, 487 P.2d 1385, 1386 (1971) ("the best interests
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In contrast to the Michigan court's decision in Fields, however,
most courts have declined to invalidate statutes framed in such general terms as "amenability to treatment" or "the best interests of the
child or the public" on vagueness grounds." 2 Some courts have engrafted criteria for the waiver decision on otherwise vague statutes via
judicial construction. "3 Frequently, these criteria consist of the factors appended by the Supreme Court to its Kent decision.' Even
of the child and the public" sufficiently precise); State ex rel. Salas, 520 P.2d 874, 876
(Utah 1974) ("best interests of the child or the public" not unconstitutionally vague).
102. For example, while conceding that the statutory standards "not amenable"
to treatment and "not a fit and proper subject" to be handled within the juvenile
process "lack explicit definition," the California Supreme Court ruled that "'[t]he
factors upon which an unsuitability finding is based are generally those which indicate
a relatively poor prognosis for rehabilitation.' "Donald L. v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d
592, 601, 498 P.2d 1098, 1104, 102 Cal. Rptr. 850, 856 (1972) (quoting People v. Smith,
5 Cal. 3d 313, 317, 486 P.2d 1213, 1216, 96 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (1971)).
103. See, e.g., State v. Gibbs, 94 Idaho 908, 916, 500 P.2d 209, 217 (1972):
Jurisdiction ordinarily is waived when (1) the defendant has acquired such
a degree of emotional or mental maturity that he is not receptive to rehabilitative programs designed for children; (2) although the defendant is immature, his disturbance has eluded exhaustive prior efforts at correction
through existing juvenile programs; or (3) the defendant is immature and
might be treated, but the nature of his difficulty is likely to render him
dangerous to the public, if released at age twenty-one, or to disrupt the
rehabilitation of other children in the program prior to his release.
Accord, Jimmy H. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 709, 478 P.2d 32, 91 Cal. Rptr. 600
(1970); Clemons v. State, 162 Ind.App. 50, 56, 317 N.E.2d 859,863 (1974), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 859 (1975); State v. Halverson, 192 N.W.2d 765 (Iowa 1971); Juvenile v.
Commonwealth, 347 N.E.2d 677, 685 (Mass. 1976); State v. Hogan, 297 Minn. 430, 212
N.W.2d 664 (1973); Knott v. Langlois, 102 R.I. 517, 523, 231 A.2d 767, 770 (1967);
Mikulovsky v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 699, 704-08, 196 N.W.2d 748, 751-53 (1972).
104. For example, one court filled in a statutory gap with the following pronouncement regarding the considerations appropriate to the waiver decision:
Though the standards for determining a minor's fitness for treatment as
a juvenile lack explicit definition . . . ,it is clear from the statute that the
court must go beyond the circumstances surrounding the offense itself and
the minor's possible denial of involvement in such offense. . . .The court
may consider a minor's past record of delinquency. . . and must take into
account his behavior pattern as described in the probation officer's report. ....

. ..Since the dispositive question is the minor's amenability to treatment through the facilities available to the juvenile court, testimony of experts that the minor can be treated by those facilities is entitled to great
weight in the court's ultimate determination. . ..
. ..Other factors which may be considered by the juvenile court in the
exercise of its discretion in certifying a minor to the superior court as not
amenable to treatment as a juvenile are the following: the nature of the crime
allegedly committed, the circumstances and details surrounding its commission, the minor's behavior pattern including his past record, if any, of delinquency, his degree of sophistication especially as the same may relate to
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these courts, however, decline to ascribe significance to any given
factor, insisting that ultimately the decision must be individualized
by the trial court's exercise of its sound discretion.
Courts have also avoided invalidating statutes on vagueness
grounds by finding that the general purpose statement of the enabling legislation creating the juvenile court provided sufficient
statutory guidance." 5 The general purpose clauses, however, typically provide scant guidance for decisionmakers, often providing simply that each child coming within the jurisdiction of the court shall
receive "such care, guidance and control, preferably in his own home,
as will serve the child's welfare and the best interests of the state."''0
While judicial gloss or general authorizing legislation has usually
been regarded as sufficient to establish the necessary criteria for decisionmaking, courts have also sustained otherwise vague statutes by
finding them as precise as is possible given the inherent uncertainties
and multiplicity of factors to be considered in making the final judgment."0 7 To justify such holdings, courts note that the statute in quescriminal activities and contradictory opinion testimony.

Jimmy H. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 709, 714-16, 478 P.2d 32, 35-36, 91 Cal. Rptr.
600, 603-04 (1970) (citations omitted); accord, People v. Moseley, 566 P.2d 331 (Colo.
1977); Clemons v. State, 162 Ind. App. 50, 317 N.E.2d 859 (1974), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 859 (1975); State v. Speck, 242 N.W.2d 287, 293 (Iowa 1976) (Kent criteria); State
v. Smagula, 377 A.2d 608 (N.H. 1977); State v. Doyal, 59 N.M. 454, 459-60, 286 P.2d
306, 310 (1955); State v. Williams, 75 Wash. 2d 604, 453 P.2d 418 (1969); Mikulovsky
v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 699, 196 N.W.2d 748 (1972).
105. See, e.g., In re Pima County Juvenile Action, 22 Ariz. App. 327, 527 P.2d
104 (1974); Clemons v. State, 162 Ind. App. 50, 317 N.E.2d 859 (1974), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 859 (1975); State v. Green, 218 Kan. 438, 544 P.2d 356 (1975); State v. Owens,
197 Kan. 212, 416 P.2d 259 (1966); In re Juvenile, 364 Mass. 531, 306 N.E.2d 822 (1974);
Lewis v. State, 86 Nev. 889, 893, 478 P.2d 168, 171 (1970); State v. Doyal, 59 N.M.
454, 286 P.2d 306 (1955); In re Bullard, 22 N.C. App. 245, 206 S.E.2d 305 (1974);
Sherfield v. State, 511 P.2d 598 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973); State v. Weidner, 6 Or. App.
317, 487 P.2d 1385 (1971); State ex rel. Salas, 520 P.2d 874 (Utah 1974); In re Burtts,
12 Wash. App. 564, 530 P.2d 709 (1975); In re F.R.W., 61 Wis. 2d 193, 212 N.W.2d 130
(1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 974 (1974). The strategy of saving a vague statute by
incorporating an equally vague purpose clause has, however, been rejected by at least
one court. See United States ex reL. Pedrosa v. Sielaf, 434 F. Supp. 493, 496 (N.D. Ill.
1977) ("This particular statement provides little if any guidance and does not compensate for the vagueness in the transfer statute.").
106. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-5-7-14 (Burns 1973), construed in Clemons v. State,
162 Ind. App. 50, 52-53, 317 N.E.2d 859, 861 (1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 859 (1975);

accord, MINN. STAT. § 260.011 (1976).
107. Thus, one court ruled that the "public interest" standard was not vague
because it "opens up for consideration any reasonable argument bearing on the course
which treatment of the juvenile should follow," In re Juvenile, 364 Mass. 531, 538, 306
N.E.2d 822, 827 (1974), and while additional factors could be specified, "the collective
effect of those individual factors, if properly and fully articulated, can only produce a
balancing which involves a consideration of the requirements of the interests of the
public in the broadest sense." Id. at 539, 306 N.E.2d at 828; accord, Juvenile v.
Commonwealth, 347 N.E.2d 677, 685 (Mass. 1976).
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tion is just as precise as those sustained in other jurisdictions. In
rejecting a challenge to the Minnesota waiver statute, for example,
the court concluded that the Minnesota statute compared favorably
with the waiver provisions of the Uniform Juvenile Court Act' without addressing the basic issue of whether that statute provided adequate standards." 9
Even while sustaining waiver standards against vagueness challenges, however, courts have decried the absence of statutory standards. Thus, as one judge remarked, "[it is disquieting. . . to learn

that judicial action is taken without governing standards available to
the public. To me their absence permits judicial decision by whim or
caprice and lends [sic] to unequal treatment under the law .. .",
As indicated in the earlier analysis of the inherent subjectivity of the
amenability and dangerousness decisions, it is doubtful that statutes
authorizing waiver on these undefined and undefinable bases provide
sufficiently articulated criteria to permit meaningful appellate court
review.
One test of the adequacy of statutory standards is whether, if
applied in similar factual situations, they will produce similar results. Empirical evaluations of the administration of waiver statutes
raise doubts about the evenhandedness with which such statutes are
applied, thus calling into question the sufficiency of the standards
employed."' For example, although the Minnesota Supreme Court
108.

UNIFoRm Juv INmCOURT Acr

§ 34.

109. See In re I.Q.S., 244 N.W.2d 30, 36-37 (Minn. 1976). Other courts have
adopted a similar strategy of finding the challenged statutes as precise as those sustained in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., People v. Moseley, 566 P.2d 331, 333 (Colo.
1977) ("these guidelines are far more specific than those appearing in transfer statutes
which have been upheld in other jurisdictions"); Clemons v. State, 162 Ind. App. 50,
55, 317 N.E.2d 859, 862 (1974) ("Similar general standards have been upheld in other
jurisdictions answering attacks on their waiver statutes for being unconstitutionally
vague."), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 859 (1975); In re Juvenile, 364 Mass. 531, 537, 306
N.E.2d 822, 827 (1974) ("Similar general standards contained in comparable statutes
in other States have been upheld.").
All of these decisions suffer from the same analytical defect:
It is common in the cases which sustain a statute against the charge of
vagueness to say merely that it is "as definite as" a statute sustained in some
earlier case-an argument which, in view of the fact that the earlier case
expresses no criterion of definiteness, is singularly unilluminating. Other
cases state only their conclusion-that the statute is too uncertain (or not
too uncertain)-and cite in support earlier decisions, not dealing with statutes of similar wording or even of similar spheres of operation ....
Note, supra note 93, at 71 (footnotes omitted).
110. United States v. Caviness, 239 F. Supp. 545, 551 (D.D.C. 1965).
111. See, e.g., Hays & Solway, supra note 21; Keiter, supranote 7; Certification
of Minors, supra note 21; Note, supra note 6; Waiver in Ohio, supra note 21; Waiver
in Wisconsin, supra note 21; [Minnesota] Supreme Court Juvenile Justice Study
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held that the Minnesota waiver statute afforded adequate standards,"I a study commission appointed by the court to examine certification issues found that in practice the exercise of discretion by the
juvenile courts in making waiver decisions frequently yielded disparate results.113 Specifically, the Commission found pronounced differences in certification practices in urban and rural counties throughout Minnesota."' According to the study, the reference or certification process is used for three different purposes or objectives:
In Hennepin County certifications are requested for youths who, in
the judgment of the office of the county attorney, represent substantial threats to the public safety or cannot be effectively handled with
the resources currently available through the juvenile court process.
This purpose or objective is consistent with legislative intent in
enacting the enabling statute. A second purpose for which certification is utilized in a number of courts is to attempt to insure that the
offender will be subject to correctional or rehabilitative efforts beyond his 18th birthday. Thus youths who are approaching their 18th
birthday at the time of their offense may be certified because some
juvenile court judges feel that a youth committed to the Commissioner of Corrections as a juvenile "automatically" will be released
from state jurisdiction when he turns 18. A third purpose for which
certification is utilized is to allow the imposition of a sanction such
as a fine or short jail sentence upon juveniles who committed relatively minor offenses and who, it is felt, are not in need of probation
or other treatments available through the juvenile court."'
The discretion afforded by this typical waiver statute thus lends itself
to a variety of applications, which, in turn, can lead to inequities. For
example, analysis of waiver decisions in a sample of counties throughout Minnesota showed that urban offenders considered for certification had generally committed more serious offenses and had more
extensive prior records than their rural counterparts."' In addition to
more recorded offenses, certified urban youths had records extending
over a longer period of time and more appearances on delinquency
petitions than did rural youths.' 7 Yet, despite the substantially
greater seriousness of the present offense and the longer and more
extensive prior records of urban youths, rural youngsters were much
more likely to be certified for adult prosecution." 8
Commission Report 61-78 (Sept. 15, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Supreme Court
Study] (on file with the author).
Report 61-78 (Sept. 15, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Supreme Court Study] (on file with
the author).
112. See In re I.Q.S., 244 N.W.2d 30, 36-39 (Minn. 1976).
113. See Supreme Court Study, supra note 111, at 61-79.
114. See id. at 67.
115. Id. at 20-21.
116. See id. at 71, tables 13-14, 73, table 16.
117. See id. at 72-73, tables 16-17.
118. See id. at 74.
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These urban/rural disparities are perhaps understandablQ in
terms of the relative tolerance with which various communities view
deviant behavior. Because crime, especially serious crime, is heavily
concentrated in urban areas, urban courts are provided with a frame
of reference and perspective for responding to serious offenders not
available to courts in rural counties, which appear to deal with a
qualitatively less serious delinquency problem."' Although the substantial urban/rural disparities that emerge under a statute intended
to be applied uniformly throughout the state can perhaps be explained on this basis, they are nonetheless disturbing. Despite the
Minnesota court's conclusion that the legislative standards are adequate to assure evenhanded administration throughout the state, in
reality the statute provides for little more than a subjective exercise
of discretion that is the antithesis of a rule of law."'
Not only may effectively standardless discretionary waiver statutes occasion improper urban/rural disparities, they may also afford
opportunities for invidious, discrimination on the basis of race or
class. Minority and lower-class youths are overrepresented in the
juvenile court population,' but the disparity in representation is
even more pronounced among those juveniles for whom adult certifi119. While differences in the availability of community correctional resources
might explain some urban/rural differences, rural counties always have the option of
committing delinquent youths to the State Commissioner of Corrections. Thus, the
lack of community correctional facilities cannot alone explain the greater propensity
to certify juveniles in rural areas. Interestingly, although urban and rural youths were
certified on the basis of different considerations, their dispositions following convictions as adults tended to reflect real differences in present offense and prior record.
Urban juveniles, who tended to be much more serious offenders, were more likely to
be incarcerated as adults than were their rural counterparts. See id. at 75 & table 21.
120. A statute explicitly providing for different treatment of youths solely on the
basis of urban/rural distinctions would probably violate equal protection. In Long v.
Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 22, (D. Md. 1970), af'd, 436 F.2d 1116 (4th Cir. 1971), the
federal district court invalidated a Maryland statute that set a statewide juvenile court
age limit of eighteen but that restricted the juvenile age limit to sixteen in Baltimore
City. As the court noted, this statutory scheme created two classes of sixteen and
seventeen year olds: "those who reside outside of Baltimore City and/or who although
residing in Baltimore City are not arrested within city limits; and those who whether
or not residing within the limits of Baltimore City are arrested therein." Id. at 26.
While recognizing that geographic distinctions do not necessarily offend equal protection, the court was unable to find a psychological, physical, sociological, or other
rational basis for distinguishing between sixteen and seventeen year olds arrested in
Baltimore City proper and those arrested throughout the rest of the state. The court
invalidated the Baltimore City exception as "arbitrary, unreasonably discriminatory,
and not related to any legitimate State objective." Id. at 28. It appears, however, that
while a legislature could not formally enact the type of urban/rural discrimination
found by the Supreme Court Study Commission, the discretion afforded by a broad,
general statute permits the same results to occur de facto.
121. See CRWE IN A FREE Socmr, supra note 61, at 44.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:515

cation is sought. The Minnesota Supreme Court Study Commission
found that while "15.1% of the offenses referred to Hennepin Juvenile
Court in 1975 were committed by black youths, almost three times
that percentage (44.8) of the cases considered for certification in Hennepin County in 1975-75 [sic] involved black juveniles."' 1 It is difficult to provide a nondiscriminatory explanation for this overrepresentation of black youths in the certification population. It is possible,
of course, that the overrrepresentation is simply a function of a disproportionate amount of* serious delinquent activity by black
youths, 12 but the findings of two studies that examined the problems
of the violent and hard-core offenders in Hennepin County, when
taken together, suggest that the overrepresentation of black youths
for their disproin the serious offender pool is insufficient to account
124
portionate presence in the certification pool.
Studies from other jurisdictions raise similar questions about the
role of race in certification decisionmaking. An examination of certification procedures in Harris County (Houston), Texas, found that
fifteen of the eighteen youths in the sample for whom certification
was sought were black.1 2 A similar study of certification administration in Cook County (Chicago), Illinois, reported similar disparities. 2 "The ethnic breakdown of the transferred juveniles poses some
serious questions. Fifty-nine of the sixty-four boys transferred (92 per
cent) were blacks. Of the remaining five, three were Puerto Rican.
Unfortunately no overall comparisons can be made because ethnic
grouping is not included in 1970 juvenile court statistics."'2
None of these studies is methodologically rigorous enough to permit a causal inference of racial discrimination. To reach such a conclusion it would be necessary to know also the minority groups' proportion of the general population, their distribution among social
classes, and the dispositions received by white offenders while con122. Supreme Court Study, supra note 111, at 68.
123. See WOLFGANG, FIGUO, & SawLN, supranote 9; note 252 infra and accompanying text.
124. See HENNEPIN Couvrm STUDY, supra note 9, at 56 (45% of all serious crimes
committed by nonwhites); Supreme Court Study, supra note 111, at 68 (55% of all
youths considered for certification in Hennepin County nonwhite).
125. See Hays & Solway, supra note 21, at 711.
126. Keiter, supra note 7, at 537.
127. Id. at 531. Keiter also notes,
Arguably the racial breakdown of the sixty-four transferred youths reveals

subtle discrimination since the backgrounds of the nonblacks indicated more
serious criminal involvement than the backgrounds of a portion of the removed blacks. But, in general, these data do not clearly establish a pattern
of racial discrimination and fail to prove outright abuse of the statutory
discretion.
Id. at 537.
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trolling for present offense and prior record. Any evidence of a consistent, systematic pattern of racial disparity in the treatment of various
offenders, however, raises equal protection questions. In this respect,
the gross disparities reported in the certification cases are strikingly
similar to the racial disparities in the imposition of capital punishment that led to challenges to the death penalty on equal protection
grounds.'2 ' Writing about the equal protection problems presented by
the discriminatory enforcement of vague statutes in another context,
Professor Amsterdam noted,
While any sort of arbitrariness may violate the guarantee [of equal
protection], some particular species of distinctions in the treatment
of citizens are especially the objects of its concern. Racial discrimination of course is the foremost of these, in view of the overriding
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment to "take away all possibility
of oppression by law because of race or color." Differential practices
of prosecution for different racial groups would be the plainest sort
of violation of the Amendment, and counsel should be awake to the
possibility of attempting to show racially discriminatory enforcement patterns . . . . A forceful showing in this regard . . . may
help to persuade the courts to invalidate a challenged vagrancy law
on its face for vagueness and overbreadth, the enforcement of the
law having demonstrated in the flesh the potential for arbitrary use
which is the basis for the vagueness contention."
While some of the racial differentials in certification may reflect real
differences in offender patterns, one must question whether such
overly broad, discretionary statutes can be administered in an evenhanded, nondiscriminatory manner.
Even assuming that the statutes could be applied evenhandedly,
there is some question whether the clinical inquiry into a youth's
amenability can avoid the effect of class or racial differences. Amenability to treatment is theoretically a scientific inquiry, neutral as to
race or class. As a practical matter, however, because determinations
as to amenability are mediated by white, middle-class professionals,
racial and class differences between the psychologist-diagnostician
and the youth may distort the objectivity of the inquiry." ' Because
128. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249-52 (1972). See generally
sources cited in Wolfgang & Riedel, Race, JudicialDiscretion, and the Death Penalty,
ANNALS, May 1973, at 119, 124 n.24. Professor Wolfgang's research demonstrates that
the influence of racial bias on the imposition of the death penalty is inescapable. See
id. at 124.
129. Amsterdam, supra note 93, at 229-30 (footnotes omitted).
130. See, e.g., Harari & Chwast, Class Bias in Psychodiagnosisof Delinquents,
10 CRmME & DELINQUENCY 145 (1964). In the absence of causal explanations of crime,
the diagnostic process is inherently imprecise, see notes 54-60 & 63-65 supra and
accompanying text, and, despite training, clinicians may respond to youths differentially on the basis of conscious or unconscious cues associated with class or race.
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of differences in cultural expectations or verbal skills, for example, a
middle-class psychologist or judge may make a poorer prognosis for
a black youth than for a white youth when the actual differences
being reported are more appropriately a measure of social distance.
B.

LEGISLATIVE WAIVER

From the preceding discussion, the deficiencies of judicial waiver
are apparent. Such a mechanism requires a court to make individual
determinations about a youth's amenability to treatment and dangerousness that simply cannot be made with any degree of precision
or uniformity. Moreover, perhaps because the answers to these questions are so indeterminate, waiving courts are given an extraordinarily broad range of unguided discretion that creates the potential for
discretionary abuse and discrimination. The principal alternative to
judicial waiver simply excludes certain categories of offenses from
juvenile court jurisdiction by legislative definition. If charged with
one of these offenses, youths above a statutory minimum age are
treated as adults. 1 ' Although such statutes are sometimes described
as prosecutorial waivers because the decision as to the offense
legislature and not the prosecharged determines the forum, it is the
13
1
choice.
policy
the
makes
that
cutor
The way in which a clinician uses the information obtained is also subject to
imprecision:
How [the clinician] perceives and interprets a given piece of behavior will
depend to a great degree on who he is, his own life experience, his value
system, and most importantly, perhaps, where he received his training, and
within which theoretical system he operates. Today there are a vast variety
of such systems and methods which, more or less, contain their own esoteric
vocabulary and frame of reference. The proponents of each claim success
though each interprets behavior differently. To subject a behavioral scientist
to a rigorous cross examination is not merely to question his data collection
system and his facts, but also to question all of his basic theoretical assumptions for which he has very little empirical data.
Croxton, The Kent Case and Its Consequences, 7 J. Fm. L. 1, 8-9 (1967). Differences
in the way a clinician and a youth regard the same information further complicate the
diagnostic process. See generally H. POLsKY, supra note 70, at 153-58.
131. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:1570 A(5) (West Supp. 1978). (adult
prosecution of "a child who, after having become fifteen years of age, is charged with
having committed a capital crime"). Some states exclude only capital offenses or those
punishable by life imprisonment. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 39.02(5)(c) (1975); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 43-21-31 (1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-280 (1969); W. VA. CODE § 49-5-3 (Supp.
1977). Other jurisdictions exclude broader categories of offenses, see, e.g., D.C. CODE
§ 16-2301(3) (1973), or youths charged with repeat offenses, see, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAws
§ 14-1-7.1 (Supp. 1977). Several jurisdictions supplement their judicial waiver provisions with legislative offense exclusions. See, e.g., COLO. Rav. STAT. §§ 19-1-103(9),
-104, -3-108 (1973 & Supp. 1976).
132. For a discussion of the distinction between "pure" prosecutorial waiver
and legislative waiver, see notes 20-21 supra and accompanying text. For further analy-
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Statutes mandating adult prosecution on the basis of offense
charged rather than the characteristics of the offender have been
criticized extensively as inconsistent with the rehabilitative philosophy of the juvenile court.'3 They have also been challenged on due
process and equal protection grounds by youths tried as adults, who
have argued that automatic certification denies the procedural safeguards required by Kent and that exclusion on the basis of the offense
alleged constitutes an arbitrary legislative classification that violates
equal protection.' 3' The due process claim is directed at the unreviewability of the charging decision and the prosecutor's exercise of discretion in removing youths from the juvenile court. The equal protection
claim attacks the rationality of the legislative decision to treat youths
charged with certain offenses as adults rather than juveniles.
In United States v. Bland, 3 the leading case on the validity of
legislative waiver statutes, a sixteen-year-old youth charged with
armed robbery and tried as an adult asserted that the Kent procedural safeguards were required as a precondition of waiver because
of the critical differences between juvenile and adult treatment.
Bland argued that since the ultimate result is the same whether the
waiver decision is made by a judge after a hearing, as in Kent, or by
the legislature and a prosecutor's charging decision, there is no justification for not requiring comparable procedural safeguards.
The argument for procedural parity was strongly endorsed by
Judge J. Skelly Wright in dissent. Judge Wright contended that
the test for when the Constitution demands a hearing depends not
on which government official makes the decision, but rather on the
importance of that decision to the individual affected. "The extent
to which procedural due process must be afforded. . is influenced
sis of the distinction, see Whitebread & Batey, supra note 20, at 232-35; Due Process
Analysis, supra note 21, at 339-46.
133. See Mountford & Berenson, supra note 21, at 62 ("It would be more consis-

tent with the purposes of a juvenile code if waiver were based on findings about the
child rather than on findings about the offense."). See generally Mylniec, supra note
20; Note, supra note 10; 53 B.U.L. REv. 212 (1973).
134. See Woodard v. Wainwright, 556 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98

S. Ct. 1285 (1978); Russel v. Parratt, 543 F.2d 1214 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Quinones, 516 F.2d 1309 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 852 (1975); Cox v. United

States, 473 F.2d 334 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 869 (1973); United States v.
Bland, 472 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973); Myers v.

District Court, 184 Colo. 81, 518 P.2d 836 (1974); Johnson v. State, 314 So. 2d 573 (Fla.
1975); People v. Sprinkle, 56 Ill. 2d 257, 307 N.E.2d 161, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 935
(1974); State v. Sherk, 217 Kan. 726, 538 P.2d 1390 (1975); Jackson v. State, 311 So.

2d 658 (Miss. 1975); State v. Grayer, 191 Neb. 523, 215 N.W.2d 859 (1974).
135. 472 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973). For discus-

sion of Bland, see Vitiello, supra note 21, at 47-52; Due ProcessAnalysis, supra note
21, at 342; Due Process and Waiver, supra note 21, at 601-07.
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by the extent to which [an individual] may be 'condemned to suffer
grievous loss.' 136
Judge Wright regarded the statute that excluded the defendant from
the juvenile court as a transparent effort to evade the procedural
requirements of Kent' T and argued that the prosecutor's charging
decision should be subjected to the same
sort of hearing as was re3
quired in the case of judicial waiver. 1
Judge Wright's argument that the comparable consequences
flowing from legislative and judicial waivers necessitate comparable
procedural safeguards did not persuade the Bland majority, and they
declined to impose procedural requirements on the prosecutor's
charging decision under the offense exclusion legislation. The majority relied on the well-established doctrine that exercises of prosecutorial discretion are not subject to judicial review or due process
3
constraints except under manifestly discriminatory circumstances. 1
136. 472 F.2d at 1345 (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970)).
137. See id. at 1341 ("This blatant attempt to evade the force of the Kent
decision should not be permitted to succeed.").
138. See id. at 1344.
139. See id. at 1335-36. In a similar challenge to a "pure" prosecutorial waiver
statute, the court in Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 909 (1973), specifically rejected procedural safeguards as a precondition to the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion:
Judicial proceedings must be clothed in the raiment of due process, while
the processes of prosecutorial decision-making wear very different garb. It is
one thing to hold, as we have, that when a state makes waiver of a juvenile
court's jurisdiction a judicial function, the judge must cast about the defendant all of the trappings of due process, but it does not necessarily follow
that a state or the United States may not constitutionally treat the basic
question as a prosecutorial function, making a highly placed, supervisory
prosecutor responsible for deciding whether to proceed against a juvenile as
an adult. If it does, as the United States has, the character of the proceeding,
rather than its consequences to the accused, are largely determinative of his
rights.
Id. at 336.
The most common justification for the unreviewability of prosecutorial decisions
is that, according to the constitutional principle of separation of powers, the judiciary
lacks the power to compel or control the executive in matters that are essentially
discretionary. See, e.g., United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973); Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 482 (D.C.
Cir. 1967); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
935 (1965). Thus, in the absence of individious discrimination, the prosecutor's decisions about whether and whom to prosecute are beyond the review of the judiciary.
See, e.g., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 455 (1962); Note, Reviewability of Prosecutorial
Discretion: Failure to Prosecute, 75 CoLuM. L. Rxv. 130 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Reviewability of ProsecutorialDiscretion]; Note, ProsecutorialDiscretion-A Reevaluation of the Prosecutor'sUnbridledDiscretion and its Potentialfor Abuse, 21 DE
PAUL L. Rav. 485 (1971). As the court in Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C.
Cir. 1967), noted, "[flew subjects are less adapted to judicial review than the exercise
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The dissent in Bland and those commentators who argue that
the comparable consequences of judicial and legislative waivers require the imposition of Kent procedures in both cases"' mistake the
basic issue in Bland. The issue whether to impose judicial review on
a prosecutor's charging decision cannot turn alone, as Judge Wright
suggested, on the seriousness of the consequences to the defendant of
being tried as an adult rather than a juvenile. Many types of prosecutorial decisions have enormous consequences for defendants-the
decision not to charge at all, the decision to charge a course of conduct as a misdemeanor rather than a felony, the decision to invoke
only one of several applicable statutes. Yet, as the Bland majority
pointed out, due process has never been held to require "an adversary
hearing before the prosecutor can exercise his age-old function of
deciding what charge to bring against whom."''
by the Executive of his discretion in deciding when and whether to institute criminal
proceeding, or what precise charge shall be made, or whether to dismiss a proceeding
once brought." Id. at 480.
Judicial reluctance to encumber the prosecutor's discretion stems from a fear of
intruding on sensitive legal and policy judgments. Apart from the separation of powers
issue, there is concern that judicial review, which presumably would entail the power
to compel the presentation or dismissal of a case, could result in a misallocation of
enforcement resources by preventing the prosecutor from maximizing its enforcement
effectiveness through selective prosecution. See United States v. Alarik, 439 F.2d 1349,
1350 (8th Cir. 1971). Nonreviewability is sometimes justified as well by the need to
maintain secrecy in the course of investigations. A hearing prior to the filing of charges
could divulge confidential sources. Additionally, the factors that influence a prosecutorial decision-legal evaluation of guilt, resource allocation, and other enforcement
policies-seldom provide a record in a form that permits meaningful pretrial review.
See Reviewability of ProsecutorialDiscretion,supra at 139.
The United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the freedom of prosecutors
from judicial constraints in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978), noting that
so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused
committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to
prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests
entirely in his discretion. Within the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, "the conscious exercise of
some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation" so long as "the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification."
Id. at 668 (footnote omitted) (quoting Oyler v. Bowles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)).
140. The Bland majority has been criticized for permitting the legislature to
circumvent Kent waiver procedures. See, e.g., Waiver of Jurisdiction,supra note 21,
at 662-64; Due Process and Waiver, supra note 21, at 606:
Because the effect and consequences of the waiver decision to the juvenile
are virtually identical whether the decision is made by a judge or a prosecutor, it might follow that the mere form of the waiver statute should be
ignored and all waiver decisions, under either a choice of charge statute or a
prosecutorial waiver statute, should be subject to review in furtherance of the
Gault philosophy.
141. 472 F.2d at 1337.
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In fact, Judge Wright's real concern in Bland seems to have been
not simply that the prosecutor's charging decision may have serious
consequences for a youthful offender but, more specifically, that in
deciding what charge to bring, the prosecutor may foreclose any subsequent consideration of a youth's amenability to juvenile treatment.
According to Wright, one of the "immutable" principles of our jurisprudence is that "'where governmental action seriously injures an
individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact
findings, the evidence used to prove the Government's case must be
disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that
it is untrue.' 12 Applying this principle in Kent, the Supreme Court
had required that before a judge could decide whether a youth was
susceptible to juvenile treatment, there had to be a hearing. Wright
suggested that the factual determinations at issue in a judicial waiver
decision are also at issue when the prosecutor makes his charging
decision. Thus, the same procedural safeguards should be required in
both situations since the result in each may be to deprive the youth
1 3
of his "right" to be charged as a juvenile.
Judge Wright's desire to extend the procedural requirements of
Kent to require review of the prosecutor's charging decision, however,
stemmed from a fundamental misunderstanding of what the prosecutor decides. The only factual issues involved in the charging decision
relate to probable cause and legal guilt, and the prosecutor's determinations in this regard are subjected to judicial review at trial. The
issue of amenability to treatment, which the dissent sought to resolve
in an adversary proceeding prior to trial, is not a factor in the prosecutor's decision to charge. Rather, the legislature, in deciding which
offenders to exclude from juvenile court jurisdiction, has presumably
concluded that youths charged with certain offenses are not amenable to treatment. The legislative classification is conclusive. Accordingly, within the statutory framework, no factual dispute regarding
amenability need be resolved.
Judge Wright's dissent notwithstanding, there is no per se right
to treatment as a juvenile. To the extent such a right exists, it exists
142. Id. at 1345 (quoting Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959)) (emphasis
added).
143. According to Wright, "a 'guilty' child may, under certain circumstances,
have a right to be charged as a juvenile." Id. at 1348. Whether that right exists in any
given case, however, can only be decided after a factual determination as to factors
such as "the maturity of the child and his susceptibility to rehabilitation." Id.
One writer who supports Judge Wright's contention notes that "a first degree
felony charge signifies only that there was probable cause to believe that juvenile may
have committed the offense for which he is charged. It does not bear on the juvenile's
prospects for treatment and rehabilitation." Due Process Analysis, supra note 21, at
344.
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because the legislature has created it, and what the legislature has
created, it can take away.' The dissent evinced a fundamental unwillingness to recognize that juvenile courts are purely statutory entities, the jurisdiction of which can be modified or abolished by the
legislature, and that in defining juvenile court jurisdiction, the legislature is free to subordinate individualized treatment values to other
considerations such as public safety. If juvenile court jurisdiction is
defined to include only those persons below a jurisdictional age who
are charged with a nonexcluded offense, all other persons are by
definition adults. While offense exclusion represents a departure from
more rehabilitative, individualized judicial examinations of the offender, the rehabilitative ideal is not writ in stone-nor in the Constitution."5
If, as Judge Wright lamented, under a legislative waiver statute,
"many impressionable 16- and 17-year-olds.

.

. will be packed off to

adult prisons where they will serve their time with hardened criminals,""' without any juvenile court inquiry into their potential for
rehabilitation, that is a result of the legislature's definition of children, not of the prosecutor's decision to file a particular charge. It is
the legislature that determines that youths charged with certain offenses should not be afforded juvenile treatment-because they are
not amenable to treatment, because they are too dangerous, or simply
because it would be too costly to attempt to rehabilitate them." 7
144. See 472 F.2d at 1335. The majority noted, "Congress easily could have
established 16 as the age cutoff date (it is not clear what constitutional infirmities our
dissenting dolleague would have found in that less sympathetic approach) .
"Id.
at 1332.
145.

As the Illinois Supreme Court stated in People v. Jiles, 43 ll. 2d 145, 148,

251 N.E.2d 529, 531 (1969),
[w]hile there would probably be almost universal agreement that it is desir-

able for a State to maintain a juvenile court and to establish special facilities
for the treatment of a separate category of "juvenile delinquents", we are

aware of nothing in the constitution of the United States or of this State that
requires a State to do so.
Accord, People v. Bombacino, 51 Ill. 2d 17, 280 N.E.2d 697, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 912
(1972); State v. Green, 218 Kan. 438, 442, 544 P.2d 356, 361 (1975) ("[The legislature
could ... withhold the protection of the doctrine of parenspatriae from all juveniles
exceeding fifteen years of age. What the legislature may do absolutely, it may do
conditionally .... ").

146. 472 F.2d at 1349.
147. The exact rationale of legislative waiver is unclear. Offense exclusion could
be viewed as a conclusive presumption that persons who allegedly engage in certain
conduct cannot be treated or are extraordinarily dangerous. The Bland court indicated
that "'experience has shown that in certain crime categories, juvenile treatment is

unworkable.' "Id. at 1332 (quoting Department of Justice memorandum to the Senate
Committee on the District of Columbia). If the classification reflects an "irrebuttable
presumption," however, it may be vulnerable:
An "irrebuttable presumption" analysis would appear to provide procedural
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In addition to challenges based on the absence of procedural
safeguards in connection with the prosecutor's charging decision, legislative waiver statutes have been challenged as violations of equal
protection by youths claiming that the statutory distinction between
those committing serious and minor offenses is arbitrary.4 8 The
courts have uniformly rejected such claims, noting that classification
on the basis of offense involves neither an inherently suspect class nor
invidious discrimination and that loss of juvenile court treatment
does not violate one of the fundamental rights or "preferred liberties"
that require stricter judicial scrutiny."' As the majority in Bland
noted, a legislative classification is entitled to a strong presumption
of constitutional validity as a means of dealing with a problem
uniquely within the legislative purview and should be invalidated
only if there is no rational basis to justify it:"'
"It is a salutary principle of judicial decision, long emphasized and
followed by this Court, that the burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of a statute rests on him who assails it, and that courts
protections for those juveniles who have been legislatively excluded from the
juvenile justice system. It might be argued in the case of the Bland statute,
for example, that Congress conclusively presumed that youths charged with
certain offenses are not amenable to treatment as juvenile delinquents. Because such a presumption may not be "necessarily or universally true in
fact," the statute creates an overinclusive burdening classification when
reasonable alternative means are available-a Kent-type waiver hearing-to
make the "critical decision" whether a particular juvenile might benefit from
juvenile treatment even though he is charged with a serious offense .... If
a State so purports to be concerned with rehabilitation of juveniles, then it
may not, consistent with due process, conclusively presume without a hearing that a particular juvenile is incapable of rehabilitation solely from the
fact that the juvenile is charged with a first degree felony.
Due Process Analysis, supra note 21, at 343-44 (footnotes omitted).
Offense exclusion may also reflect a legislative judgment that juvenile treatment
might undercut the seriousness of the norm violated. Such a judgment, however, is
contrary to the philosophical premises of the juvenile court, whih emphasize the needs
of the offender rather than the seriousness of the offense.
Whatever the rationale, offense exclusion is clearly at odds with the rehabilitative
philosophy of the juvenile court. Stamm notes that
if all offenses are not initially subject to management within the juvenile
justice system, there is an inherent incompatibility with the avowed philosophy of the juvenile court. It is tantamount to saying that children who
commit certain offenses cannot be rehabilitated and must be sent to criminal
court to protect the public safety and common good.
Stamm, supra note 8, at 139 (footnote omitted).
148. See cases cited note 134 supra.
149. See, e.g., United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1336-37 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973). The Bland court noted that "[s]everal states have
similarly excluded certain crimes in defining the jurisdiction of their respective systems of juvenile justice." Id. at 1334.
150. ' See id. at 1333-34.
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may not declare a legislative discrimination invalid unless, viewed
in the light of facts made known or generally assumed, it is of such
a character as to preclude the assumption that the classification
rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience
of the legislators." ''
Consistent with this analysis, a factual question for any court
faced with a challenge to a legislative waiver statute is whether "facts
known or generally assumed" provide a rational basis for treating
serious offenders differently from minor offenders. Since the challenger bears the burden of showing that a statute that classifies offenders according to offense is arbitrary and irrational, it is not surprising that these equal protection challenges have uniformly failed.
It appears that a statute discriminating between serious and minor
offenders will be sustained if it comports with a generally held societal belief that serious offenders ought to be treated differently because, as a class, they are beyond the rehabilitative reach of the
juvenile court or because their presence within the juvenile justice
system is detrimental to the rehabilitation of others.'52
Legislatures appear to assume, and courts to accept without
further elaboration, that youths who commit serious offenses are
different from minor offenders. The Bland court for instance,
adverted to the exclusion by other jurisdictions of certain classes of
offenses from the juvenile court as justifying its own assumption that
offenders can be differentiated on the basis of their offenses.'53
While legislative waiver statutes have uniformly been sustained
against due process and equal protection challenges, the courts have
not addressed several potentially more significant problems presented by these statutes. For instance, if the rationale of the legisla151. Id. at 1334 (quoting Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580,
584 (1935) (footnote omitted)) (emphasis added).
152. As Vitiello observes, however,

it is not clear whether a juvenile who commits a serious offense is ipso facto
less amenable to treatment than one who commits a trivial offense. Ingeneral, courts have glossed over that possibility and pointed to the seriousness
of the offense as indicative of nonamenability. The problem appears to be
far more complex than courts have recognized. For example, one study indicated that juvenile murderers are model prisoners and low rate recidivists.
There is also an indication that juvenile offenders can be categorized not by
seriousness of the offense but by the motivational need that the crime fills.
Vitiello, supra note 21, at 39; see notes 161-81 infra and accompanying text (question-

ing the legislative rationality of distinguishing first offenders on the basis of seriousness
of offense).
153. See 472 F.2d at 1334. The factual assumption legitimating classification on
the basis of offense appears contrary to the basic rationale of the juvenile court that
offenders differ and that there.is no direct or even necessary relationship between what
they did and what they need.
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tive waiver classification is that juvenile court treatment is inappro-

priate for those who commit certain offenses, then regardless of the
initial charge, if an individual is subsequently found not to have
committed one of the offenses excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction, he should be returned to that court.'54 Return to juvenile court
is certainly consistent with the statutory policies providing for differential treatment on the basis of offense committed. Moreover, the
policy reasons that militate against subjecting the prosecutor's charging decision to prior judicial review do not preclude examining it after
the fact. Finally, in the absence of a transfer-back provision, legislative waiver statutes lend themselves to prosecutorial abuse via overcharging.'55
Yet, despite the desirability of a transfer-back provision, statutes
such as that at issue in Bland' typically base adult court jurisdiction
on the prosecutor's initial charge rather than on the youth's ultimate
conviction;

57

the juvenile court is thus divested of jurisdiction with-

out any opportunity to assess the correctness of that decision.
A second, more significant problem with most legislative waiver
statutes is that the offense classification employed may not adequately reflect all the policy goals of the legislature. Consistent with
one legislative purpose, a classification based on purely retributive
values presumably could exclude from the juvenile process, solely on
154. The Senate Committee on the District of Columbia, in considering one of
the bills that underlay the statute ultimately challenged in Bland, addressed the issue
of transferring back to juvenile court jurisdiction those juveniles who were ultimately
convicted of offenses not falling within the statutory exclusion.
Family Division jurisdiction must be restored where the basis of transfer has
been invalidated. The Committee recognized that the ultimate finding, regarding the reasonable prospects of rehabilitation, consists of a prediction as
to the nature of the child's social character at the time of disposition. So too,
the committee recognized that of great revelance [sic] to this prediction is
the nature of the misconduct which, at the time of any dispositional hearing,
the child will have been found to have committed. Yet, in the committee's
opinion, it follows logically-from the fact that the transferfinding amounts
to predictionand from the assumption in that prediction that the child has
committed the acts alleged-thata child who is found not to have committed
the acts may well not suffer from the lesser prospects of rehabilitationpredicted, and ought to be returned to the juvenile system.
S. REP. No. 620, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1969) (emphasis added).
155. A district attorney is traditionally more likely than a judge to be
responsive to political pressure, and thus more likely to seek transfer of
jurisdiction in response to society's demand for retribution and to ignore the
rehabilitative considerations upon which the juvenile justice system is premised. Further, as an adversary, a prosecutor is less likely than a judge to
consider the welfare of the accused.
Vitiello, supra note 21, at 48.
156. D.C. CODE § 16-2301(3)(A) (Supp. 1970).
157. See note 131 supra and accompanying text.
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the basis of culpability, an older youth who committed a serious first
offense. Exclusion grounded only in retribution, however, is
backward-looking, keyed to the commission of one serious offense.
Under a retributive system, some acts are judged to be so heinous and
atrocious that the perpetrator deserves punishment without regard to
any other considerations. To the extent that the legislation proposed
in this Article focuses on serious offenses as the most significant
policy concern of the legislature, it clearly contains retributive features.
A basic premise of this Article, however, is that legislative exclusion should reflect more than past culpability or the commission of
one serious offense. Rather, the principal function of a legislative
exclusion statute should be rationally to distinguish between those
serious offenders who will continue to recidivate and those who are
likely to desist from future delinquencies. In short, a legislative
waiver statute may be in part retributive, but it should also be utilitarian in terms of the underlying premises of the juvenile justice
system. In this regard, the legislative exclusion statute in Bland
properly attempted to use information about past offenses not simply
as a basis for punishment, but also to improve judgments about the
likelihood of future delinquencies. That statute excluded youths
charged with certain serious offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction
on the basis of congressional findings that offenders between the ages
of sixteen and eighteen who had committed certain serious crimes
were simply "beyond rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system,"''
"too well formed or sophisticated for . . .mere juvenile therapy if
[they had] already been exposed . . . to the juvenile system,"' 59 and
different from "first offenders charged with minor offenses . . .
[because] in certain crime categories, juvenile treatment is unworkable."' In short, the statute purported to make a prediction concerning amenability and recidivism. Unlike the similar prediction involved in judicial waivers, however, the legislative prediction was
based on the seriousness of the offense rather than on the characteristics of the offender.
158. United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 909 (1973).
159. S. REP. No. 620, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1969). There were apparent
conflicts between the House and Senate "findings," and the final version of the statute
is a compromise between the Senate's requirement of prior juvenile treatment and the
House's extensive catalogue of excluded offenses. The final compromise "eliminates
the previous finding of delinquency required under the initial Senate version and
shortens the list of serious crimes contained in the initial House version." United
States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973).
160. Crime in the National Capital: Hearings on S. 2981 Before the Senate
Comm. on the District of Columbia, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 7, at 1816 (1969).
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Whether the legislative policy objectives and findings relied
upon in Bland can be translated into an offense classification that
successfully differentiates between those juvenile offenders who will
recidivate and those who will not depends, in part, upon whether
serious first offenders differ from minor offenders in their likelihood
of recidivating (or, as Congress viewed it, their amenability to treatment) and whether a serious first offense alone is a sufficient basis
for distinction. The statute involved in Bland, however, is significant
in that it attempts to use the commission of a past serious offense in
a predictive rather than purely retributive fashion.
As suggested in the earlier discussion of amenability to treatment, there is reason to question whether any significant differences
in amenability to treatment can be found among offenders classified
solely on the basis of present offense.' 1 Despite the congressional
findings noted in Bland, there is little empirical evidence to justify
the conclusion that a youth whose first offense is a serious one is any
more difficult to rehabilitate than a youth whose first offense is
minor. Congress apparently assumed that a youth progresses through
a delinquent career, starting with minor delinquencies and culminating with serious felonies, and that juvenile court intervention typically occurs at an intermediate point in such a progression."' This
conception assumes that a youth charged with a serious felony has
come into contact with the juvenile system earlier in his "career" and
that juvenile therapy has already proven unsuccessful in bringing
about rehabilitation.
While such progression from minor to serious offenses may occur,
it is certainly not inevitable. From the available evidence regarding
hidden delinquency and the development of delinquent careers,' it
appears that many youths engage in both trivial and serious law
violations at the same stage of their careers and that police arrest and
process youths primarily as a function of the frequency rather than
161. See notes 52-65 supra and acccompanying text.
162. The committee has concluded that a juvenile can reliably be considered too well formed or sophisticated for, and beyond the reach of, mere
juvenile therapy if the particular juvenile has already been exposed, in years
of relative discretion, to the juvenile system and treated to the extent that
his case required (as suggested by a prior finding of delinquency), and has
nevertheless returned to serious misconduct (as suggested by a serious felony

charge).
S. REP. No. 620, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1969). See generally Emerson, Role Determinants in Juvenile Court, in HANDBOOK OF CRMINOLOGY 621, 631-38 (D. Glaser ed. 1974).

The presumption of a progressive escalation in seriousness of sequential offenses does
not appear to be borne out in fact. See notes 170-76 infra and accompanying text
(indicating that, regardless of the number of prior violations, the probability that the
next violation will be more serious remains fairly static).
163. See notes 54-58 supra and accompanying text.
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the seriousness of an individual's delinquent involvements. ' Apprehension thus appears to be random, resulting primarily from a
youth's persistence. If this is true, then the fact that a youth is apprehended for a serious offense may not distinguish him from a youth
apprehended for a minor offense whose hidden serious delinquency
simply did not result in apprehension. Thus, the seriousness of an
offense provides little basis for distinguishing those youths who are
not susceptible to rehabilitation and are likely to recidivate from
those for whom disposition as a juvenile is appropriate.
Consistent with this conclusion are the findings contained in
Wolfgang's Delinquency in a Birth Cohort, which indicate that a first
offense, even a serious one, is predictive of neither the probability nor
the seriousness of future offenses." 5 Delinquency in a Birth Cohort
164. Williams and Gold report that
[tihe frequency of teenagers' delinquent behavior is positively associated
with their getting caught ....
To a lesser degree, so is the seriousness of
their behavior ....
[The frequency of delinquent behavior is more pre-

dictive of getting caught by the police than the seriousness of that behavior
*
[G]etting caught is to a great extent a chance occurrence.
Williams & Gold, supra note 54, at 219; see id. at 219-25.
165. See WOLFGANG, FIGuo, & SELuN, supra note 9, at 159-61. This study is a
very valuable contribution to an understanding of delinquency and the responses of
legal agencies to it. In examining the official delinquent careers of the birth cohort,
the authors conducted a search of police records and other data sources to determine
whether a juvenile in the sample was ever arrested. Delinquents were defined as those
with officially recorded delinquencies known to the police. Such delinquencies covered
a range of juvenile law violations, and a severity index was used to permit qualitative
comparisons of delinquent events.
Obviously, there are difficulties in relying on official police arrest data as the
criterion for delinquency. Official records cannot reflect the extensiveness of hidden
delinquencies or the relationship between hidden and known activity. Furthermore,
because official statistics may reflect some preliminary exercises of discretion in the
compilation of records, undiscernible biasing of the statistics may have occurred. Relying on arrest statistics may also include youths who are factually innocent, hence
nondelinquent. In light of the relationship between hidden and official delinquency,
however, while "there is a slight chance that an offense of which [a juvenile] is not
guilty may be recorded against him, . . . there is a much greater likelihood that the
records of the police inadequately show his real involvement in delinquency." Id. at
22. Moreover, relying on court adjudications rather than arrest as a criterion of delinquency would reflect one or two additional screening decisions and exercises of discretion. While all of those who are formally adjudicated are delinquents, many whose
cases were closed by the police or court intake also committed delinquencies. For
purposes of understanding delinquency, official arrest records are the closest to the
actual universe of delinquent activities, albeit still a conservative estimate.
There may be some question whether the results reported by Wolfgang can be
generalized beyond the location of the study-Philadelphia-or its time frame, covering boys born in 1945 and becoming delinquent in the late 1950's and early 1960's.
While the extent to which the findings apply elsewhere can be determined only by
replication studies in other locales and from other time periods, Delinquency in a Birth
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reports the results of a study of the official delinquent careers of all
males born in 1945 and residing in Philadelphia from their tenth until
their eighteenth birthday. Based on this study, Wolfgang concludes
that for virtually all purposes most of the significant differences in
frequency and seriousness of delinquency occur between those juveniles with one or two delinquencies and those with five or more.'6 The
study found that while one-third (34.9%) of all of the boys in the
Philadelphia cohort were involved in at least one delinquency, nearly
half (46.4%) of the offender group desisted after initial contact with
the police and committed no further delinquences.11 Of those offenders committing a second delinquency, an additional one-third
(34.9%) desisted from committing a third.'66 Offenders inflicting personal injury were nearly as likely to desist after one offense (43%) as
other types of offenders.'69 As a policy matter, then, the severe adult
intervention in the life of a serious first offender that occurs under
most legislative waiver statutes appears unnecessary since in many
cases these youths will not persist in delinquent behavior.
These findings raise other policy issues regarding legislative exclusions of serious first-time offenders. One question concerns the
probability that a person who commits an initial injury offense will
commit a second offense, and if so, the probability that it will also
be an offense against the person. A second concerns the extent to
which the probabilities of a subsequent offense against the person for
those who commit an initial injury offense differ from the probabilities for prior offenders. The Philadelphia study found some evidence
indicating a tendency toward offense specialization in delinquent careers-the probability of committing a second offense of the same type
as a prior offense-but such tendencies were relatively weak. 7 ' The
probability that a youth whose first offense involved personal injury
would subsequently be arrested for another injury offense was less
than ten percent (9.2%). A recidivating offender who had previously
committed a property damage offense was almost as likely as an
injury offender to be arrested the next time for an injury offense
Cohort is a pioneering attempt to "note the age of onset and the progression or cessation of delinquency," the relationship between delinquency and "certain personal or
social characteristics of the delinquents," and the difference between delinquents and
those who "did not have official contact with the law." Id. at 4-5. Whatever its shortcomings may be, it provides some of the best available evidence on many delinquency
and social policy issues.
166. See id. at 88-105.
167. See id. at 159-60. While two-thirds of these first offenses were less serious
(nonindex) types of offenses, the remainder were more serious (index) delinquencies.
Nearly eight percent of first arrests were for injury offenses. See id.
168. See id. at 163.
169. See id. at 160.
170. See id. at 188-90.
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Thus it appears that youths initially arrested for serious
offenses are scarcely more likely to be rearrested for such offenses
than are those whose initial violation was less serious.
While a retributive-utilitarian legislative exclusion should be
designed to prevent serious offenses from recurring, the likelihood
that an initial serious offender will commit a second serious offense
is low and not significantly different from the likelihood that a minor
offender's second offense will be serious.17 Generalizing about the
probabilities that, given prior violations, particular types of subsequent violations will occur, Wolfgang concludes that
(8.8%).

11

the typical offender is most likely to commit a nonindex [i.e., nonserious] offense next, regardless of what he did in the past. If he
does not commit a nonindex type next, is most likely to desist from
further delinquency. If he were to commit an index [i.e., serious]
offense next, it would most likely be the theft of property ....
With the exception of the moderate tendency to repeat the same
type of73 offense, this pattern obtains regardlessof the previous offense.1
While a first offense provides a slight indicator of the type of
second offense, the number and type of offenses prior to the last
offense provide no additional aid in predicting the type of the next
offense.' 74 Moreover, the probability of committing a particular type
of offense remains apprbximately the same regardless of the number
of prior offenses, and there does not appear to be a progressive increase in the seriousness of the offenses committed as the number of
prior involvements rose.' 5
[Tihe probability of being involved in a particular type of offensive
behavior is independent of the number of offenses that a juvenile
may have committed. We may state simply, as an example, that a
boy is no more likely at, say, the eleventh offense to be involved in
a violent act than he was at the fifth.' 7'
171. Id. at 188. The likelihood of an injury offender ever committing another
injury offense, regardless of other intervening offenses, was .2138. Id. at 190, table
11.10. Unfortunately, the data do not include the probability of other types of recidivista ever committing an injury 6ffense.
172. See id. at 183, matrix 11.9. The probabilities of committing particular types
of offenses did not change appreciably with the number of offenses. Wolfgang generated a transition matrix indicating the probabilities of injury offense, inter alia, given
a prior offense. The probability of an injury offense following a prior injury offense was
.0920, while the probability of an injury offense following a nonindex violation was
.0685; following theft, .0530; following damage, .0882; following combination, .0703.

See id.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 189 (emphasis in original).
See id. at 206.
See id. at 165.
Id. at 175.
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Finally, Wolfgang reports that, in terms of persistence, the most
significant offender differences occur between those juveniles with
one or two delinquencies and those arrested five or more times.'" The
probability that a chronic offender will be involved in a sixth or
subsequent delinquency is about .80,178 Although the likelihood that
any given delinquent act will be a serious offense is low, the relatively
small group of chronic delinquents accounts for a disproportionately
large amount of the total volume of serious youth crime.17 1 In summarizing the differences between most offenders and the chronic delinquents, Wolfgang reports,
These chronic offenders represent only around 6 percent of the entire
birth cohort and 18 percent of the delinquent group; yet, this small
group of 627 were responsible for 5,300 delinquencies, or 52 percent
of all such acts committed by the entire birth cohort. They were
heavily represented among those who committed violent offenses;
about 55 percent of all the offenses we designatedviolent were committed by this small group of 62Z They were responsible for 71
percent of the robberiesand for all the homicides. The other offenses
committed by most of the other delinquents in the birth cohort were
relatively trivial, and when we tried to grade them (i.e., weight them
in some way by a seriousness score that we had worked out earlier),
the differences between the hard core-the chronic
small group of
180
627-and the others became even more dramatic.
While most youngsters desist after one or two delinquencies, for those
few youths who persist, the probability of significant recidivism stabilizes. 8'
*The only valid basis for distinguishing chronic offenders from
their less persistent counterparts is the number of prior involvements.
The seriousness of the offense alone is no indicator of the likelihood
of repetition. Thus a statute that excludes a juvenile who commits a
single serious offense subsumes many juveniles who probably would
not be involved in subsequent serious misconduct. Focusing on one
offense alone, such statutes cannot rationally distinguish between the
random serious offender and those relatively few persistent youths
who ultimately account for most of the serious delinquencies.
These findings of the Philadelphia study have important implications for the construction of rational legislative waiver categories.
They suggest that a first offense, even a serious one, is not indicative
of either future offenses or their seriousness since most first offenders,
177.
178.
179.
180.

NAL

See id. at 65, 88.
Id. at 162, table 10.3.
See id. at 88.
Wolfgang, ContemporaryPerspectives on Violence, in VIOLENCE
JUSTICE 7 (D. Chappell & J. Monahan eds. 1975) (emphasis added).
181. See WOLFGANG, FIGLIO, & SELWN, supra note 9, at 163.
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including serious ones, are likely either to desist from further criminal
involvement entirely or to commit a nonindex, nonserious offense
next. They suggest that while the commission of an offense is the best
indicator of the likelihood of a subsequent offense of the same type,
it is a weak indicator, and the probabilities of offense switching are
nearly as great. They suggest that the probability that a particular
type of violation will occur remains approximately the same regardless of the number of prior violations. Finally, they suggest that,
regardless of the type of initial offenses, youths who will be persistent,
chronic violators can be identified only after they have recidivated
several times. Even though the probability of a serious offense at any
given delinquent event is low, persistent offenders commit more delinquencies and thus have a better "chance" of eventually committing serious ones. Thus, utilitarian legislative waiver classifications
must be designed to identify persistent delinquents who are also
serious, rather than initially serious delinquents who may ultimately
be neither serious nor persistent offenders.
Some jurisdictions attempt to account for persistence as well as
seriousness by legislatively waiving only repeat offenders. Rhode Island, for example, legislatively excludes only youths aged sixteen or
over who are currently charged with felonies and who have been
convicted of felonies twice since becoming sixteen.1 82 The prerequisite
of two felony convictions after sixteen clearly addresses the serious
and persistent offender identified by the Wolfgang study. Within a
judicial waiver framework, a Colorado statute provides that two prior
felony convictions create a prima facie case for waiver.", The Juvenile
Justice Standards Project recommends an even more stringent criterion, a previous adjudication for a violent crime, as a prerequisite to
judicial waiver.""
Legislative exclusion on the basis of a present serious offense
combined with a significant prior record is much more likely than the
"one-shot" statutes to identify the persistent juvenile offenders who
ultimately pose the serious threat to the community. A reference
matrix combining various present offenses with prior records could
explicitly incorporate the actuarial prediction methods on which the
courts implicitly rely in making amenability/dangerousness determinations. A legislatively promulgated matrix, based on retributiveutilitarian assumptions, could identify serious and persistent delinquents at least as accurately as the most sophisticated clinicaljudicial methods and with much greater objectivity, fairness, and
ease of administration.
182. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-7.1 (Supp. 1977).
183. CoLo. RE v. STAT. §§ 19-3-108(2)(c) (1973).
184. See TRmsum BrwmxN CoURTS, supra note 21, § 2.2 C(2).
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III. THE LEGISLATIVE ALTERNATIVE TO JUDICIAL
WAIVER
Selecting the criteria to construct a legislative matrix entails
both an empirical judgment and a value choice. The empirical judgment involves an effort to identify the persistent and serious offender
statistically on the basis of the available, albeit inadequate, social
science data and information concerning present waiver administration. The task is to select criteria that will identify serious and persistent recidivists with as little overprediction as possible and to discriminate between the relatively few youths who should be handled
as adults and the vast majority of juvenile offenders who appropriately belong within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. As the preceding discussion indicates, the most reliable and relevant criteria on
which to base these judgments are the present offense and the prior
record, combined so as to maximize the differences between the two
classes of juvenile offenders.
Selecting the matrix criteria also entails an explicit value choice
about the quantity and quality of youthful deviance that will be
tolerated within the juvenile system before a more punitive adult
response is mandated. Since youths will normally not receive better
rehabilitative services in the adult correctional system than are available in the juvenile system, the decision to transfer a youth to the
adult process must ultimately be defensible on either retributive or
general preventive grounds. From the community's perspective, the
principal values of exclusion are enhanced community protection
through the greater security and longer sentences available in the
adult system, increased general deterrence through greater certainty
of consequences, and reaffirmation of fundamental societal norms
regarding intolerable deviance. Since most offenders, adults and juveniles alike, do not require penal incarceration, however, legislative
exclusion is appropriate only when an offender's past record of persistence and the seriousness of his present offense appear to society
to warrant confinement. The value judgment as to when this situation is reached reflects a tension between retribution and utility.
While a retributive value choice might dictate automatic exclusion
of those who commit a serious, heinous offense, a choice based on
utility requires that the serious offender be excluded only if shown to
be a chronic recidivist.
The proposed matrix, in requiring convictions for prior offenses
in addition to a present serious offense, attempts to reconcile the
retributive and utilitarian bases for excluding serious and persistent
offenders. The choices embodied in the matrix define the outer limits
of juvenile court intervention and determine how much repeated juvenile deviance may occur before an adult sanction is sought.
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A. Tim LEGISLATIVE MATRIX
The proposed matrix'" draws upon available empirical data and
existing legislative judgments about age, persistence, and seriousness. Because the matrix reflects value choices, others may disagree
with the categories proposed. On balance, however, especially when
considered in conjunction with the anticipated beneficial systemic
changes that may occur from "counting offenses,"'' 6 use of a matrix
is a realistic approach toward identifying the serious and persistent
offender.
The proposed matrix establishes a minimum age of fourteen
years as a precondition for adult prosecution. It then creates four
categories that combine different degrees of offense seriousness with
different measures of persistence. These categories attempt to reconcile the tension between retribution and utility. While utility and
predictive validity increase with persistence, retribution increases
with seriousness. Thus, as the seriousness of the present offense increases, the number of prior convictions required declines. As the
seriousness of the present offense decreases, the number of prior convictions required increases. Seriousness is determined by legislative
classifications and authorized penalties. While using legislative offense categories as a basis for classification may not be the most
sensitive measure of an act's seriousness, it is the only measure available that can be administered uniformly throughout the jurisdiction.
The matrix attempts to identify the relatively small proportion
of the juvenile population that accounts for a significant proportion
of the overall volume of serious offenses committed. The underlying
assumption is that, although predicting who will be a serious offender
in the future is an extremely imprecise enterprise, the most reliable
indicators available are the seriousness of the present offense and the
extensiveness of the prior record. Moreover, since the issue of waiver
arises primarily in the context of a concern for public safety, it seems
appropriate to address the issue of an offender's seriousness and
persistence directly rather than circuitously through an amenability
inquiry.
1. Minimum Age of Fourteen Years
For purposes of the matrix, a youth must have attained a minimum age of fourteen years at the time of the act as a precondition
for adult prosecution, and only offenses committed after a youth has
attained the age of fourteen will be counted among the offenses included in the prior record within the exclusion matrix. Fourteen is a
185.
186.

See Appendix, pp. 617-18 infra.
See notes 234-74 infra and accompanying text.
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minimum age commonly used in waiver statutes and is presumably
a reflection of the policies underlying the common law infancy defense.8 7 There is ample reason to believe that most youths aged fourteen or older possess the necessary criminal culpability to be regarded
as being as responsible for their criminal misconduct as adults. Moreover, the Minnesota legislature has already made the policy judgment that youths aged fourteen or older may be prosecuted as
adults. I n
Any minimum age is necessarily arbitrary, and most youths currently referred for adult prosecution are older than fourteen. In a
Minnesota study, nearly ninety percent of the youths for whom adult
reference was sought were sixteen or older, and more than seventy
percent were seventeen or eighteen at the time of their reference
hearing. 9 This heavy weighting toward the older end of the juvenile
client spectrum is consistent with studies of waiver practices in other
jurisdictions.' Since the matrix entails consideration of prior record
as well as present offense, it is likely that those excluded will continue
to be among the older delinquents. Nevertheless, a minimum age
higher than fourteen would be unresponsive to the occasional youth
whose delinquent career begins at a relatively early age. Especially
in urban counties, youthful involvement in serious crime at a relatively young age is unfortunately common. Approximately 25% of the
adult reference petitions filed in Hennepin County, for example, involved youths who were either fourteen or fifteen.'' The present legislative judgment regarding the minimum age for adult prosecution is
retained to reach these more youthful offenders.
2. Previously Adjudicated a Delinquent After Attaining the Age of
Fourteen Years on the Basis of Conduct That Would Be a Felony If
Committed by an Adult and Charged with Murder in Any Degree
The killing of another human being without justification or excuse is the most serious offense in the criminal code. The authorized
penalties for murder are significantly greater than those for any other
187. See, e.g., IOWA COD § 232.72 (1977); MINN. STAT. § 609.055 (1976). For a
discussion of the infancy defense and its relationship to juvenile court jurisprudence,
see note 308 infra.
188. See MiNN. STAT. § 609.055 (1976).
189. See Supreme Court Study, supra note 111, at 69, table 12.
190. See, e.g., Note, supra note 6, at 854 (All of the youths waived during the
seventeen months surveyed in the study were seventeen-year-old males with prior
court adjudications; 88% had previously been committed to the state's training
school.); Waiver in Wisconsin, supra note 21, at 553 (survey of juvenile court judges,
who reported that they were "more likely to waive, the closer the juvenile is to 18").
191. See Supreme Court Study, supra note 111, at 69, table 12. Only two percent
were still fourteen at the time of their reference hearing.
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offense, ranging from 25 years to life imprisonment. ' To treat juveniles who commit murder as a separate class of extraordinary seriousness seems appropriate. Many jurisdictions treat murder as a special
class," 3 and even states employing judicial waiver may legislatively
exclude juvenile murderers."'
Under the matrix, in order for a juvenile charged with murder
to be excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction, he must have been
adjudicated a delinquent after attaining fourteen years of age on the
basis of conduct that would be a felony if committed by an adult.'95
Although the seriousness of homicide may reduce the necessary showing of persistence, a prior felony adjudication based on conduct arising out of a transaction separate from the present offense is still
required."' At least one separate involvement in serious misconduct
seems necessary to warrant a conclusion that the juvenile's seriousness and persistence require adult disposition. It is important to reemphasize that a serious first offense alone is indicative of neither
future seriousness nor persistence."'
Homicide is a relatively uncommon juvenile offense.'98 It may be
committed by a sophisticated young offender for whom it is the culmination of a career encompassing several delinquency adjudications. On the other hand, the murder of a parent, for example, may
be the only discordant note in the life of an adolescent otherwise free
of contact with the juvenile system. Requiring a prior felony adjudication after reaching fourteen years of age as a condition precedent
to adult prosecution for murder is an attempt to legislatively distinguish between the persistent serious offender and the isolated serious
192. Murder in the first degree, MINN. STAT. § 609.185 (1976) (life imprisonment); murder in the second degree, id. § 609.19 (forty years); murder in the third
degree, id. § 609.195 (25 years).
193. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-5-7-4.1(a)(1) (Bums Supp. 1977).
194. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-23-29 (1972) (excluding those charged with
crimes punishable by life imprisonment or death).
195. While technically juveniles cannot be convicted for committing crimes,
MINN. STAT. § 260.211(1) (1976), they can be adjudicated delinquents on the basis of
conduct which would be criminal if committed by an adult, id. § 260.015(5)(a)-(b).
196. Section 609.035 of the Minnesota Statutes requires that all offenses arising
out of one course of conduct be charged and tried at the same time or they will be
barred by double jeopardy. The matrix requirement of a prior felony from a separate
transaction emphasizes the persistence element by precluding a juvenile's exclusion
on the basis of another felony occurring concurrently with the homicide, such as a
felony-murder. See id. § 609.195(2).
197. See notes 165-81 supra and accompanying text.
198. Youths under eighteen account for less than ten percent of the murders and
nonnegligent homicides committed. FEDERAL BuREAu OF INVESTIGATION, DEP'T OF JusTcE, CaME IN TE UNITED STATES 1975: UNwoRm CnnmE REPORTS 190, table 37 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as UNiFORm CaIME REPORTS].
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offender. While the youth for whom a murder is an isolated event may
be significantly disturbed, such an offender is more appropriately
treated within the juvenile justice or mental health system than by
adult prosecution.'99 When the youth has had a prior delinquency
adjudication for a felony, however, a subsequent homicide may properly be regardqd as evidence of persistence and seriousness"'
3. Previously Adjudicated to Be Delinquent on Two PriorOccasions
After Attaining the Age of Fourteen Years on the Basis of Conduct
That Would Be a Felony If Committed by an Adult, or on One Prior
Occasion After Attaining the Age of Fourteen Years on the Basis of
Conduct That, If Committed by an Adult, Would Be Murder in Any
Degree or One of the FeloniesListed Herein, and Charged with Manslaughter in the First Degree, Arson in the First or Second Degree,
Criminal Sexual Conduct in the First or Second Degree, Sodomy,
Aggravated Assault, Aggravated Robbery, Robbery, or Kidnapping
All offenses listed in the second category share similar characteristics. They are crimes against the person, involving violence or the
threat of violence, and carry maximum penalties ranging from ten to
forty years imprisonment."' With murder, they constitute what are
regarded as the most serious offenses. Juveniles account for a significant proportion of these offenses.0 2
Under the matrix provisions, a youth charged with one of these
offenses will be excluded for adult prosecution only if, after reaching
fourteen years of age, he has been previously adjudicated guilty of
murder or one of the other offenses against the person included in this
category or has been twice adjudicated a delinquent on the basis of
199. See generallyMikulovsky v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 699, 708, 196 N.W.2d 748,753
(1972) (the court rejected as irrelevant the fact that a seventeen-year-old juvenile who

had murdered his parents had no prior record and that the act was unique in his life).
200.

Obviously, an adjudication for a felony such as unauthorized use of a motor

vehicle, MINN.

STAT.

§ 609.55 (1976), does not suggest that the youth will subsequently

commit a more serious crime such as murder, but it might be assumed that most

youths who commit murder will have prior adjudications for other felonies. This is an
impression gleaned from various waiver studies. See sources cited note 111 supra.
201. Manslaughter in the first degree, MINN. STAT. § 609.20 (1976) (fifteen years);
arson in the first degree, id. § 609.561 (twenty years); arson in the second degree, id. §
609.562 (ten years); criminal sexual conduct in the first degree, id. § 609.342 (twenty
years); criminal sexual conduct in the second degree, id. § 609.343 (fifteen years);
sodomy, id. § 609.293 (thirty years); aggravated assault, id. § 609.225 (ten years);

aggravated robbery, id. § 609.245 (twenty years); simple robbery, id. § 609.24 (ten
years); kidnapping, id. § 609.25 (forty years).
202. In 1975, youths under eighteen years of age committed about eighteen percent of the rapes and aggravated assaults and 34% of the robberies. UNiFORm Cmm
REPoaRTs,

supra note 198, at 190, table 37.
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other felony charges. Youths who have been previously adjudicated
for an offense against the person or who have two previous felony
adjudications and who are now charged with an offense against the
person are serious and persistent offenders. While an isolated instance of serious misconduct may indicate neither seriousness nor
persistence, repetition of such' behavior supports an inference that it
is no longer atypical, and although even a second incident is not
strongly predictive, the seriousness of the conduct in this category
requires a more immediate response. The Juvenile Justice Standards
Project required a prior adjudication of an offense against the person
as a prerequisite to reference for adult prosecution:
[I]he juvenile [must] have been previously adjudicated on
charges of threatening or inflicting serious bodily injury. The presumption in favor of juvenile court jurisdiction is strong. Only juveniles who pose genuine threats to community safety should be
waived and exposed to the greater sanctions of the criminal court.
A prior record of violent acts is evidence of that threat.m
The matrix incorporates this recommendation through its requirement of a prior offense against the person. It provides, in the alternative, that two prior felony adjudications coupled with a present offense against the person also warrant exclusion, since two prior felony
adjudications provide greater evidence of persistence, offsetting their
lesser seriousness.
4. Previously Adjudicated a Delinquent on Three Prior Occasions
After Attaining the Age of Fourteen Years on the Basis of Conduct
That Would Be a Felony If Committed by an Adult and Chargedwith
Burglary
Burglary is an offense committed primarily by youths and is one
at which they become highly specialized.2' It is not uncommon for
youths embarking on a career of burglary to become highly recidivistic.ns Moreover, although burglary is arguably only a property crime,

there is often the possibility of a violent encounter between the bur-

203. TRANSFER BzrwzN CouRTs, supra note 21, at 39.
204. Youths below eighteen years of age committed 53% of all burglaries in 1975.
UNIFoRM CmEas REPoirrs, supra note 198, at 190, table 37. The prcblem is especially
acute in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area, where, in 1975, of all persons arrested for
burglary, 78% in Minneapolis and 69.1% in St. Paul were juveniles. CrzENs LEAGuE,
supra note 19, at 4.
205. The highest probability of ever committing the same offense again occurs
for theft offenders. The likelihood that another theft will be committed in a delinquent
career is between .3349 and .4722, the highest probabilities of any major crime.
WOLFGANG, FGLuO, & SELuN, supra note 9, at 190.
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glar and the victim. The seriousness of burglaries of dwellings is
reflected in the fact that such burglaries are punishable by as much
as twenty years imprisonment." 6
Constructing a matrix requires that prevalent or persistent forms
of youthful misconduct be taken into account, even if they are not as
serious as offenses against the person. The matrix attempts to balance the somewhat lesser seriousness of burglary, as compared to
offenses against the person, and to identify only those significant
career burglars who specialize in this offense by requiring three prior
felony adjudications as a precondition for exclusion.
5. Previously Adjudicated a Delinquent on Four Prior Occasions
After Attaining the Age of Fourteen Years on the Basis of Conduct
That Would Be a Felony and Charged with a Felony
This is a residual category designed to include a persistent offender who is involved in a large amount of significant criminal misconduct even though none of it is as serious as that reflected in the
preceding categories. Felonious conduct subjects an adult to imprisonment of more than one year and is, by legislative definition, a
serious departure from the community norm. Persistent felonious
misconduct, as manifested by four previous adjudications in juvenile
court and a fifth felony arrest, is likely to continue. Wolfgang's research indicates that a youth with five arrests for any type of offense
has a probability of approximately .80 of being involved in a subsequent offense, and there is a nearly one-in-three chance that any
subsequent offense will be a felony. 0 7 These probabilities of additional violations remain relatively stable for any number of offenses
thereafter. While Wolfgang's research is based on all offenses, the
matrix counts only felonies and is thus a relatively conservative estimator of the likelihood of recidivism. Given the high probability of
recidivism by persistent offenders and the likelihood that a subsequent crime will be felonious, this residual category effectively limits
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over repeat offenders who have
already demonstrated by their lengthy record that they are not responsive to the intervention of the juvenile court.
See MiNN. STAT. § 609.58 (1976).
207. See WOLFGANG, FIGLIO, & SELu, supra note 9, at 162, table 10.3, 163; cf.
206.

M. Wolfgang, From Boy to Man-From Delinquency to Crime 9, table V (paper presented at National Symposium on the Serious Juvenile Offender in Minneapolis, Minnesota, Sept. 19-20, 1977) (tracing the offense patterns of the delinquent cohort into
adulthood and reporting that after the fourth offense, the probability of additional
offenses ranges between .771 and .955, and the probability that any additional offense
will be a felony ranges between .300 and .722).
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COMPARISON OF THE MATRIX TO JUDICIL WAIVER

As indicated earlier, the object of the matrix is to identify youths
whose behavior can be characterized as serious and persistent and to
differentiate between that group and other juveniles appearing before
the court. While a comparison of the youths who would be identified
by the matrix with those for whom judicial waiver has been sought
would be informative, the absence of an automated, statewide offender tracking system and a lack of complete data on certified
youths prevent a thorough comparison of the legislative and judicial
approaches to the identification of serious and persistent offenders.
Several studies of various aspects of certification administration,
however, provide information bearing on these questions.2'
The Governor's Commission on Crime Prevention and Control
compared some alternative definitions of violent and hard-core offenders that might be included in a legislative matrix to determine
the number of youths that would be excluded by different criteria and
the extent to which such youths differed from other juveniles in terms
of the frequency or seriousness of their involvements.20 ' Although the
matrix proposed in this Article was not among those tested, many of
its components were included in other definitions that were. The
study found that more restrictive definitions-those that required
serious offenses and prior records-provided the greatest discrimination between persistent and serious offenders and the remainder of
the juvenile population."' The more restrictive definitions identified
fewer youths as "violent" and "hard-core," but those who were identified had more extensive records, greater seriousness per sustained
offense, and the greatest differences from the remaining juvenile population in terms of frequency and severity." The definition that the
208. See, e.g., GovmRNoR's CommissIoN STUry, supranote 18; HENNEPiN CouNTr
STUDy, supra note 9; CORRMcONS PROFILE, supranote 70; Supreme Court Study, supra
note 111.
209. GoVERNoR's CoMnssioN STUDy, supra note 18, at 12. The study sampled
juvenile court records in selected counties in Minnesota, coding age, present offense,

prior record, and other information. The data collected permitted estimates based on
the entire Minnesota juvenile population. The alternative definitions employed were

then tabulated to determine how many youths in the sample fit within each definition
(and by extrapolation how many youths in the state met each definition) and to what
extent the records of youths so identified differed from the remainder of the sample in
terms of seriousness and persistence. See id. at 15, table 1.
210. See id. at 16-20.
211.

A subsequent analysis indicates that the matrix definition proposed in this

Article would exclude approximately 182 youths out of a total juvenile court population
in Minnesota exceeding 13,000. Id. at 15, table 1. This is a significantly lower number
than would be excluded under most of the other definitions of violent or hard-core
offenders tested by the Governor's Commission on Crime Prevention and Control. See
id. The author greatly appreciates the assistance of Ann Jaede, Cynthia Turner, and
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study concluded discriminated most effectively between serious offenders and other delinquents was also the one that was most similar
to the proposed matrix."' As the study noted,
[alithough the ...

definition appears to be relatively compli-

cated, (1) it does differentiate between violent or hard-core and
other offenders, (2)it results in a relatively small proportion of the
total juvenile offender population, (3) it does characterize serious
offense histories indicated by the relatively high mean severity
scores, and (4) 13the definition does encompass both violent and hardcore behavior.

Thus, it appears that the proposed matrix identifies serious and persistent offenders in such a way as to maximize distinctions between
them and their less delinquent peers.
Another study conducted in Hennepin County (Minneapolis)
compared the characteristics and delinquent careers of violent and
hard-core offenders with other juveniles handled by the juvenile
court. 2 4 In that study, violent and hard-core youths were defined as

those with two arraignments for offenses against the person or three
arraignments for major property crimes.2"' The report also included
summaries of the case files of youths for whom waiver for adult prosecution was sought in 1974.211 On the basis of the information contained in those summarized files, every case that the juvenile court
actually certified for adult prosecution would also have been excluded
from the juvenile system by the matrix criteria. It appears, however,
that the certified youths would have been excluded somewhat earlier
by the matrix, thereby "saving" at least some of the additional offenses that they committed prior to waiver. Of the cases that the court
declined to transfer, some would have been excluded by the matrix,
while others would have remained within the juvenile system. Thus,
it appears that the urban juvenile offender would be marginally more
likely to be referred for adult prosecution under the proposed matrix
and that, on the whole, the matrix identifies serious recidivists as well
as does the juvenile court. As the Minnesota Supreme Court's Study
Linda Biele of the Minnesota Crime Control Planning Board for their assistance in
providing and analyzing data about serious juvenile offenders in Minnesota.
212. This definition, as modified, identified youths aged fourteen and over who
had been convicted of: (a) homicide, kidnapping, aggravated arson, or criminal
sexual misconduct, first or third degree; (b) manslaughter, aggravated assault, aggravated robbery, with a prior felony conviction within the preceding 24 months; (c) two
separate adjudications for major property offenses. See id. at 20.
213. Id. at 19.
214. HENNEmN COUNTY STUDY, supra note 9.
215. See id. at 5. Arraignment was used as the criterion in order to reduce the
effects of subsequent plea bargaining.
216. See id. at 62-85.
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Commission noted, however, certification is apparently reserved for
serious and persistent offenders only in urban counties." 7 One probable consequence of exclusion by a legislative matrix is that rural
youths who often are waived for fewer and less serious offenses than
their urban counterparts would remain within the juvenile justice
system longer than they do under the present discretionary waiver.
C.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE MATRIX

1.

Determinationsof Jurisdiction

The proposed matrix uses an offender's age, present offense, and
prior record to exclude certain youths from juvenile court. Those
chronological minors that fit the proposed criteria would be tried as
adults with all of the procedural and substantive rights available to
adult criminal defendants.
The prosecutor's charging decision would initially determine
whether a case is subject to juvenile or adult court jurisdiction. If a
prosecutor involved in juvenile proceedings evaluated a juvenile's
present offense and found probable cause to believe that the juvenile
had committed a particular felony, he would then consult the youth's
prior juvenile court record to determine whether this juvenile could
be appropriately prosecuted as an adult. In the event that a juvenile's
age, present offense, and prior record excluded him from juvenile
court jurisdiction, the case would be transferred for adult prosecution.
Once the juvenile's case was transferred, there would be a
prompt probable cause determination as part of the normal adult
criminal process." ' If probable cause were found that the youth's
conduct was an excluded felony, then the youth could be properly
217. See notes 113-19 supraand accompanying text. This observation is partially
confirmed by a study by the Research Unit of the Minnesota Department of Corrections, which indicates that 75% of the certified youths committed to the State Reformatory for homicide and 72% of those committed for other offenses against the person
were from the metropolitan area, while 65% of those committed for burglary and
unauthorized use of a motor vehicle were from more rural counties. CoRECurlONS
PRoFILE, supra note 70, at 1.
218. An initial probable cause determination will be made on the basis of a sworn
complaint. This complaint must set forth "the facts establishing probable cause to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it."
MiNN. R. CraM. P. 2.01. The contents of an adult complaint must provide much greater
specificity and particularity than that required for juvenile court petitions. Compare
MInN. R. CaIM. P. 2, with MINN. Juv. CT. R. 3-2; State v. Burch, 284 Minn. 300, 170
N.W.2d 543 (1969), with In re Hitzemann, 281 Minn. 275, 161 N.W.2d 542 (1968).
Although an adult may move for a probable cause hearing, see MINN. R. CfaM. P. 11.03,
a juvenile who is not being held in detention receives no probable cause determination
prior to the trial itself.
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prosecuted as an adult. If probable cause was not found or was found
only for a lesser offense that would not fit within the matrix given the
prior record, then the case would be referred back to the juvenile
court. Similarly, if a juvenile's prior record in conjunction with the
present offense did not mandate exclusion, a motion raising the juris219
dictional defect could result in a transfer back to the juvenile court.
If the juvenile was convicted in an adult proceeding of offenses
that excluded him from juvenile court jurisdiction, .the juvenile court
would thereafter have no jurisdiction over him. Accordingly, if the
juvenile, while still a minor, were subsequently involved in further
criminal conduct that in itself would not automatically exclude him
from juvenile court jurisdiction, he would still be prosecuted as an
adult rather than as a juvenile because of his past record.2 By contrast, under present judicial waiver procedures, a juvenile must be
certified for adult prosecution for every new offense, with a hearing
conducted each time to determine his amenability and dangerousness, despite prior findings on these issues.
If the youth was acquitted or convicted of a lesser offense that
would not exclude him as an adult under the legislative criteria, the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court over the offender would be revived,
and the case would be transferred back to the juvenile court for disposition. The provision for "rejuvenating" young offenders not convicted of excluded offenses by basing dispositional jurisdiction on
convictions rather than on initial charges provides an important additional check on the prosecutor's charging discretion.Y1Transferring
juveniles whose convictions do not fit the legislative criteria back to
the juvenile court for disposition avoids one of the most serious potential abuses of present legislative waiver provisions.
2.

Young Adult Dispositions

One policy problem associated with juveniles waived for adult
prosecution that could exist as well with legislative exclusion is a
reluctance by district court judges to impose penalties on young offenders tried and convicted as adults. Judicial reluctance to impose
sanctions stems in part from the appearance and demeanor of juveniles. Despite their convictions for serious felony offenses, these
young offenders still look like "kids," and because of a justifiable
concern about the possible physical victimization of younger offenders at the hands of adult inmates,12 many judges hesitate to incarcer219.
220.
221.
222.

See, e.g., MiNN. R. CraM. P. 11.04.
See subdivision 3 of the Proposed Act in Appendix at pp. 617-18 infra.
See notes 156-57 supra and accompanying text.
See note 70 supra.
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ate them with hardened adults.m
A related aspect of the sentencing problem stems from the practice of sentencing most first-time adult offenders to less restrictive
conditions of confinement or probation rather than to prison.224 The
Minnesota Supreme Court's Study Commission found tha of the
juveniles prosecuted and convicted as. adults in Hennepin County,
only 46% were sentenced to jail terms of more than ninety days, and
only 27% were subjected to terms of confinement in state penal institutions.22' The Hennepin County juveniles were also the most serious.
and persistent offenders in the sample, and the rates of institutional
confinement from the nonurban parts of the state were substantially
lower. 5 If a juvenile who is tried as an adult receives only a nominal
disposition, "one is finally compelled to ask what logic there is in the
use of probation or a minimum security facility for a child who was
transferred out of court because he was too 'dangerous' and a 'security
risk'?"m For those youths certified as adults, these constraints on
significant dispositions may actually reinforce the youth's long-term
deviance by indicating that the adult system is as nonpenal as the
juvenile process from which he was just evicted.
While an analysis of the problems of sentencing is beyond the
scope of this Article, m there are some useful models that the legislature might consider in seeking to overcome some present obstacles to
sentencing. One is the creation of an intermediate sentencing category-a youthful offender status-comprised of those chronological
juveniles sentenced as adults. Segregating this group by age, 22' either
in separate facilities or in segregated sections within existing adult
facilities, and limiting the maximum penalty that could be imposed
on such offenders to either a fraction of that authorized for adult
offenders or a definite period such as that contained in the Federal
Youth Corrections Act =2 ' might encourage the courts to incarcerate
223. See Stamm, supra note 8, at 143-44.
224. As a general sentencing policy, this is appropriate. The arguments developed earlier regarding the likely desistance of serious first offenders are as applicable
to adults as to juveniles. Most offenders do not need to be incarcerated, and as a
rational allocation of scarce resources, the decision not to imprison most first offenders

is sensible.
225. See Supreme Court Study, supra note 111, at 75, table 21.

226. See id. See also notes 116-18 supra and accompanying text.
227. Stamm, supra note 8, at 147.

228. An adequate examination would initially require an articulation of the justifications for coercive intervention in the lives of offenders and an elaboration of princi-

ples for implementing these policies. For a discussion of one form that sentencing
policies might assume, see sources cited note 62 supra.
229. See, e.g., Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1976);
§ 1771 (West 1972); CONN.Gm . STAT. § 54-76b (West Supp.
1978); N.Y. CraM.PROC. LAw § 720.10 (McKinney Supp. 1977).
CAL.WELF.&INST. CODE

230. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1976). Under the Federal Youth Corrections Act
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youthful offenders with extensive juvenile histories. Similarly, prosecuting juveniles as adults via a legislative matrix and making the
juvenile court records available to the adult sentencing authorities
would help to emphasize to these authorities that such "first" offenders are actually repeat offenders with extensive prior involvements.
The legislative creation of a youthful offender status might also
encourage experimentation to develop more appropriate treatment
for the serious, persistent juvenile offender. Although present rehabilitative efforts have proved unsuccessful, such efforts should not necessarily be abandoned. The hope of treatment, however, should not
be used to justify imprisonment when there is little basis for optimism about successful intervention. Thus, in the case of serious,
persistent juvenile offenders, it seems inappropriate to rely on the
(FYCA), federal judges have discretion to commit convicted offenders below the age
of 22 to the custody of the Attorney General for special treatment as youth offenders.
See id. § 5010. In the event of such a commitment, regardless of the penalty for the
criminal statute violated, the youth must be conditionally released within four years
of the date of conviction and unconditionally discharged no later than six years from
the date of conviction, see id. § 5017(c), unless the maximum period is extended at
the time of initial sentence because the judge determines that additional time for
treatment and supervision is required, see id. 5010(c). Insofar as is practical, youths
sentenced under the Act are to be segregated from other federal offenders and housed
in special facilities designed to provide "treatment," id. § 5011, defined as "corrective
and preventive guidance and training designed to protect the public by correcting the
antisocial tendencies of youth offenders," id. § 5006(f). When a youth is unconditionally discharged, his criminal conviction is set aside. See id. § 5021. For general analysis
of this provision, see Schornhorst, supra note 6, at 595; Note, Sentencing Under the
Federal Youth Corrections Act: The Interpretive Conflict Concerning Judicial
Discretion, 23 CATH. U.L. Rxv. 574 (1974); Note, Appellate Review of Federal Youth
Corrections Act Sentences in the Aftermath of Dorszynski v. United States, 45
FORDHAM L. REv. 110 (1976); Note, An Approach to 'No Benefit' Findings Under the
Federal Youth CorrectionsAct, 62 IowA L. REv. 1173 (1977); Comment, Sentencing
Under Section 5010(d) of the Federal Youth CorrectionsAct, 1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 741.
Unfortunately, the FYCA suffers from some defects similar to those associated
with judicial waiver. A youth may be sentenced under the statute unless the sentencing
judge concludes that the youth would derive "no benefit" from commitment. 18 U.S.C.
§ 5010(d) (1976). A "no benefit" determination is functionally equivalent to a decision
with respect to amenability to treatment and suffers from the same uncertainties.
Nevertheless, in Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424 (1974), the Supreme Court
held that, while 18 U.S.C. § 5010(d) (1976) requires an explicit finding that a youth
would derive no benefit from receiving a sentence under the FYCA, a supporting
statement of reasons was unnecessary. See 418 U.S. at 441.
Interestingly, judges making a "no benefit" finding are aided by a salient factor
score, an actuarial parole prognosis aid. A youth is sentenced on the basis of the
severity of his offense and his parole prognosis, which incorporates actuarial predictors
such as prior record, prior incarceration, and age at first commitment. See U.S. PAROLE
COMMISSION, SALIENT FACTOR SCORING MANUAL (rev. ed. 1977). Although the salient
factor score is not binding, it is an encouraging use of actuarial tables to make clinical
judgments.
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treatment rationale to deny the procedural safeguards currently afforded adults. On the other hand, if these offenders are tried as
adults, with indictments, jury trials, and all of the other procedural
safeguards of the criminal law, no barrier exists to incarcerating
them, as a means of punishment, upon conviction since in such circumstances, failure to provide successful treatment would not open
the door to charges by these youths that they were being subjected
to punishment without due process. Obviously, successful rehabilitation is preferable to simple custodial confinement. But, since voluntary participation and self-motivation are important components of
successful rehabilitation, an adult treatment program that is based
on voluntary participation and that is available to incarcerated
youths as an alternative to simply "doing time" might be more effective than involuntary intervention."'
Another sentencing consequence for youths excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction is the loss of protections traditionally associated with adjudication as a delinquent, including confidentiality of
proceedings and records, sealing of records after attaining majority,
and the avoidance of civil disabilities imposed on those convicted of
crimes. As the Supreme Court noted in Kent, juvenile court jurisdiction "confers special rights and immunities. [The youth] . . . is
shielded from publicity. . . [He] is protected against consequences of adult conviction such as the loss of civil rights, the use of
adjudication against him in subsequent proceedings, and disqualifications for public employment." 2 A mechanism to reduce the consequences of a first-time adult conviction for excluded juveniles sentenced as youthful offenders might be considered. Several jurisdic"tions currently provide for expungement of records or removal of
disabilities for waived youths following the completion of their adult
sentences.2 3
IV. THE SYSTEMIC IMPLICATIONS OF OFFENSE-BASED
EXCLUSION FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION

A.

DIsPosrrioNAL DECISIONMAKING

A legislative matrix that excludes on the basis of offenses has
systemic implications for the administration of a juvenile justice system that historically has based disposition decisions on the characteristics of the offender. A shift of emphasis from the offender to the
offense reflects an undercurrent that has been developing within ju231. See, e.g., D. MANN, supra note 50, at viii-ix; N. MoRms, supra note 1, at
94-99.
232. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556-57 (1966).
233. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.060(e) (1975); IowA CODE § 232.72 (1977).
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venile justice jurisprudence for over a decade. The juvenile justice
system is a peculiar hybrid of the criminal law on the one hand, and
the mental health and welfare systems on the other, reflecting impulses toward both punitive social control and benevolent intervention,
but firmly grounded in neither.? Nowhere has this unresolved tension between crime and mental health, between punishing and helping, been more acute than in the response to the persistent or serious
offender.
More than a decade ago the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice suggested that the
juvenile justice system might ultimately develop into a two-track
system separating the control and welfare functions. In such a system
most minor offenders and status delinquents would be diverted and
handled informally. More serious offenders would be referred to the
juvenile court for formal adjudication, thus acknowledging that an
important purpose of intervention is social control rather than treatment. 235 Specifically, the Commission proposed that

[t]he formal sanctioning system and pronouncement of delinquency should be used only as a last resort.
In place of the formal system, dispositional alternatives to adjudication must be developed for dealing with juveniles....
The range of conduct for which court intervention is authorized
should be narrowed with greater emphasis upon consensual and
informal means of meeting the problems of difficult children.
The cases that fall within the narrowed jurisdiction of the court
and filter through the screen of pre-judicial, informal disposition
methods would largely involve offenders for whom more vigorous
measures seem necessary. Court adjudication and disposition of
those offenders should no longer be viewed solely as a diagnosisand
prescriptionfor cure, but should be frankly recognized as an authoritative court judgment expressing society's claim to protection.
While rehabilitativeefforts should be vigorously pursued in deference to the youth of the offenders and in keeping with a general
commitment to individualized treatment of all offenders, the incapacitative, deterrent, and condemnatory aspects of the judgment
should not be disguised.?6
234. See, e.g., Schults & Cohen, Isolationism in Juvenile Court Jurisprudence,
in PURSUING JUSTcE FOR THE CmiL 21 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1976).

235. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 2.
236. Id. (emphasis added). The President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and Administration of Justice noted,
The juvenile court is a court of law, charged like other agencies of criminal
justice with protectingthe community against threatening conduct. Rehabilitation of offenders through individualized handling is one way of providing
protection, and appropriately the primary way of dealing with children. But
the guiding considerations for a court of law that deals with the threatening
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Recognition that most juvenile offenses are trivial and not symptomatic of a need for formal intervention has increased pressures
toward "judicious non-intervention," 37 or even "radical nonintervention,""s in an effort to avoid stigmatizing juveniles who will
outgrow their delinquencies. The decarceration of status delinquents " ' and the growth of diversionary alternatives to. adjudication4 0 in the case of nonserious offenders reflect this process. The
other thread in the development of a two-track juvenile justice system is reflected in the imposition of criminal procedural safeguards
241
on the adjudication of the true, hard-core juvenile offender.
The emergence of a dual-track juvenile justice system raises previously submerged questions about the criteria and screening processes by which youngsters are routed to informal or formal dispositions. The traditional "rehabilitative ideal" affords juvenile justice
personnel such enormous discretion to make decisions in the "best
interests of the child" that there has been no need to formalize diversionary criteria. These individuals enjoy even greater discretion than
do their adult process counterparts because of the presumed need to
look beyond present offense and consider individual circumstances in
deciding appropriate treatment and because paternalistic assumptions about children and their control allow for more extensive discre42
tionary intervention than would be permitted in the lives of adults.
With this greater discretion comes a greater potential for abuse.
There are no simple solutions to the problems caused b the
extensive, unregulated, and unreviewable discretion that currently
characterizes the juvenile justice system. Any solution requires a
conduct is nevertheless protection of the community. The juvenile court, like
other courts, is therefore obliged to employ all the means at hand, not excluding incapacitation, for achieving that protection. What should distinguish the juvenile from the criminal courts is their greater emphasis on
rehabilitation,not their exclusive preoccupationwith it.
CRIME INA FREE SocIErY, supra note 61, at 81 (emphasis added).

237. See, e.g., Lemert, The Juvenile Court-Questand Realities, in TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 21, at 91, 96.

238. See, e.g., E. ScHm, supra note 61.
239. See, e.g., Ellery C. v. Redlick, 32 N.Y.2d 588, 300 N.E.2d 424, 347 N.Y.S.2d
68 (1973); Harris v. Calendine, 233 S.E.2d 318 (W. Va. 1977); 18 U.S.C. § 5035 (1976)

(institutional separation of delinquents adjudicated on the basis of "status" and
crimes).
240. See, e.g., E. LEmERT, INSTEAD OF COURT (U.S. Dep't of Health, Education,
and Welfare Pub. No. 72-9093, 1971); Nejelski, Diversion: The Promise and the
Danger, 22 CRIM & DELINQUENCY 393 (1976); Nejelski, Diversion: Unleashing the
Hound of Heaven?, in PURSUING JUSTIE FOR THE CHaD 94 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1976).
241. See, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970).

242. See, e.g., Bittner, Policing Juveniles: The Social Context of Common
Practice,in PURSUING JUSTICE FOR THE CHmw 69 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1976).
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forthright recognition of the magnitude of the task assumed, the limitations of intervention, the fallibility of professional expertise, and
the negative as well as positive consequences of helping. As a starting
point, however, where differences in treatment of similarly situated
offenders cannot be empirically and objectively justified, discretionary judgments should be subordinated to uniform dispositional principles and the rule of law. 4'
The proposed matrix has both direct and indirect effects on the
exercise of discretion within the juvenile justice system. First, and
most obviously, the matrix eliminates all discretion with respect to
the decision to refer for adult prosecution. Once the decision to proceed against the offender has been made and the appropriate charge
determined, the decision whether to proceed in the juvenile court or
the district court is made mechanically by reference to the matrix.
But because the matrix emphasizes the present offense and the prior
record, every decision influencing the disposition of the present offense, as well as every decision associated with each prior contact
with the system, increases in significance. Thus, the matrix may well
have an influence far beyond its literal scope, affecting dispositional
decisions at every stage of the process, whether or not the offender is
potentially eligible for transfer on any particular occasion. " '
Most generally this influence arises out of bureaucratic imperatives and the desire of juvenile and criminal justice agencies to avoid
scandal and unfavorable political attention.2 45 A matrix combining
243. There has been a call for administrative rulemaking to constrain the excessive, unnecessary, and unjustifiable discretion in the adult and juvenile justice systems. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, DISCRrbONARY JUSTICE (1969); K. DAVIS, POLCE DISCRErION
(1975).
244. The juvenile justice system involves dispositions at every step in the process. Police officers may refer a juvenile to intake for formal processing or may adjust
the case informally on the street, at the station-house, or by diversion. Intake, in turn,
may refer a youth to the juvenile court for formal adjudication or dispose of the case
through informal supervision or diversion. Finally, even after formal adjudication, the
juvenile court has a wide choice of dispositional alternatives, ranging from a continuance without a finding to probation and to commitment to state training school.
For a general overview of the juvenile justice process and the alternative dispositions available, see S. Fox, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN JUVENn.z JusTIcE (1972);
F. MILLER, R. DAWSON, G. Dix, & R. PARNAs, THE JUVENILE JusTIcE PROCSS (1976);
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 4-40; J. SENNA & L. SmGEL, JUVENILE LAW (1976);

Note, Juvenile Justice in Arizona, 16 ARIz. L. REV. 235 (1974); Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79 HARv. L. REV. 775
(1966).
245. The constraint that "fear of scandal" imposes on juvenile court dispositions
has been noted by a number of observers. See, e.g., A. CIcounEL, THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE (1968); R. EMERSON, JUDGING DELINQUENTS (1969). Such constraint is a reflection of basic organizational processes and the limitations that an
organization's environment imposes on its freedom of action. See generally P. SELz-
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present and prior offenses increases the significance, visibility, and
vulnerability of all decisions made by the bureaucracy. If a youth had
previously committed a felony and was not processed by the system,
a subsequent serious offense could draw attention not only to his
present situation but also to the prior failure to intervene."' The safe
bureaucratic decision-the one that avoids the threat of scandal-is
the restrictive one to formally process the juvenile accused of a felony.
An alternative is to have sufficient supporting documentation to defend a nonformal disposition. Bureaucracies could gradually develop
internal rules and formal or informal guidelines to shape the exercises
of discretion either to make the safe decision to process a juvenile
TVA AND THE GRAss RooTS (University of California Publication in Culture and
Society No. 3, 1949).
Emerson, supra note 162, at 623-28, notes that as a result of political considerations and media publicity,
juvenile court decision-making comes to be pervaded by a sense of
vulnerability to adverse public reaction for failing to control or restrain delinquent offenders ....
[Fear of scrutiny and criticism increases pressure] to
impose maximum restraints on the offender-in most instances incarceration. Anything less risks immediate criticism. But more than this, it also
exposes the court to the possibility of even stronger reaction in the future.
For given any recurrence of serious illegal activity, former decisions that can
be interpreted as "lenient" become difficult to defend.
Id. at 624 (emphasis in original). For a similar observation that the effect of public
pressures and "those specialists in indignation-newspapermen" create a demand for
severity in disposition, see D. MAzA, DELINQUENCY AND DIrr 122 (1964).
The possibility of scandal pervades every decision that the court makes, no matter
how innocuous.
[E]ven where the current offense is not particularly violent or serious, the
court becomes vulnerable should the delinquent commit such a highly visible
act in the future. Thus, any particular disposition, no matter how obvious,
appropriate, and defensible it was at the time, can subsequently become
evidence of the court's "coddling," overlenieney in failing to "protect the
community," or outright gullibility, if and when the youth involved commits
a newsworthy and sensational offense.
The kinds of pressures analyzed above often introduce a fundamental
restrictiveness into the court's handling of its cases. Particular decisions
have to anticipate possible adverse public and political reaction. Decisions
that might open the court to criticism constitute risks and may well be
avoided. Indeed, "risk" specifically reflects the court's vulnerability to criticism for having failed to control and restrain.
Emerson, supra note 162, at 624.
246. Matza notes that the juvenile court judge is
ultimately responsible to the public. He will have to explain . . .why the
17-year-old murderer of an innocent matron was allowed to roam the streets,
on probation, when just last year he was booked for mugging. This is no easy
question to answer. Somehow, an invoking of the principle of individualized
justice and a justification of mercy on the basis of accredited social-work
theory hardly seems appropriate on these occasions.
D. MATZA, supra note 245, at 122.
NICK,
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felon formally or to adequately document and justify a departure
from that norm on a publicly and politically defensible basis. It is
in reliance on the bureaucratic quest to avoid scandal that many of
the systemic changes in dispositional decisionmaking are anticipated.
Because of this scandal avoidance impulse, the emphasis that
the matrix places on prior felony adjudications as a prerequisite to
adult prosecution could have two beneficial effects. First, use of the
matrix would reinforce the two-track aspects of the juvenile justice
process by encouraging a more formal response to more serious forms
of juvenile deviance. A distinction among offenders on the basis of
their offenses, with diversion of the less significant from the formal
process, is consistent with the policies of the President's Commission241 and would foster more rational resource allocation by both
narrowing the range of children served formally and increasing the
intensity of intervention.
Second, and more important, adoption of the matrix would exert
significant pressure at each level of the system-police, intake, prosecutor, and court-to objectify the criteria upon which dispositional
decisions are made, giving more weight to such legally relevant factors as offense and prior history and less to such factors as race, class,
and attitude that create dangers of discrimination and inequity in the
exercise of discretion. It is in this latter respect that the matrix may
have its most significant beneficial and rationalizing effects.
At the outset, however, it should be noted that the degree to
which this pressure would force a change in present practices is not
at all clear. It is a common observation that lower-class and nonwhite
youths are overrepresented in the populations of criminal and juvenile justice systems. 4 Less clear are the causes of this overrepresentation. Moreover, ascertaining these causes with regard to
the juvenile system is fraught with difficulty since the criteria for
decisions-"individualized justice" and "the best interests of the
child"-are so obscure and entail such a broad inquiry.249 It has been
argued that this obscurity tends greatly to amplify whatever differ247. See note 236 supra and accompanying text.
248. See CRME IN A FREE SocEry, supra note 61, at 44. See generallyUNIFoRM
CRIME REPORTS, supra note 198, at 192-94, table 39; Short & Nye, Reported Behavior
as a Criterion of Deviant Behavior, 5 Soc. PROB. 207 (1957).
249. One author has observed,
The principle of individualized justice is more inclusive than the principle of offense. It contains many more criteria in its framework of relevance
....
The principle of individualized justice suggests that disposition is to
be guided by a full understandingof the client's personal and social character and by his "individual needs."
D. MATZA, supra note 245, at 114-15 (emphasis in original).
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ences in criminal activity may actually exist between races and
classes because discretionary judgments on the basis of social characteristics redound to the disadvantage of the poor and minorities.
According to this theory, "individualized justice" permits decisions
to be made on the basis of social characteristics rather than legal variables, and such subjective decisions lend themselves to abuse and
discrimination.2 ° Thus, within the unlimited framework of individualized justice, the poor and blacks may receive harsher discretionary
dispositions because of who they are or whom they may become
rather than because of what they have done.
An alternative explanation, however, has suggested that despite
the juvenile system's outward commitment to individualized justice, dispositional decisions with respect to individual offenders are
frequently made not on the basis of an assessment of individual needs
but by reference to the principle of offense and the accompanying
threat of scandal: "[W]hether a juvenile goes to some manner of
prison or is put on some manner of probation. . . depends first, on
a traditional rule-of-thumb assessment of the total risk of danger and
thus scandal evident in the juvenile's current offense and prior record
of offenses . . . ."I If this is the case, the overrepresentation of
minority and lower-class youths in the juvenile system can be attributed to a proportionately higher volume of serious crimes committed
by such youths." ' Proponents of this position infer from available
250. See, e.g., Chiricos, Jackson, & Waldo, Inequality in the Imposition of a
CriminalLabel, 19 Soc. PROS. 553 (1972); Green, Race, Social Status, and Criminal
Arrest, 35 Am. Soc. Rav. 476 (1970).
251. D. MAA, supra note 245, at 125. Reliance on offense as a decisional basis
is grounded in a principle of equality-treating similar cases similarly. The substantive
basis for deciding whether cases are indeed alike is the "offense and conditions closely
related to offense like prior record, and ... more or less preclude[s] considerations
of status and circumstance." Id. at 113-14 (emphasis deleted).
252. The research findings in WOLFGANG, FIGLIO, & SELLIN, supranote 9, indicate
that "official delinquents," those whose contacts with law enforcement personnel have
resulted in official records, are disproportionately concentrated in poor and minority
communities and that in every socioeconomic category black youths are engaged in
delinquency to a greater extent than their white counterparts. Even this research,
however, relies on official statistics that may already reflect selection biases and discretionary decisions by police officers prior to the creation of official records. See also
Hindelang, supra note 57; 11 CRIMES OF VIOLENCE 267-86, tables 3-17 (Staff Report
submitted to the National Commission on the Causes & Prevention of Violence, 1969).
Hindelang's research compared the racial composition of offenders reported in the
FBI's Uniform Crime Reports with the racial composition of offenders as reported by
victims of crime in a victimization panel study. He found that the racial composition
of offenders as reported by victims was considerably more consistent with that revealed
in the official records than it was with the research on hidden delinquency. His research provides some of the strongest evidence that racial differentials in the popula-
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data that controlling for present offense and prior record eliminates
most class and racial disparities. Thus, this research implies that
both adult and juvenile systems operate relatively fairly, responding
primarily to legally relevant criteria like offense and recidivism, and
that the client population disparities reflect real differences in criminal activity among groups.
The crucial issue in assessing the probable impact of the matrix
on dispositional decisionmaking is whether dispositions are currently
based primarily on legally relevant factors, such as present offense
and prior record, or on more diffuse variables, such as social characteristics. If dispositions are already grounded in the principle of offense, then the model proposed here would tend to reinforce existing
practices. If, however, decisionmaking is actually based on social
characteristics, the increased salience of the principle of offense
under the matrix might foster a refocusing on more objective, legally
relevant criteria, thereby reducing the potential for discrimination
and abuse of discretion that results from subjective assessment of
social factors.
To determine the basis upon which dispositions in the juvenile
process are currently made, it is necessary to ascertain, for each level
at which such decisions are made, the relationship between legal
variables-present offense and prior record-and disposition, and
social characteristics-for example, race and social class-and disposition. One can begin by assessing the research on dispositional
decisionmaking by police, intake, and the courts, but "even a superficial review of the relevant literature leaves one with the rather uncomfortable feeling that the only consistent finding of prior research
is that there are no consistencies in the determinants of the decisionmaking process."" 3 The studies, conducted in different jurisdictions
at different times, and employing different methodologies and theoretical perspectives, yield contradictory results. Nonetheless, from
this research a number of useful insights into dispositional decisionmaking within the juvenile justice system can be gleaned.
Police officers encounter juveniles involved in a variety of legal
and illegal activities and have an enormous amount of discretion and
a wide range of dispositional alternatives with which to resolve the
tions of juvenile and criminal justice agencies reflect real differences in behavior rather
than discretionary decisionmaking.
253. Thomas & Sieverdes, Juvenile Court Intake: An Analysis of Discretionary
Decision-making, 12 CRIMINOLOGY 413, 416 (1975). The contradictory results of the
research on discretionary decisionmaking have been adverted to by others. See, e.g.,
Thomas & Cage, The Effects of Social Characteristicson Juvenile Court Dispositions,
18 Soc. Q. 237, 239 (1977); Thornberry, Race, Socioeconomic Status and Sentencing
in the Juvenile Justice System, 64 J. CaRM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 90 (1973).
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encounter. While reprimand and release may be the only appropriate
response to trivial incidents, and serious felonies may practically
mandate taking the child into custody, in the wide intermediate category of encounters, officers are encouraged to exercise their discretion. " ' Unless they have had prior contacts with the child or are
familiar with the child's home situation, school record, and prior
offenses, however, they have very little information with which to
make these determinations other than the circumstances of the
present involvement, which include the nature of offense and the
responses of the youth in his interactions with the police.
There is some research indicating that field dispositions are frequently made on the basis of the child's attitude or demeanor and the
youth's response to adult authority. These studies suggest that social
and behavioral cues contribute to the disproportionate number of
minority and lower-class youths referred by police to the juvenile
court.2 Other studies, however, have questioned whether the police
254. Analyses of various aspects of the resolution of police encounters with juveniles may be found in Bittner, supra note 242; Black & Reiss, Police Control of
Juveniles, 35 Am. Soc. REv. 63 (1970); Ferdinand & Luchterhand, Inner-City Youth,
the Police, The Juvenile Court, and Justice, 17 Soc. PROS. 510 (1970); Hohenstein,
FactorsInfluencing the Police Disposition of Juvenile Offenders, in DELINQUENCY: SELECTED STUDIES 138 (T. Sellin & M. Wolfgang eds. 1969); McEachem & Bauzer, Factors
Related to Dispositionin Juvenile Police Contacts, in JUvENIE GANGS IN CONTEXT 148
(M. Klein & B. Myerhoff eds. 1964); Piliavin & Briar, Police Encounters with
Juveniles, 70 AM. J. Soc. 206 (1964); Terry, Discriminationin the Handlingof Juvenile
Offenders by Social-ControlAgencies, 4 J. RESEARCH CRm & DEaaNQuENcY 218 (1967);
Terry, The Screening of Juvenile Offenders, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 173 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Screening of Juvenile Offenders]; Thornberry, supra note 253;
Weiner & Willie, Decisions by Juvenile Officers, 77 Am. J. Soc. 199 (1970); Werthman
& Piliavin, Gang Members and the Police, in THE POLicE 56 (D. Bordua ed. 1970);
Williams & Gold, supra note 54.
255. Piliavin and Briar report that black youths are twice as likely as white
youths to display an unsatisfactory demeanor. See Piliavin & Briar, supra note 254,
at 212. A more recent study also has found that police discriminate among offenders
on the basis of demeanor and resistance to authority. This study compares the attitudes of black and white delinquents and finds that while black youths have more
positive attitudes on a number of dimensions than do whites, they are also more likely
to respond negatively to authority figures. It concludes that while first-time
black offenders are less anti-social and less aggressive than white offenders
• . . they are also more rejecting of public authority and more likely to come
from incomplete families. In spite of the rather promising picture black
offenders generally present, however, the factors that seem to weigh most
heavily upon the police in making their dispositions of black youths are their
level of Authority Rejection and the structure of their families.
Ferdinand & Luchterhand, supia note 254, at 520. The study finds that this discretionary discrimination is only significant for first offenders and minor offenders and that
"when a youth's delinquency is rather pronounced, his disposition is made primarily
in terms of factors immediately relevant to his case; but when delinquency is relatively
mild, racial membership is a factor in his disposition." Id. at 521. Perhaps the most
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themselves are prone to discriminate against minority and lowerclass youths and instead have attributed the racial and class disparities in police handling of juveniles to pressure from complaining victims or witnesses for a more stringent disposition of these offenders.,,6
Still another line of studies reveals no disparities in the police treatment of black and white delinquents when legally relevant factors are
taken into account.n?
critical study in this line of research reports that

[e]ven when the seriousness of the offense is held constant, blacks are more
[Tihe seriousness of the offense does not explain the relationship between race and dispolikely than whites to receive a more severe disposition ....

sition.
This finding is essentially the same when the number of previous offen-

ses is held constant ....
Thornberry, supra note 253, at 95. Controlling for present offense and prior record
simultaneously still reveals differences in disposition by race. See id.
Reliance on demeanor as a dispositional variable is justifiable, it is argued, because a youth who is disrespectful to police officers may be even more obstreperous or
delinquent when they are not present. See, e.g., Bittner, supra note 242, at 82-85.
However, the conflict between police and minority youths may represent a form of
institutionalized class struggle, and a hostile demeanor may therefore be part of a
ritualistic exchange, reflecting interactional expectations rather than providing insight
into a youth's moral character. See id.
256. Black and Reiss report that differences in demeanor were not significant to
racial disparities in police dispositions. See Black & Reiss, supra note 254, at 74. They
attribute the racial disparities in police handling of juveniles to situational variables
and suggest that most offenses were intraracial and that the racial disparities in dispositions can be accounted for by the more punitive responses sought by black victimcomplainants than by white victim-complainants. See id. at 70-74. The role of victimcomplainants in constraining police discretion and contributing to racial disparities in
dispositions has been noted by other researchers as well. See, e.g., Hohenstein, supra
note 254.
257. Williams and Gold report that apprehension by the police is essentially a
chance occurrence reflecting frequency of violation and that similar proportions of
black and white teenagers were apprehended. See Williams & Gold, supra note 54, at
219. They also find that, of those apprehended, equal proportions of black and white
offenders are likely to receive official police records as a result of the contact, a fact
that suggests that race is"not a significant factor in the police handling of these delinquents. See id. at 223. Another study has analyzed screening decisions by police officers and has found a strong relationship between "the seriousness of the offense committed, the number of previous offenses committed, and the age of the offender and
the severity of sanctions" imposed. Screening of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 254,
at 177. Social characteristics such as ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and area of
residence are insignificant factors in dispositional decisions. The study concludes that
[t]he police appear to utilize basically legalistic criteria in making disposition decisions. The variables that are regarded as criteria are the same as
those which could be expected to guide their handling of adult offenders as
well. In other words, the police appear to interpret the "best interests of the
child" in terms of criteria also used when dealing with adult offenders.
Id. at 179. McEachern and Bauzer have analyzed the factors that lead police officers
to request petitions for delinquent youngsters and have reported that the most signifi-
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Despite differences in the conclusions reached by the authors of
these various studies, the research taken as a whole tends to suggest
that, if one controls for the influence of the offense committed, prior
record, and the age of the offender, social characteristics such as
ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and area of residence are secondary
factors in dispositional decisions. Studies of decisionmaking by juvenile officers as opposed to patrol officers have also failed to demonstrate any systematic or consistent differences in handling youths of
different races or classes, once the legal variables are controlled.,,
Thus, the thrust of this research appears to be that, while the exercise
of discretion by police in dealing with nonserious offenders may reflect extraneous social considerations, dispositions for serious offenders are primarily a function of the present offense and the prior record.
The tendency of police to base dispositional decisions regarding
serious offenders on considerations of past record and present offense
can be explained in terms of general police orientation. To a greater
extent than other personnel within the juvenile justice process, police
are responsive to public safety concerns and the effects of youthful
crime on the community. Socialized initially as police officers rather
than juvenile officers, they are more inclined to respond to offenses
than offenders. This crime control orientation is consistent with law
enforcement ideology and accepted police practices in dealing with
adult offenders and extends readily to juvenile felony offenders.
By requiring a felony adjudication as a precondition to a waiver
decision, the proposed matrix would reinforce police decisionmaking
on the basis of offense. Formal departmental rules, developed to effectuate the legislative goals of referring juveniles involved in felonies
to the district court, would further buttress general police attitudes
and encourage rational decisionmaking on legally defensible grounds
and reduce the likelihood of invidious discrimination on the basis of
nonlegal considerations.
If following a juvenile's encounter with the police, his case is
referred to juvenile court, it will normally be screened by an intake
cant factor in seeking a petition is the youth's offense, with some additional influence

exerted by age and the number of offenses in the youth's delinquent history. There do
not appear to be any systematic or consistent differences in handling youths of differ-

ent races, once the legal variables are controlled. See McEachern & Bauzer, supranote
254.
258. In a study of decisions by juvenile officers rather than patrolmen, Weiner
and Willie report that "the race of an individual youth has no influence on the disposition decisions of the juvenile officer, nor does the race of his neighborhood." Weiner &
Willie, supra note 254, at 208-09. They conclude that juvenile officers emphasize
"fairness" as a dispositional guide, which presumably means treating similarly situated offenders similarly. See id.
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unit to decide whether the case requires formal court adjudication
and intervention or whether it can be resolved informally or diverted.
A preliminary social investigation typically results in the closing or
informal adjustment of about half of the cases referred by police.29
The intake social worker, like the police officer in the field, has an
enormous amount of discretion and a wide range of dispositional
alternatives. As a result, all of the problems of individualized justice,
discretion, and discrimination manifest at the police level are also
present at intake.
Again, the research findings are contradictory as to the basis on
which dispositional decisions are made. Some research suggests that
intake discretion is more likely to be influenced by a child's social
characteristics and demeanor than by the reasons for the child's referral, which, in turn, is likely to amplify the racial and class disparities
of youths referred to juvenile court.2 10 Others report that both legal
and social variables determine whether a juvenile is referred to juvenile court, but that some social characteristics-whiteness, middleclass background, stable family-may insulate some offenders from
referral.2 8 1 Still other research concludes that the seriousness of the
present offense, the extensiveness of the prior record, and the age of
the offender are related to the severity of intake dispositions but that
the relationship between these legalistic criteria and dispositions is
not as strong as at the police level.2 2 Again, while the studies are
259. In 1974, the most recent year for which national juvenile court statistics are
available, 53% of the delinquency cases disposed of by juvenile courts were handled

nonjudicially.
U.S.

NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION,

14 (1974).
260. Thornberry reports that "at the intake hearing the racial differences are not
as great [as at police referral], but are still in the same direction. Blacks are less likely
. . . than whites. . . to have their cases adjusted, but are more likely. . . than whites
• . . to be referred for a court hearing." Thornberry, supra note 253, at 94. Although
the results were somewhat equivocal, the differences in dispositions could not be accounted for by the present offense or the prior record. Similarly, Williams and Gold
report that black repeat-offenders were more likely than white recidivists to be referred
to juvenile court. See Williams & Gold, supra note 54, at 226.
261. Thomas and Sieverdes report that the prior record had relatively little influence on intake dispositions; that seriousness of the present offense was the most powerful single variable in explaining case dispositions; that social characteristics also affected dispositions; and that
the relative importance of seriousness of offense in the determination of case
dispositions is greatest when the alleged offender is male, has a prior offense
record, is black, comes from a lower social class background, is in an unstable
family setting, had one or more co-defendants, and when the age at first and
most recent offense was between 16-17. Under all other conditions, the seriousness of the offense was not so relevant in the determination of the appropriate case disposition.
Thomas & Sieverdes, supra note 253, at 425-26.
262. See Screening of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 254, at 177, 179.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS

1978]

JUVENILE JUSTICE

inconclusive, it appears that decisionmaking currently is based either
on legally relevant criteria or on subjective factors that result in a
disproportionate number of formal referrals of minority youths. In
either case, explicit reliance on formal legal criteria would have a
desirable impact on the decisionmaking process.
Encouraging intake probation officers to use formal legal criteria
more extensively could also reduce some of the present conflicts between police, intake, and the court. Police officers refer juveniles to
intake to reinforce their own authority. Their efforts to maintain
order on the street may, in turn, require coercive intervention by the
juvenile court. 63 When intake closes a case that the police refer, the
police are likely to perceive the closing as a failure to consider prior
encounters of the juvenile with the police that were informally adjusted. Administrative rules that rationalize police referrals would
clarify the status of the juvenile at intake. Structuring police referrals
would also increase the pressures on intake to process the juvenile for
formal adjudication. Initially, pressures in this direction may emanate from the police bureaucracy, which may require intake to justify
the informal closing of a case. The threat of scandal if an informally
adjusted juvenile felon is subsequently involved in an excluded offense might also increase court referrals and could eventually lead to
administrative guidelines, promulgated by intake or the juvenile
court, mandating the referral of certain categories of offenses. Since
police and intake would thus share a common frame of reference-the
offense and prior record-the various components of the system
should respond to offenders more consistently.
As in the case of decisionmaking by the police and intake officials, research evaluations of present dispositional decisionmaking at
the juvenile court level reveal inconsistencies in the way the courts
act. Some studies of the relative effects of social and legal factors on
dispositions indicate that blacks receive more severe dispositions
than whites. " Other research found racial or class bias only in the
dispositions of minor offenders, while for recidivating felons, the so263. See, e.g., A. CICOUREL, supranote 245; R. EMERSON, supra note 245, at 4245; Bittner, supra note 242, at 85-88; Emerson, supra note 162, at 621.
264. See, e.g., Bittner, supra note 242, at 87-88.
265. See Arnold, Race and Ethnicity Relative to Other Factorsin Juvenile Court
Dispositions, 77 Am. J. Soc. 211 (1971) (minority group members are likely to receive
greater punishment than whites for the same offense); Thomas & Cage, supranote 253,
at 250 (when the legal considerations are held constant, juvenile court's individualized
justice "typically applies harsh sanctions to blacks, those who have dropped out of
school, those in single parent or broken homes, [and] those from lower socioeconomic
backgrounds"); Thornberry, supra note 253, at 97-98 (even after controlling for the
present offense and the prior record, black offenders were significantly more likely than
white offenders to be committed to institutions by the juvenile court).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:515

cial characteristics were essentially irrelevant. ' Other studies have
suggested, contrary to expectations, that white youths receive more
severe dispositions than blacks. ' Still other research indicates that
dispositional decisions are based principally on legal criteria and that
as the seriousness of the offense increases, discrepancies between
races decline.2 8 Taken together, these studies, while indicating that
the juvenile court appears to use a broader range of dispositional
criteria than do decisionmakers at earlier stages, are generally consistent with the findings of a recent study of juvenile court dispositional
decisionmaking in Minnesota, which indicate that the severity of the
are the most
present offense and the number of prior involvements
269
significant factors in dispositions of juveniles.
It appears, then, that a stronger statistical relationship exists
between legal variables and dispositions than between social variables and dispositions at all levels of the dispositional process. At the
same time, however, these variables only partially explain dispositions, and even when the relationship between legal characteristics
or social characteristics and disposition is statistically significant, a
separate question exists as to the strength of the relationship. Although statistically significant, most of the relationships between
legal or social factors and juvenile dispositions were found to be only
weak to moderate.
The question of the strength of the relationship is important to
a full understanding of dispositional decisionmaking and to predicting a probable disposition. The question is the extent to which knowledge about a particular independent variable improves predictive
266. See, e.g., Thomas & Cage, supra note 253.
267. Scarpitti and Stephenson report that while present offense appeared to be
associated with the court disposition, "black boys had to exhibit a much greater degree
of delinquency commitment than whites before the most punitive alternative
[disposition] was selected." Scarpitti & Stephenson, Juvenile Court Dispositions:
Factors in the Decision-Making Process, 17 CRnM & DELINQUENCY 142, 148 (1971).
Ferster and Courtless also report lack of a relationship between offense seriousness and
disposition and that "more lenient dispositions were given non-whites than whites."
In addition, they have found that nonwhites were more likely than whites to enjoy
adjudications without formal findings of delinquency. None of these differences could
be explained in terms of differences in the present offense, prior delinquency records,
or age. See Ferster & Courtless, Pre.DispositionalData, Role of Counsel and Decisions
in a Juvenile Court, 7 LAw & Soc'y Rav. 195, 212 (1972).
268. Ferdinand and Luchterhand report that despite earlier discrimination by
the police, dispositional decisionmaking by the court did not appear consistently to
differentiate among offenders on the basis of race. Moreover, as the seriousness of the
offense increased, discrepancies between races declined. Ferdinand & Luchterhand,
supra note 254, at 521; accord, Screeningof Juvenile Offenders, supra note 254.
269. See GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON CRIME PREVENTION AND CONTROL, A PRIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE JUVENILE OFFENDER WITHIN THE MINNESOTA JUVENILE COURT
SYSTEM 43 (tent. ed. 1976).
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accuracy about variation of the dependent variable. Where the relationship between offense and disposition is very strong, for example,
.80, knowledge of an individual's offense would enable us to predict
a probable disposition accurately eighty percent of the time, a considerable improvement over chance. Where the relationship is weak,
albeit statistically significant, however, knowledge of the relationship
may not appreciably improve predictive accuracy.
All of the dispositional studies report only weak to moderate
relationships between the independent variables and the dispositions. In the Minnesota Governor's Crime Commission study, despite
the relationship between the present offense, prior record, and disposition, variations of the first two factors accounted for only 24% of the
variation in disposition.
The statement that the number of prior involvements of the juvenile
and the severity of the offense are the two strongest determinants
of disposition must be tempered by the fact that over 75% of the
variation in disposition is not explained by these variables. In other
words, even though we have included the variables which would
seem to be logically the most relevant to disposition, they in fact do
little to explain how the court arrives at its decisions.Y'
While the methodologies of the various studies differed and it is difficult to generalize from them, it would be accurate to conclude that
even those factors that appear to be related to dispositions account
for only about 25% of the variation in disposition."' In short, there
appears to be enormous variation in dispositions that cannot be explained consistently by reference to either legal or social factors.
The absence of any powerful, explanatory relationship between
predictor variables and dispositions may be interpreted as true
"individualized justice"; that is, every child is the recipient of a
unique disposition tailored to his or her individual needs. An equally
plausible interpretation, however, is simply that dispositional decisionmaking is not rational at all, but instead consists of little more
than hunch, guesswork, and hopes, minimally constrained by the
2
youth's present offense and prior record.
270. Id. at 44.
271. See, e.g., Thomas & Cage, supra note 253, at 244.
272. See id.:
[Tihe levels of association between both general types of predictor variables
and case disposition are weak to moderate. This suggests that no single factor
exerts a major independent influence on judicial decisions. Given the philosophy of the juvenile court system, this finding might be interpreted as quite
positive in the sense that it could imply that judges consider a broad spectrum of both legal and social variables in their attempt to individualize
decisions. On the other hand, these findings also suggest the possibility that
those who share various social characteristics will be treated in a signifi-
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The adoption of an offense-based matrix could contribute to rationalization of the dispositional decisionmaking process. At present,
since waiver is discretionary and may occur only after an extensive
record has accumulated, a court has no initial incentive to intervene
in the life of serious offenders. The lack of relationship between offense and disposition means that a serious offender could receive
probation repeatedlyY3 An offense-based matrix, by contrast, imposes a finite outer limit on the length of juvenile court jurisdiction
and places both the youth and the court on notice that continued
criminal involvement will eventually lead to prosecution as an adult.
For example, both the court and the youthful offender would be
aware the first time a youth is convicted of an aggravated offense
against the person that a repetition will result in adult prosecution.
Knowing this, the court presumably would maximize its intervention
in order to avoid the subsequent adult consequences. A similar impetus would exist in the case of any youth with several felony convictions. As noted earlier, the proposed matrix encompasses virtually all
youths presently certified as serious offenders, but it identifies them
at an earlier point in their delinquent careers than does the present
discretionary practice.24 The net effect would be an increased focus
on the serious juvenile offender because courts would be encouraged
to pay greater attention to the offense and to maximize their intervention in the lives of youths whose records otherwise suggest a limited future within the juvenile court.
The preceding discussion of dispositional decisionmaking assesses some systemic changes that could occur in response to the
adoption of an offense-based matrix. It would be necessary to evaluate and monitor the system to determine whether these changes actually occur. If they do, it will be necessary periodically to readjust
the categories included in the certification matrix to reflect changes
in current operations. If the various dispositional decisionmakers-police, intake, and the court-begin to respond earlier and more
cantly different fashion from those drawn from other categories in the popu-

lation; those against whom complaints are filed by one type of complainant
will be treated differently than those who have engaged in comparable behavior, but whose offense has been brought to the attention of social control
agencies by a different complainant; and those who come before one judge
will be disposed of differently than those who appear before another judge,
regardless of who they are or what their present and past offense record might
be.
273.

A study in Hennepin County of serious juvenile offenders reported that more

than eighty percent of these youths were placed on probation at least once and that
thirty percent had been on probation from four to ten times. See HENNUIN CoUNTY
STUDY, supra note 9, at 12-13.
274. See notes 214-17 supra and accompanying text.
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formally to serious offenders than they do now, it will be necessary
to adjust upward the number of offenses in the matrix categories.
This upward adjustment is required since the matrix is designed to
address the problem of the serious and repetitive offender. A youth
fitting the present matrix criteria will probably have had extensive
hidden delinquencies, a number of police contacts, intake adjustments, or court adjudications without findings before compiling a
record warranting exclusion under the matrix. If the system begins
to respond formally to these offenders at an earlier point in their
careers, it may be necessary to modify the matrix accordingly.
B.

LAWYERS IN JUVENILE COURTS

The influence of an offense-based matrix may engender systemic
changes other than those involving criteria for dispositional decisionmaking. Specifically, the adoption of an offense-based matrix has
implications for the adversariness of juvenile court litigation, the
burden of proof and legal outcomes in juvenile trials, and the role of
counsel in such proceedings.
1. Burden of Proof and ProsecutorialDecisionmaking
As has been suggested, fundamental differences in the operational philosophies of the adult and juvenile courts translate into
differing administrative practices and procedures. The Supreme
Court's concern in McKeiver v. Pennsylvanias that the imposition
of jury trials would detract from the flexibility and informality of
juvenile court proceedings is an acknowledgment of one aspect of this
difference.26 Similarly, the difference is reflected in the fact that
attorneys functioning in a legal system that serves benevolent as well
as punitive goals are likely to view their role somewhat differently
from attorneys acting within the adult criminal justice system.2 71
275. 403 U.S. 528 (1970).
276. The Court cautioned that "[tihere is a possibility, at least, that the jury
trial, if required as a matter of constitutional precept, will remake the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary process and will put an effective end to what has been the
idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding." Id. at 545.
277. See, e.g., Kay & Segal, The Role of the Attorney in Juvenile Court Proceedings: A Non-PolarApproach, 61 GEo. L.J. 1401, 1410 (1973):
In adult criminal trials [the obligation to represent a client "zealously
within the bounds of the law"] demands that, within the bounds of professional ethics, the lawyer use all his skill and resources in order to establish
his client's innocence. It is not at all clear that the attorney is under a similar
duty to work as single-mindedly against a finding of delinquency for his
client in juvenile proceedings.
The differences in attorney roles are attributed to the more clearly adversary nature
of adult proceedings, institutional pressures that reinforce the more cooperative pro-
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These and other differences in the operation of the two systems of
justice notwithstanding, however, the Supreme Court in In Re
Winshipns indicated that the same standard of proof is required to
convict a juvenile of an offense that would be a crime if committed
by an adult as to convict an adult similarly charged. 9 The Court's
rationale was that the seriousness of the proceedings and the potential consequences for the defendant require the highest standard of
proof in both contexts in order to avoid convicting innocent people.21
The requirement of comparable standards of proof seemed logically to portend that prosecutors, in deciding what charges to bring,
would treat juveniles and adults alike, given similar facts. In
McKeiver, however, the Court appears to have undermined this expectation when it refused to extend the constitutional right to a jury
2
trial to juvenile court proceedings.

1'

In McKeiver, the Court held that the only requirement for
"fundamental fairness" in juvenile court proceedings is "accurate
factfinding" and reasoned that this requirement could be as well
satisfied by a judge as by a jury.282 But in suggesting that nothing
more than accurate factfinding was required to satisfy the requirements of due process in the juvenile context, the Court departed
significantly from its own prior analysis of the dual function of procedures in juvenile court adjudications,2 for earlier decisions actually
cess of the juvenile court, the more serious consequences that follow adult convictions,
and basic differences in adult and juvenile client characteristics. See id.
278. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
279. See id. at 365.
280. The Court reasoned that the reasonable doubt standard plays a fundamen-

tal role in American criminal procedure:
It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual
error. The standard provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence-that bedrock "axiomatic and elementary" principle whose
"enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal
law."...
The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has this vital role
in our criminal procedure for cogent reasons. The accused during a criminal
prosecution has at stake interests of immense importance, both because of
the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of
the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction ....
Moreover, use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in application of the

criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be
diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent
men are condemned.
Id. at 363-64 (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)); see id. at 368
(Harlan, J., concurring).
281. 403 U.S. at 545.

282. Id. at 543.
283. See, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528-31 (1975); In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 363 (1970). See generally The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 I-IRv. L. REv.
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appear to have been premised on two rationales-accurate factfinding and protection against governmental oppression. '
Thus, in its preoccupation with the impact of jury trials on the
informality and flexibility of juvenile court proceedings,2 the Court
failed to acknowledge the protective functions that juries serve beyond the accuracy of their factual findings."' The jury is the carrier
38, 118 (1971); Comment, ConstitutionalLaw-Due Process:No ConstitutionalRight
to Trial by Jury for Juveniles in Delinquency Proceedings,56 MINN. L. Rv. 249, 257
(1971).
284. This dual function of procedures was clearly recognized, for example, by the
Supreme Court in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), when it held, inter alia, that juveniles
must be accorded the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination in connection with juvenile court adjudications of delinquency. See id. at 55. If the Court in
Gault had been concerned solely with the reliability of juvenile confessions and the
accuracy of fact finding, safeguards other than the fifth amendment privilege-for
example, a requirement that all confessions be shown to have been made voluntarily-would have sufficed. See id. at 75-78 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). The Court, however, recognized that fifth amendment safeguards were not
required simply to ensure accurate fact finding or reliable confessions, but to serve as
a fundamental bulwark of the adversary system and a means of maintaining a balance
between the individual and the state:
The privilege against self-incrimination is, of course, related to the question of the safeguards necessary to assure that admissions or confessions are
reasonably trustworthy, that they are not the mere fruits of fear or coercion,
but are reliable expressions of the truth. The roots of the privilege are,
however, far deeper. They tap the basic stream of religious and political
principle because the privilege reflects the limits of the individual's attornment to the state and-in a philosophical sense-insists upon the equality
of the individual and the state. In other words, the privilege has a broader
and deeper thrust than the rule which prevents the use of confessions which
are the product of coercion because coercion is thought to carry with it the
danger of unreliability. One of its purposes is to prevent the state, whether
by force or by psychological domination, from overcoming the mind and will
of the person under investigation and depriving him of the freedom to decide
whether to assist the state in securing his conviction.
It would be entirely unrealistic to carve out of the Fifth Amendment all
statements by juveniles on the grounds that these cannot lead to "criminal"
involvement. In the first place, juvenile proceedings to determine
"delinquency," which may lead to commitment to a state institution, must
be regarded as "criminal" for purpbses of the privilege against selfincrimination. . . . [C]ommitment is a deprivation of liberty. It is incarceration against one's will, whether it is called "criminal" or "civil."
Id. at 47-50 (footnotes omitted).
285. 403 U.S. at 550.
286. By contrast, in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), the Court, in
holding that jury trials were constitutionally required in state criminal proceedings,
had clearly acknowledged that the rationale for juries involved more than accurate fact
finding which could be accomplished without providing a jury. See id. at 149 n.14.
The Court concluded that in an Anglo-American system of criminal jurisprudence,
factual accuracy was not determinative of fundamental fairness. After reviewing the
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of the community's norms and functions as a barrier between the
state and the defendant. When judges and juries differ about the
outcome of a trial, juries are more likely to acquit than are judges.27
This tendency is attributable to basic differences in jury-judge evaluations of evidence, as well as to such factors as jury sentiments about
the "law" (jury equity) and jury sympathy for the defendant.
One of the most significant functions of juries is to uphold the
reasonable doubt standard. 288 After accounting for other sources of
disagreement, it appears that juries employ a higher evidentiary
threshold standard of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" than do
judges.29 As Kalven and Zeisel conclude, "If a society wishes to be
serious about convicting only when the state has been put to proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, it would be well advised to have a jury
system." 9 ' Given the importance of juries in this regard, the Supreme
Court's decision in McKeiver to dispense with juries in juvenile court
can be seen as rendering it somewhat easier to convict a youth appearing before a judge in juvenile court than to convict him on the
basis of the same evidence before a jury of detached citizens in an
adult proceeding. 2 ' Thus, McKeiver appears to undercut the Court's
mandate in Winship that the same standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required in both juvenile and adult
proceedings.
The difference between "judge-reasonable doubt" and "juryreasonable doubt," coupled with the greater flexibility and informality of the juryless closed proceedings in juvenile court, may produce
some important differences between juvenile and adult prosecutors'
evaluations of cases and may result in adjudicatory outcomes in juvenile court that could not be obtained in corresponding adult proceedhistory of the right to jury trial, the Court justified requiring states to provide juries
"in order to prevent oppression by the Government. . . .Providing an accused with
the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against
the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric
judge." Id. at 155-56.
It is instructive to compare the Court's reasoning in McKeiver with that of the
Alaska Supreme Court in R.L.R. v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971) (holding that the
state constitution required jury trials in juvenile court because of the protective buffer
they provide between the individual and the state).
287. See, e.g., H. KALvEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AmERicAN JuRY (1971).
288. See id. at 182, 185-90.
289. See id.
290. Id. at 189-90.
291. Kalven and Zeisel found that one characteristic eliciting jury sympathy was
the youthfulness of the defendant. While their research was confined to adult proceedings, they concluded that in that context the youth of a defendant was the personal
characteristic that engendered the greatest jury sympathy. See id. at 209-13. This

finding buttresses the conclusion that it is easier to obtain convictions in juvenile court
without a jury than in adult proceedings with one.
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ings. For example, the difference between charging a simple assault, 9 ' a misdemeanor, and an aggravated assault, 3 a felony, is the
factual difference between "bodily harm ' 294 and "great bodily
'
To the extent that the reasonable doubt standard is lower
harm."295
for judges than for juries, a juvenile might be convicted of an aggravated assault in juvenile court on the basis of facts and circumstances
that would produce only a conviction of simple assault in an adult
proceeding.
An offense-exclusion matrix, however, may encourage greater
equality in prosecutorial decisionmaking and in adjudication outcomes. For example, aggravated assault is one of the offenses for
which a youth could be excluded by the legislative matrix, whereassimple assault is an offense that remains within the juvenile court's
original and exclusive jurisdiction. Prosecutors evaluating a case and
deciding whether to issue a complaint that excludes a youth from
juvenile court jurisdiction must also assess the probability of obtaining a conviction if the case is tried before a jury in adult court. If a
juvenile prosecutor fails to evaluate correctly whether the evidence is
sufficient to satisfy the reasonable doubt of a jury, the adult prosecuting authority may refer the case back with the notation, "not sufficient evidence to take this case before a jury." The adult authorities
are likely to be reluctant to spend prosecutorial time and resources
on cases that will ultimately result in convictions for nonexcluded,
lesser offenses, which will require that the case be transferred back
to the juvenile court for disposition. Consequently, under the matrix,
juvenile prosecutors would have to become more cognizant of adult
charging standards and jury-reasonable doubt evidentiary standards
in order to apply them to cases subject to adult prosecution. Cases
initially referred to the adult court for prosecution but transferred
back to the juvenile court for insufficient evidence or because of convictions for lesser included offenses would educate juvenile prosecutors about adult case evaluations and charging standards and would
thus promote greater parity in the legal decisions made by prosecutors in both systems.
2.

Juvenile Court Litigation and Plea Bargaining

A second, indirect effect of adoption of the matrix could be to
encourage a more aggressive defense of the legal interests of juveniles
by their attorneys. Because exclusion from juvenile court jurisdiction
292.

See MINN. STAT. § 609.22 (1976).

293. See id. § 609.225.
294. See id. § 609.02(7).
295. See id. § 609.02(8).
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under the matrix is based on the present offense and the prior record,
a juvenile's every contact with the system acquires greater significance. Since one or more felony convictions will trigger automatic
exclusion for adult prosecution under the matrix, defense attorneys
have a strong incentive to be vigorous advocates for their clients.
Moreover, as a youth's prior record of even nonserious felonies accumulates, the imperative to resist each additional conviction increases
correspondingly.
To some extent, an increased emphasis on adversariness represents a departure from present practices. Professional cooptation and
informal accommodation to the system tend to reduce the aggressiveness of many defense attorneys.21 Lawyers appearing regularly in
juvenile court may have a greater stake in maintaining their relationships with the prosecutors and with the court and its personnel than
they do in representing their own clients.211 Aside from bureaucratic
pressures, an attorney's cooperative attitude is fostered by the perceived lack of consequences of juvenile court adjudications since most
offenders receive probation. A matrix may change this by increasing
296.

The cooptation of defense attorneys in the adult criminal process has been

described in Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence Game: Organizational
Cooptationof a Profession, 1 LAw & Soc'y Rav. 15 (1967). Blumberg argues that certain
institutional pressures and the need to maintain stable cooperative relationships with
other personnel in the system are inconsistent with effective advocacy and an adversary position. Defense attorneys are involved in on-going relations with prosecutors and
judges and become dependent on their cooperation. Similarly, prosecutors and the
court depend on defense attorneys to cooperate in order to expedite a large volume of
cases. The result is a system of informal relationships in which maintaining organizational stability may become more important than the representation of any given
client.
The same analysis has been applied to the role of attorneys in juvenile court. See,
e.g., A. PLATT, supra note 3, at 163-75. See generally Duffee & Siegel, The Organization
Man: Legal Counsel in the Juvenile Court, 7 CalM. L. BULL. 544 (1971); Platt &
Friedman, The Limits of Advocacy: OccupationalHazardsin Juvenile Court, 116 U.
PA. L. Rav. 1156 (1968); Platt, Schechter, & Tiffany, In Defense of Youth: A Case
Study of the PublicDefender in Juvenile Court, 43 IND. L.J. 619 (1968). Other studies
have questioned whether lawyers can actually perform as adversaries in a system
rooted in parens patriae and benevolent rehabilitation. See, e.g., V. STPLErON & L.
TEITELBAUM, IN DEFENSE OF YOUTH (1972); Lefstein, Stapleton, & Teitelbaum, In
Search of Juvenile Justice: Gault and Its Implementation, 3 LAW & Soc'v Rav. 491
(1969); Lemert, Legislating Change in the Juvenile Court, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 421.
297. See, e.g., A. PLATr, supra note 3, at 165; Blumberg, supra note 296.
Platt notes that lawyers are generally more inclined to extend themselves for
"good kids." He suggests that an attorney decides whether a client is "good" or "bad"
on the basis of "criteria which positively indicate moral and social propriety. 'Badness'
is a residual category applied to clients who do not meet these wholesome criteria. His
decision relies primarily upon the demeanor of his client and secondarily upon the
demeanor of his client's parents." A. PLATT, supra note 3, at 168-69 (footnotes omitted). Reliance on demeanor as a decisionmaking criterion pervades the juvenile justice
system. See, e.g., Bittner, supra note 242; Emerson, supra note 162, at 636-37.
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the significance of each felony adjudication. Because of the cumulative impact of felony convictions, juvenile court practitioners will
have to be an effective adversary with respect to every felony, regardless of the probable disposition.
Similarly, the increased significance of each conviction may subject the plea bargaining process in juvenile court to greater constraints, controls, and supervision. Under the present practice, there
is no necessary relationship between the offense for which a juvenile
pleads or is adjudicated a delinquent and the ultimate disposition.
As a consequence, there is a relatively cavalier attitude on the part
of prosecutors and defense attorneys in plea bargaining, since an
admission of even one offense provides the court with all the legal
authority it needs for maximum intervention. Where each offense
now acquires independent significance as part of the prior record
within the matrix, prosecutors may be less inclined to dismiss some
charges in return for admissions on others. Similarly, defense attorneys may be less willing to allow their clients to admit to charges.
With increased significance now attached to each offense, the inability to strike deals as readily may foster a greater degree of adversariness both in negotiation and ultimately in litigation.
C.

DETERRENCE

Deterrence or general prevention is the restraining influence that
punishment of an offender has on other potential offenders.9 8 In addition to the overt compliance resulting from the threat of punishment,
the imposition of sanctions also has a moralizing, educating, and
socializing influence on others by expressing societal condemnation
of the prohibited acts and reinforcing habitual conformity.3" Within
the juvenile court, the elevation of rehabilitation over the other justifications for punishment has tended to undermine the general preventive effects of coercive intervention by characterizing dispositions
as treatment rather than sanctions, by preventing the communication of the threat of punishment to other potential offenders because
of closed proceedings and restricted publicity, and by individualizing
disposition, thereby, reducing any certainty of application of sanc298. See, e.g., Andenaes, General Prevention Revisited: Research and Policy
Implications, 66 J. CanM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 338, 341-43 (1975). See generally J. GraBS,
CmpuE, PUNISHMENT, AND DETERENcE (1975); F. ZIuWNG, PERSPECTIVES ON DurERREncE
(Public Health Service Pub. No. 2056, 1971); F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENcE-THE LEGAL THREAT iN CreME CONTROL (1973).
299. See, e.g., Andenaes, supranote 298, at 341; Andenaes, The Moral or Educative Influence of CriminalLaw, 27 J. Soc. IssuEs 17 (1971); Hawkins, Punishmentand
Deterrence: The Educative, Moralizing, and HabituativeEffects, 1969 Wis. L. REv.
550.
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tions and obscuring any relationship between an act and its consequences. As faith in the rehabilitative ideal has declined, there has
been an enormous upsurge of interest and research in the preventive
effects of punishment 3 ® Although a review of these studies is beyond
the scope of this Article, some of their insights are relevant to this
discussion.
With the exception of the research findings on capital punishment,3"' the research supports the intuitively obvious proposition that
penal sanctions and the threat of imprisonment have a deterrent
300. See, e.g., Andenaes, Deterrence and Specific Offenses; 38 U. CHi. L. REv.
537 (1971); Andenaes, Does PunishmentDeter Crime?, 11 CraM. L.Q. 77 (1968); Andenaes, The General PreventiveEffects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 949 (1966);
Antunes & Hunt, The DeterrentImpact of CriminalSanctions: Some Implicationsfor
CriminalJustice Policy, 51 J. URB. L. 145 (1973); Antunes & Hunt, The Impact of
Certainty and Severity of Punishment on Levels of Crime in American States: An
Extended Analysis, 64 J. CraM. L. & CRmuNoLoGY 486 (1973); Bailey & Smith,
Punishment: Its Severity and Certainty, 63 J. Ca. L.C. & P.S. 530 (1972); Becker,
Crime and Punishment:An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECoN. 169 (1968); Buikhuisen, General Deterrence: Research and Theory, 14 ABSTRACTS CRIMiNOLOGY &
PENOLOGY 285 (1974); Chambliss, The DeterrentInfluence of Punishment, 12 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 70 (1966); Chambliss, Types of Deviance and the Effectiveness of Legal
Sanctions, 1967 Wis. L. Rxv. 703; Chauncey, Deterrence: Certainty, Severity, and
Skyjacking, 12 CRIonNOLOG 447 (1975); Chiricos & Waldo, Punishmentand Crime: An
Examination of Some Empirical Evidence, 18 Soc. PROB. 200 (1970); Erickson &
Gibbs, Further Findings on the Deterrence Question and Strategies for Future
Research, 4 J. CRiM. JUST. 175 (1976); Gibbs, Crime, Punishment, and Deterrence,48
Sw. Soc. Sci. Q. 515 (1968); Logan, GeneralDeterrentEffects of Imprisonment,51 Soc.
FORCES 64 (1972); Schwartz, The Effect in Philadelphiaof Pennsylvania'sIncreased
Penalties for Rape and Attempted Rape, 59 J. Cam. L.C. & P.S. 509 (1968); Tittle,
Crime Rates and Legal Sanctions, 16 Soc. PRos. 409 (1969); Tittle & Logan, Sanctions
and Deviance: Evidence and Remaining Questions, 7 LAw & Soc'Y Rrv. 371 (1973);
Tittle & Rowe, Certainty of Arrest and Crime Rates: A FurtherTest of the Deterrence
Hypothesis, 52 Soc. FORCES 455 (1974); Tittle & Rowe, Moral Appeal, Sanction,
Threat, and Devianc':An Experimental Test, 20 Soc. PROB. 488 (1973); sources cited
notes 298-99 supra.
301. See, e.g., Forst, The DeterrentEffect of CapitalPunishment:A Cross-State
Analysis of the 1960's, 61 MINN. L. REv. 743 (1977); Schuessler, The DeterrentInfluence of the Death Penalty, ANNALS, November 1952, at 54; Zimring, Eigen, &
O'Malley, Punishing Homicide in Philadelphia:Perspectiveson the Death Penalty, 43
U. Cm. L. REv. 227 (1976).
The most conspicuous research purporting to find that capital punishment has a
deterrent effect is that of Isaac Ehrlich. See Ehrlich, Deterrence: Evidence and
Inference, 85 YmxE L.J. 209 (1975); Ehrlich, The DeterrentEffect of CapitalPunishment: A Question of Life and Death, 65 AM. ECON. REv. 397 (1975). The research
reporting such a deterrent effect, however, has been strongly challenged on both methodological and substantive grounds. See, e.g., Baldus & Cole, A Comparisonof the
Work of Thorsten Sellin and Isaac Ehrlich on the Deterrent Effect of Capital
Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 170 (1975); Bowers & Pierce, The Illusion of Deterrence in
Isaac Ehrlich'sResearch on Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 187 (1975); Passell, The
Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty:A Statistical Test, 28 STAN. L. REv. 61 (1975).
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effect on potential offenders. While the amount of prevention differs
by offense, there is generally an inverse relationship between frequency of sanctions and crime rates. Although the classical deterrence paradigm was formulated in terms of swiftness, certainty, and
severity of punishment, most research suggests that certainty of punishment is the primary source of preventive restraint:"' "With regard
to certainty of punishment the research up to now, seen in its totality,
has given support to the common sense assumption that increased
certainty of sanction will tend to reduce the amount of crime.""3 3 The
certainty of punishment has to be credible before this effect appears,
however, suggesting a minimum threshold of certainty below which
the threat of punishment may be inefficacious.-" Research on the
effect of severity of sanctions is more equivocal. When sanctions are
already severe, increasing the penalty still further apparently has
little marginal influence.0 5 Moreover, the effect of penal severity may
be mediated by the certainty of punishment, so that until the certainty is credible, the independent influence of severity may be reduced. As the level of certainty increases, however, the degree of
severity may decrease with relatively little loss of preventive effect.",
Although virtually all of the deterrence research involves analyses of adult statistics, adolescents may well be as responsive as their
elders to a realistic threat of punishment. Psychological research concerning legal socialization indicates that youngsters move through a
developmental sequence of stages of cognitive functioning with respect to legal reasoning, internalization of social and legal expectations, and ethical decisionmaking. 7 This developmental sequence is
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

See, e.g., Gibbs, supra note 300; Tittle, supra note 300.
Andenaes, supra note 298, at 362.
See, e.g., Tittle & Rowe, supra note 300.
See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 300.
See, e.g., Bailey & Smith, supra note 300.

[Tihe research suggests that very long prison sentences give a small payoff.... It seems likely that increasing severity yields diminishing returns
and that a given number of prison years will produce more by way of general
prevention if distributed as short sentences to a greater number of offenders
rather than as long sentences to a small number of offenders.
Andenaes, supra note 298, at 362.

307. Developmental psychology describes and explains changes that occur in
human behavior as a result of maturation and experience. See generally
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 5 (1971). Although there are several theories of

psychological and moral development, the one most relevant to this discussion is
cognitive-development theory. See generally R. BROWN, SOCAL PSYCHOLOGY 350-414

(1965); Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-DevelopmentalApproach to
Socialization,in HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATON THEORY AND RESEARCH 347 (D. Goslin ed.
1969). This theory of psychological development assumes that an individual's cognitive
structure or coding process intervenes between environmental stimulus and individual
response. The cognitive structure undergoes changes over time as a result of an individ-
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strikingly parallel to the imputations of responsibility associated with
the common law infancy defense," 8 indicating that by about age fourual's interactions with his environment. See id. at 348. Changes'in coding processes
reflect new ways of ordering and interpreting information rather than cumulative
increases in knowledge. Essential to this theory is the concept of a sequence of development. Coding processes differ at each stage of development, and every succeeding stage
builds upon and conceptually reorganizes the stage preceding it.
Stage and structure are core concepts of the moral development position. Each stage represents a qualitatively different organization of thought,
not a set of specific beliefs. Cognitive structures are the rules for processing
information, i.e., connecting experiences. Stages, basically ideal-typological
constructs, represent different psychological organizations of thought. The
order of the stages is always the same. Culture may accelerate or retard
movement through the stages but not change the quality or order. While
movement through all the developmental stages is not inevitable, each stage
is characterized by increasing differentiation and integration, extending the
individual's ability to resolve conflicts. In sum, this cognitive stage model is
characterized by a distinctive response form in modes of thinking; situational generality; stage consistency across core. aspects or categories; differentiative and integrative hierarchical functioning; invariant sequence; and
a sequential rate only affected by environmental conditions . ...
Tapp & Kohlberg, Developing Senses of Law and Legal Justice, in LAw, JUSTICE, AND
THE INDIVIDUAL INSociory 90 (J. Tapp & F. Levine eds. 1977). Among other behavioral

developments, cognitive theory is concerned with the ways in which individuals learn
to make ethical choices and acquire and internalize legal values. See id. Much of the
contemporary research on cognitive development and legal socialization is based on
the moral developmental theories of Piaget. See generally J. PIAGur, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CILD (1932). An excellent introduction to this literature may be found
in Tapp & Levine, Legal Socialization: Strategies for an Ethical Legality, 27 STAN. L.
REv. 1 (1974). Piaget posited three periods in the development of a child's sense of
justice: an initial conformity to the dictates of adult authority, followed by the development of autonomy, and, finally, the development of a feeling of equity. See J.
PjAGEr, supra at 314-25. See generally id. at 224-31. Each stage reflects a different
orientation toward the nature, source, and purpose of rules, the observance of rules,
and the proper punishment for their violation. See Tapp & Levine, supra at 12-13.
Researchers following in this developmental tradition have refined the steps in the
progression, but have confirmed a sequence of stages of moral reasoning from simple
to more complex. See generally Kohlberg, supra at 375-89; Tapp & Kohlberg, supra.
208. Crimes consist of socially harmful actions accompanied by the requisite
state of mind. See J. HALT, GENERAL PouNcIPLEs OF CRu&MAL LAw (2d ed. 1960). Since

criminal liability is premised on rational actors who make blameworthy choices and
are responsible for the consequences of their acts, the common law recognized and
exempted from punishment categories of persons who lacked the requisite moral and
criminal responsibility. Children less than seven years of age were conclusively presumed to be without criminal capacity, while those fourteen years of age and older were
treated as fully responsible. Between the ages of seven and fourteen years, there was a
rebuttable presumption of criminal incapacity. See, e.g., W. LAFAvE & A. ScoT,
CamunAL LAw 351 (1972); Fox, Responsibility in the Juvenile Court, 11 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 659 (1969); Platt & Diamond, The Origins of the "Right and Wrong" Test of
Criminal Responsibility and Its Subsequent Development in the United States: An
HistoricalSurvey, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1227 (1966); Westbrook, Mens Rea In the Juvenile
Court, 5 J. FAm. L. 121 (1965). The doctrine that children below the age of seven are
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teen a youth has acquired most of the legal and moral values and
reasoning capacity that will guide his behavior through later life." '
There is, therefore, reason to assume that the deterrence research
indicating a preventive influence has applicability for adolescents as
well as for adults.
Although the conjunction of adult deterrence research and studies of cognitive development indicates that youths may respond to a
threat of punishment having enough certainty to be credible, the
juvenile court as an institution has virtually ignored its potential role
in achieving that credibility. Sanctions imposed in juvenile court are
defined as treatment rather than punishment, addressed to what the
offender needs rather than what he did, and administered so as to
prevent the communication of the threat to its relevant audienceother potential juvenile offenders. The unwillingness to acknowledge explicitly that one purpose of juvenile court intervention is
social control has seriously detracted from the potential deterrent
effect that such intervention might have. By insisting that it is not
punishing a juvenile, the court virtually eliminates the word "threat"
from its vocabulary, and closed and confidential proceedings with
individualized dispositions limit the communication of whatever
threat of punishment may remain.
Perhaps more significantly, the juvenile court may actually give
misleading messages to the youths who appear before it. Juveniles are
brought before the court for committing crimes. Recognizing that
they have "done wrong," their reasonable expectation is that unpleasant consequences will follow. Instead of punishment, however,
the court's intervention is defined as treatment, thus introducing a
degree of confusion in the child's mind. 10 If, despite committing a
conclusively presumed incapable of crime and those below the age of fourteen are
rebuttably presumed to be incapable of crime has continuing validity despite the
development of the juvenile court and its departure from common law concepts of
crime. Juvenile court jurisdiction based on delinquency requires a consideration of the
child's capacity to commit a crime. See, e.g., In re Gladys R., 1 Cal. 3d 855, 464 P.2d
127, 83 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1970); In re Winburn, 32 Wis. 2d 152, 145 N.W.2d 178 (1966).
309. The research findings of Kohlberg and others reporting an agedevelopmental sequence of legal socialization, see note 307 supra, correspond closely
to the ages recognized in the common law infancy defense, see note 308 supra. Although individuals may progress through a developmental sequence at different rates,
most children of a particular age will tend to use similar types of cognitive processes
in legal reasoning. See Kohlberg, The Development of Children's OrientationsToward
a Moral Order, 6 VrrA HUMANA 11 (1963). By the age of fourteen, most people employ
the same or nearly the same level of moral reasoning as they will as adults. See id. at
16. Surveying these findings, Tapp notes that "crystallization occurs during the adolescent years and . . . substantial consistency is demonstrated during adulthood."
Tapp, Psychology and the Law: An Overture, 27 ANN.REv. PSYcH. 359, 374 (1976).
310. As Matza notes, "[e]veryone is encouraged to believe that the basis of
disposition is individualized justice. Thus, whenever a glimmering appears that this
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crime, a child is "treated" rather than punished because he is
"dependent and immature," the court may actually reinforce the
irresponsible behavior it is attempting to prevent. If the treatment
is only a nominal intervention that the child perceives as inconsequential, it may foster disrespect for the court and the laws it attempts to uphold. Conversely, if the sanction is severe enough to be
perceived as unpleasant, then the child may regard the court as hypocritical, disguising punishment with claims of benevolence.
Judicial waiver practices have contributed to the erosion of the
deterrence associated with the imposition of criminal sanctions.
There can be no degree of certainty in a discretionary certification
system since every decision is necessarily individualized. A youth
may appear in juvenile court on numerous occasions, and there is no
way to anticipate whether the next appearance will produce yet another juvenile disposition or a waiver proceeding. Indeed, many
waived youths have been the subjects of previous, unsuccessful certification proceedings.
The legislative matrix introduces a measure of certainty into the
process. Both the youth and the court can reliably predict the consequences of serious and persistent behavior. Upon a youth's first felony
conviction, he could receive a copy of the matrix and the admonition
that repetition can automatically result in adult prosecution. Moreover, the certainty and predictability of legislative waiver, coupled
with the initial publicity associated with trial as an adult rather than
as a juvenile, may convey the message to potential offenders that they
too are in jeopardy if they persist in their delinquencies.
V.

CONCLUSION

The retention of serious and persistent juvenile offenders within
the juvenile justice system challenges the fundamental rehabilitative
premises of juvenile justice. Removing these individuals from the
juvenile system for prosecution as adults, however, raises equally
difficult questions of both procedure and substance: who decides
which juveniles to prosecute as adult offenders, and on what substantive and evidentiary bases? Ultimately, the issue is one of discretion:
who shall exercise it and on what basis. Although both present waiver
alternatives-judicial and legislative-suffer from conceptual and
administrative deficiencies, the defects of legislative exclusion can be
remedied, whereas those of judicial waiver cannot. Accordingly, this
Article proposes that the discretionary value choices be made by the
legislature.
is not a basis for decision, the stage is set for the imputation of hypocrisy, favoritism,
or whimsical inconsistency." D. MATZA, supra note 245, at 133.
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Under a judicial waiver system, youths are designated for adult
prosecution on the basis of a juvenile court judge's assessment as to
their amenability to treatment or dangerousness. Unfortunately, judicial waiver statutes requiring judges to identify the amenable or
dangerous necessitate the asking of questions that cannot be answered. There is no clinical basis on which a judge can reliably predict whether a youth will respond to a particular form of treatment.
Similarly, there is no clinical basis on which a judge can reliably
predict whether a particular youth will be dangerous. But the problem is more than just an inability to answer the questions that the
legislature poses. Within the broad discretionary framework, a variety of abuses occur. Standardless discretion results in discrimination.
Within an individualized justice framework, in which decisions are
based on multiple criteria, there is virtually no way to prevent this
from occurring. And in this society, discretionary, discriminatory
judgments bear disproportionately and unfairly on the disadvantaged.
On the basis of the available social science research, it appears
that legislative waiver-a form of actuarial prediction-can provide
a more reliable basis for making judgments about future conduct and
a more just and more easily administered method for deciding which
youths to prosecute as adults. Using a legislative waiver system, it is
possible to exclude from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court those
relatively few juveniles who are exceptionally sophisticated on a rational and legally defensible basis-their present offense and prior
record. By focusing on the seriousness and persistence of a youth's
delinquent career, a legislature can differentiate between the hardcore offenders and the vast majority of juveniles who are unlikely to
repeat and who are therefore appropriately handled by the juvenile
court. By stressing the more objective records rather than subjective,
impressionistic clinical factors, juveniles can be separated on a basis
that avoids many of the dangers of abuse of discretion and discrimination inherent in judicial sorting.
In terms of the concerns addressed in this Article, legislative
exclusion as currently practiced suffers from two defects, both of
which can be corrected. The first problem, that of prosecutorial overcharging, can be remedied by divesting the juvenile court of jurisdiction on the basis of final convictions rather than initial charges. The
second defect, the tendency of legislative waiver statutes to exclude
all serious first offenders rather than focus on the chronic repeat
offender, can be remedied by expressly acknowledging past misconduct as the best indicator of future misconduct and by stipulating
that prior record be considered as a factor in any waiver determination. The specific combinations of present offense and prior record
that warrant exclusion are ultimately legislative value judgments.
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This Article proposes a statute that addresses both of the deficiencies just mentioned. The suggested matrix incorporates various
combinations of present offense and prior record to identify serious
and persistent offenders and to maximize the differences between
these youths and other delinquents. It attempts to balance seriousness and persistence, recognizing that while persistence is the most
reliable basis for differentiation, the seriousness of the misconduct of
some offenders may not always allow that luxury. In every case, however, the matrix requires some indication of recidivism before a youth
is waived. Thus, regardless of the present offense, a youth must have
been previously convicted of an offense that would have been a felony
if committed by an adult to warrant adult prosecution. The requirement of a prior serious offense underscores the belief advanced in this
Article that only the serious offender who is likely to repeat should
properly be excluded from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
Beyond providing a rational basis for discriminating between
juvenile and adult offenders, the proposed matrix may also foster a
number of desirable changes in the administration of other components of the juvenile justice system. The requirement of a prior felony
conviction could significantly influence dispositional decisionmaking
by police officers, intake probation officers, and the juvenile court in
their handling of juvenile offenders. While the present criteria for
dispositional decisionmaking are not self-evident, bureaucratic defensiveness to avoid scandal may increase the significance of the
offense as a dispositional factor. This would rationalize the decisionmaking process, maximize intervention with the serious offender, and
reinforce the dual-track structure of juvenile justice.
Increasing the emphasis placed on the offense could have salutary consequences for lawyers practicing in juvenile court by reducing
the acceptability of accommodation and compromise in the representation of youthful clients. Given the present lack of connection between what juveniles do and the dispositions they receive, attorneys
have little incentive to litigate every issue vigorously. The cumulative
impact of felony convictions could provide this incentive. The same
process could increase adversariness and provide a needed check on
plea bargaining practices.
In addition, the proposed legislation may foster more consistent
charging decisions by juvenile and adult prosecutors and, in so doing,
may ultimately contribute to a greater equality of result in juvenile
and adult proceedings. As a result of the requirement that youths who
are initially excluded under the matrix but whose convictions do not
warrant exclusion be returned to juvenile court, juvenile prosecutors
will become familiar with the standard of proof required in adult
proceedings and should learn to apply the same standard in evaluating juveniles subject to waiver.
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Perhaps most important, however, legislation that focuses attention on the offense rather than the offender may introduce a measure
of accountability for both the juvenile justice system and the juveniles it processes. The rehabilitative ideal has minimized the significance of the offense as a dispositional criterion. The emphasis on the
"best interests of the child" has weakened the connection between
what a person does and the consequences of that act on the theory
that the act is at best only symptomatic of real needs. Yet, in view
of its lack of success to date, it is highly questionable whether coercive intervention can meet real needs and rehabilitate. It is also questionable whether a legislature would gamble the enormous resources
that a real commitment to such an endeavor entails. Finally, it is
doubtful whether the standardless discretionary judgments associated with individualized treatment are compatible with equal justice and the rule of law. The results of efforts to treat offenders in the
absence of an effective change technology, in the face of inadequate
resources and a lack of social commitment to provide them, and
through a process that grants discretion with no rational, objective
basis for its exercise suggest that juveniles still receive the worst of
both worlds.
By contrast, a system of justice that responds to people on the
basis of what they do, rather than who someone else thinks they are,
or what someone else believes they need or predicts they will become,
can be held accountable by the community. A measure of proportionality and determinacy, and a relationship between the seriousness of
an act and its consequences, can be evaluated much more readily
than can confidential, individualized dispositions. Personnel within
the juvenile justice system are currently unaccountable because of a
lack of criteria for evaluation and a dearth of information about performance. Since they have no functional dispositional standards,
evaluations of their decisions founder in a morass of assumed individualized needs. Legislation like the proposed matrix can increase the
significance of the offense as a dispositional criterion, encourage intervention at the serious end of the spectrum, and provide an objective basis for evaluating the performance of decisionmakers.
Furthermore, a system of justice and social control that responds
explicitly to youthful offenders because of their antisocial behavior
rather than their perceived needs may instill an accountability on the
part of these youths that is currently lacking. By insisting that it is
treating the whole child, the present system may actually encourage
the conduct it seeks to prevent. Inconsequential sanctions may teach
children the rhetoric of determinacy, provide additional rationalizations to neutralize social obligations, and unwittingly undermine social norms by minimizing the seriousness of the offense and weakening the condemnation of criminal behavior. Harsh sanctions justified
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as treatment may foster perceptions of hypocrisy and further delegitimize legal institutions. On the other hand, holding people responsible for their misconduct and strengthening the relationship
between act and consequence may encourage responsible behavior
and foster accountability.
The juvenile court as an institution is currently at a crossroads.
The fundamental challenge to the rehabilitative ideal has not been
stilled by a modicum of due process since the failure is ultimately one
of substance, not procedure. The real issue of juvenile jurisprudence
is not due process hearings or lawyers. Rather, the question is whether
the modest successes of rehabilitation can continue to justify coercive
intervention, with its accompanying reliance on professional expertise and the exercise of a standardless discrition having little rational
basis. It is the question of whether individualized justice is compatible with the basic principle of equal justice under law. Whether the
juvenile court can reconcile its promise of rehabilitation with the rule
of law before the entire enterprise is abandoned is the yet unanswered
question.
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APPENDIX
A bill for an act
relating to corrections and juveniles; removing certain juveniles from
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court; amending Minnesota Statutes
1976, Sections 260.015, by adding a subdivision, 260.111, by adding
a subdivision, and 260.125, by repealing.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF
MINNESOTA:
Section 1. Minnesota Statutes 1976, Section 260.015, is
amended by adding a subdivision to read:
Subd. 5a. Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision 5, the
term "delinquent child" does not include a person who:
a) has attained the age of fourteen years; and
b) has been adjudicated to be delinquent after attaining the
age of fourteen years on the basis of conduct that would be a felony
if committed by an adult and is charged with murder in any degree;
or
c) has been adjudicated to be delinquent on two prior occasions
after attaining the age of fourteen years on the basis of conduct that
would be a felony if committed by an adult, or on one prior occasion
after attaining the age of fourteen years on the basis of conduct that,
if committed by an adult, would be murder in any degree or one of
the felonies listed herein, and is charged with manslaughter in the
first degree, arson in the first or second degree, criminal sexual conduct in the first or second degree, sodomy, aggravated assault, aggravated robbery, robbery, or kidnapping; or
d) has been adjudicated to be delinquent on three prior occasions after attaining the age of fourteen years on the basis of conduct
that would be a felony if committed by an adult, and is charged with
burglary; or
e) has been adjudicated to be delinquent on four prior occasions after attaining the age of fourteen years on the basis of conduct
that would be a felony if committed by an adult, and is charged with
any felony.
Notwithstanding any general or special law to the contrary, the
district court shall have original jurisdiction of persons described in
this subdivision.
Sec. 2. Minnesota Statutes 1976, Section 260.111, is amended
by adding a subdivision to read:
Subd. 3. No person described in section 260.015, subdivision
5a, who is convicted as an adult of any of the offenses enumerated
therein shall thereafter be subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court, provided, however, that any person described in subdivision 5a
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who is acquitted or, although charged with a felony, is convicted of a
lesser included offense not included in subdivision 5a, shall be subject
to juvenile court jurisdiction for disposition and for subsequent unlawful conduct other than that governed by subdivision 5a.
Sec. 3. Minnesota Statutes 1976, Section 260.125 is repealed.

